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Strategic Insights is a quarterly online journal published by the Center on Contemporary 
Conflict, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. 
 
We publish scholarly articles as well as viewpoints that address issues of current interest to 
the makers and executors of US national security policy. We are particularly interested in 
articles addressing homeland security, WMD/WME proliferation, regional conflict, and the 
contemporary role of US security forces. The journal seeks articles that will make our readers 
think, generate discussion, and gain new insight into the challenges and opportunities 
confronting US policymakers and military operators. Views that run counter to the 
conventional wisdom or official US government policy are welcomed. 
 












About the Cover 
 
The cover on this edition of Strategic Insights features the NATO sigil overlaid with Leonardo 
da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man. The original Vitruvian Man was designed by the Roman architect 
Vitruvius in an attempt to define artistic proportions for the human body. Da Vinci made 
adjustments to Vitruvius’s proportions, making them more accurate. Specifically, da Vinci 
realized that the circle and square that outline the limits of the man’s limbs do not have the 
same center: the center of the circle is the man’s navel, while the center of the square is 
somewhat lower. 
 
Here, the Vitruvian man stretches his arms to find the extent of his reach, just as NATO 
today is debating the extent of its mission. His arms reach in many directions, representing 
the many directions NATO has taken in its various operations around the world. The rays of 
the NATO star radiate from the center of the man, as the shared goals of the Alliance 
radiate from a shared history. Even so, the man does not occupy the center of the world; 
rather, he is a small part of a bigger world, to which he extends his hand. 
Foreword 
Winter 2011: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Editors 
 
Since the end of the Cold War 20 years ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has sought new 
roles in the world while facing existential questions about its purposes. The Allies have provided 
some answers to those questions in the 2010 Strategic Concept and other fundamental policy 
statements, and the Alliance has enlarged to include twelve new member-states—mostly from the 
former Warsaw Pact—and has conducted missions in Europe, Africa, and Central Asia. Despite an 
active military and diplomatic agenda, NATO continues to grapple with foundational questions. 
This issue begins with arguments regarding the future of NATO, one from Stanley R. Sloan and 
another from Julian Lindley-French, both keynote speakers at the workshop on deterrence held in 
Tallinn, Estonia, in May 2011, and co-sponsored by NATO and the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency. Mr. Sloan argues that the debate about strategic matters neglects a crucial problem facing 
NATO, namely, perceived gaps in commitment and investment between the United States and the 
European Allies. Americans often see themselves as paying for the defense of European countries 
that are unwilling the defend themselves or even help the United States protect its interests. 
Meanwhile, there is a perception in Europe that the United States is using NATO to pursue its own 
interests at European expense. Mr. Sloan argues that these viewpoints must be addressed, or they 
will hinder NATO’s pursuit of its political goals. Mr. Lindley-French examines similar questions 
from another angle. While NATO excels at grand strategy and tactical cooperation in its various 
missions, it has, he argues, neglected its foundation: the coordination of national defense policies to 
ensure a cohesive alliance. 
Brendan Wilson examines the arguments of American critics who see European countries as 
“freeloaders” in the Alliance, arguing that while their military budgets may not measure up to US 
defense spending, they contribute more than their fair share according to their size. In addition, 
European member states also offer capabilities that complement those of the United States, freeing 
America to devote its resources elsewhere. 
Following the argument of complementary capabilities, Glenn Segell examines how NATO air 
support contributed to the conduct of the African Union mission in Darfur, and how such 
cooperation with a regional organization outside Europe established a template for NATO’s 
intervention in Libya. His article provides a rare examination of the Alliance’s activities in Africa.   
Continuing on the theme of peacekeeping and stability operations, Ivan Ivanov examines how 
countries aspiring to NATO membership have increased their commitment to international 
operations as they have deepened their relationships with NATO. However, the aspirations of these 
countries—and thus their participation in NATO-led operations—are constrained by domestic 
politics, unresolved disputes with their neighbors, and the willingness of current members to accept 
them as Allies. 
From here, we return to the issue of cooperation between member-states, as Richard Weitz 
examines some of the formal institutional constraints and opportunities facing the Alliance. 
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Finally, we look at NATO through the lens of the European Union, an international institution that 
shares many of its members with NATO. Andreas Winter and David Anderson examine the military 
provisions of the EU’s new Lisbon Treaty and consider whether they complement, duplicate, or 
conflict with the way member states work with NATO. While there is some potential for 
redundancy or competition, they find that the EU’s new military efforts largely complement its 
members’ commitments to NATO. 
Through the course of the seven articles presented in this issue, our authors cover common territory 
from many directions, providing a multifaceted view of a complex alliance and its role in the world 
today. The editors hope that readers will see NATO in a new light after reading this issue. 
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NATO's Deterrence Review 
Strategic Fiddling while Rome Burns?1 
Stanley R. Sloan 
 
In May 2011, American and European experts on NATO deterrence issues met in Tallinn, Estonia, 
to consider and help inform the review of NATO’s deterrence strategy as mandated by NATO 
leaders in the November 2010 ―Lisbon Summit Declaration.‖2 As a keynote speaker at this 
conference, I discussed the broader political context that will influence the production and 
implementation of any revised NATO deterrence strategy—specifically, whether or not recent 
developments in the United States and Europe raised fundamental questions about how well today’s 
alliance serves US and European interests. The big question, I suggested, is whether or not a review 
of NATO deterrence strategy amounts to strategic fiddling while Rome burns. 
This provocative question must be considered by anyone who has been a strong supporter of the 
transatlantic alliance for many decades. Throughout NATO’s history its strategists have faced a 
dilemma: they can devise intricate deterrence formulas that are intellectually rigorous and logically 
constructed, but perhaps politically irrelevant—or that at least take insufficient account of the 
seemingly irrational world of political realities. 
Today, the future of the transatlantic security relationship rests less on complex deterrence formulas 
and decisions, for example, about whether or not to continue deploy US nuclear weapons in 
Europe, and more on the perceptions of mutual trust and shared interests held on both sides of the 
Atlantic. NATO must address these perceptions if any strategic concept is to move forward. 
 
Strategic Fiddling 
Thirty years ago, the principal political dilemma facing NATO was the deployment of Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles. According to the strategic wisdom of the time, the goal was to 
hold Soviet targets at risk with nuclear delivery systems deployed on European soil, thereby 
reinforcing the credibility of the strategic link with Europe through the US nuclear guarantee. In the 
words of Lynn Davis, an architect of the ―dual-track‖ decision in 1979 to deploy US intermediate 
range missiles in Europe while trying to negotiate limits on those systems: ―NATO governments 
argued that the capability to strike the Soviet Union with systems based on land in Western Europe 
was necessary in order to convey to the Soviet Union a real sense of risk from any aggression on the 
continent, and that only a new generation of INF missiles could provide such an assured 
capability.‖3  
                                                 
1 This essay is based on the text of a keynote presentation made to the conference on ―Adapting NATO’s Deterrence 
Posture‖ in Tallinn, Estonia on May 5, 2011. 
 
2 North Atlantic Council, Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010, par. 30, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease 
 
3 Lynn Davis, ―Lessons of the INF Treaty,‖ Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988 (Accessed at www.foreignaffairs.com). 
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The public debate, however, tended to be dominated by less esoteric arguments. Americans who 
favored the deployments saw them as necessary simply to ―balance‖ the Soviet deployments of SS-
20 missiles. European opponents, many of whom took to the streets to protest in large numbers, 
believed the deployments would increase the danger of nuclear war on European soil, rather than 
deter it. On the other hand, some American opponents asked why the United States should be 
taking on such a major new commitment when the Europeans seemed unappreciative and free-
riding. In such discussions, the true strategic rationale of the dual track decision got lost, especially 
when the 1987 INF Treaty eliminated all intermediate-range US and Soviet nuclear-armed ground-
launched ballistic and cruise missiles. This accord, negotiated by US President Ronald Reagan’s 
administration, was hailed as a major breakthrough in East-West arms control. The accord surprised 
many who had suspected the sincerity of the administration’s arms control efforts. Davis suggested 
that the accord resulted when the Soviet Union surprisingly agreed to eliminate all intermediate-
range systems, calling what Davis saw as the administration’s ―zero option‖ bluff.4  
The treaty, ironically, was inconsistent with the supposed linkage rationale of the original 
deployment decision. The view of some at the time was that elimination of all weapons in this range 
would leave the Soviet Union with serious military advantages in Central Europe and with 
Europeans still questioning the credibility of the US strategic nuclear guarantee. However, in the 
long run the INF Treaty proved a positive development at the dawn of revolutionary changes in 
Europe; factors other than sophisticated strategic theories frequently determine final outcomes in 
such matters. Arguing that some long range missiles should be kept in Europe for the sake of 
extended deterrence would have been a non-starter politically when the whole class of weapons 
could be eliminated. When, a few short years later, the Warsaw Pact disbanded and the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, the treaty seemed a logical prelude to the European revolutions.  
 
Mutual Transatlantic Perceptions and Misperceptions  
Times have changed, but perhaps some basic realities have not. On the Eastern shores of the 
Atlantic, some Europeans ask why they should spend lives and fortune on America’s war in 
Afghanistan. Many Europeans believe the United States mishandled the Afghan mission by going 
into Iraq and thus compromising the contributions other NATO members made in the Afghan 
theater. In addition, Europeans do not like to invest in defenses against threats they see as conjured 
up by the United States; they are even skeptical of the threat assessments produced by the European 
Union's foreign and defense policy system. Such views are shaping new policy approaches among 
European powers, particularly in the cases of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Now that 
Osama Bin Laden has been killed, the questioning on both sides of the Atlantic has grown. 
Germany’s domestic politics can be seen from across the Atlantic as forcing Berlin toward a reduced 
commitment not only to NATO but also to the European Union’s Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP). A lot of this, it could be argued, comes down to simple populist economics. 
Germans want to preserve the high standard of living that most of them enjoy. Removing Gaddafi 
from power and fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan have little relevance to their economic goals. 
On the other hand, their trade and energy relationship with Russia looks like something that will 
improve Germany’s economy and the quality of life of Germans. The antagonistic Russian attitude 
toward NATO could damage these goals.  
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
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Stephen Szabo, a leading American expert on Germany, has noted that ―…while Germany is crucial 
to any Western policy consensus on Russia, there are real differences in interests, cultures, and 
approaches between Berlin and Washington, which could lead to dangerous divisions if not handled 
well. There is a real danger that without a common approach, Germany could increasingly play the 
role of mediator between Russia and the United States.‖5 Such a posture would be a radical 
departure from over 60 years of close cooperation between Germany and the United States on 
NATO diplomacy with Russia. 
Germany’s evolving relationship with Russia could raise the question of whether or not it wants a 
US-financed deterrent against Russian power, as well as whether the United States will wish to 
provide such a deterrent in the future. Such declining cooperation between two of NATO's major 
powers would worry Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, which are more exposed to Russian power, 
but this concern is not shared everywhere in Europe. 
At the other end of the spectrum, France and Great Britain have recently advanced their bilateral 
military cooperation,6 which will enhance their role within the Alliance. For example, they now have 
leveraged their newfound cooperation into effective international activism in support of removing 
Gaddafi from power. However, even this success has revealed limitations on their ability to perform 
such missions: much like the United States, they have voiced frustration that other European 
countries were not willing or able to do more to support their efforts. After the mission turned out 
to be much more demanding than expected, they also complained that US reticence was to blame 
for NATO’s shortcomings. In the process, both Paris and London discovered some of the 
questionable benefits of leadership that the United States knows all too well. The United States has 
often been ―damned if it did and damned if it didn’t‖ provide strong leadership for the alliance. 
Now the French and British have experienced both the highs and lows of taking a strong leadership 
position. 
On the Western shores of the Atlantic, Americans ask why the United States should deploy 
expensive missile defense systems to defend Europe, when Europeans themselves are unwilling to 
make serious efforts on behalf of their own defense. Faced with a large and growing deficit, some 
Members of Congress – both on the left wing of the Democratic Party and among Tea Party 
Republicans – look at NATO commitments as a prime target for spending cuts. For some, the 
difficulties of the Libyan mission have only underscored their arguments. 
One American commentator, Lawrence F. Kaplan, criticized the Obama administration’s leaving 
Libya to the Europeans, saying that ―someone on the Obama team ought to have inquired about 
European capabilities – that is, whether the Europeans can do this or, more to the point, [can do] 
anything at all?‖7 Kaplan quoted French expert Bruno Tertrais as saying that Libya demonstrated 
                                                 
5 Interview with Stephen F. Szabo, atlantic-community.org, June 16, 2011 (Accessed at: http://www.atlantic-
community.org/index/items/view/Dr._Stephen_F._Szabo,_Executive_Director_of_the_Transatlantic_Academy.) 
 
6 John F. Burns, ―British Military Expands Links to French Ally,‖ The New York Times, November 2, 2010 (Accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/world/europe/03britain.html). 
 
7 Lawrence Kaplan, ―Open Wide, How Libya revealed the huge gap between U.S. and European military might,‖ The 
New Republic, April 26, 2011 (Accessed at: http://www.tnr.com/article/crossings/87377/libya-nato-military-power-
europe-us ). 
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that Europe has ―no ability to achieve a common political vision and no capacity to take on an 
operation of this kind.‖8 
It may be true that NATO’s problems in managing the anti-Gaddafi mission are in large part due to 
fact that the United States took a back seat in the operation. However, President Obama was simply 
applying the lessons the United States had learned from the past decade of US-led military 
operations: get an international mandate; do not put the United States in the position of attacking 
another Muslim country; try to get allies to do as much of the grunt work as possible; and keep US 
boots off the ground. President Obama also was responding to the message he heard from the 
American people: tend to our own problems; let the world take care of itself. 
Unfortunately, when the administration said it was turning leadership of the mission over to NATO, 
it helped perpetuate a long-standing flawed view of the alliance: many Americans regard NATO as 
simply meaning ―those damned Europeans,‖ while at the same time, many Europeans look at the 
alliance as ―those damned Americans.‖ 
 
Importance of the Political Environment for Strategy 
All of this leads to the following question: In this kind of environment, how viable is any deterrence 
strategy that depends on US generosity, manpower, and weapons systems for its credibility? This 
question is particularly relevant for extended deterrence. Most Americans don’t understand or buy 
into the argument that many have made about the need to station troops in Europe to ensure that 
we can build effective military coalitions through NATO.  
Arguments about the need to keep the alliance active and viable for building habits of cooperation 
and interoperability look to many Americans like ―inside baseball,‖ or a concentration on the 
obscure details of the relationship – this, at a time, when many Americans think Europeans have 
become self-satisfied, soft, and increasingly disrespectful of their American cousins. 
American governments have had to deal with burden-sharing concerns from the beginning of the 
alliance. In the late 1940s, the US Congress wanted Germany and Spain to be significant 
contributors to the alliance in spite of continental concerns at the time about Germany’s recent past 
and Spain’s authoritarian regime.  
In the middle of the Cold War, Senator Mike Mansfield argued that the only way Europeans would 
take responsibility for their own defense would be to pull US troops out of Europe. The essence of 
his argument still resonates with Americans who maintain that European countries have fallen into a 
culture of defense dependence and need to be shocked out of it by the United States leaving 
European defense to the European Union. One NATO expert put it this way in a recent exchange: 
―the only way the Europeans will be incentivized is if they know we won't always be there for 
them.‖  
Of course, those who hope that CSDP can replace NATO must have had at least a few second 
thoughts after the discord over Libya. Such doubts have likely grown with the current issue facing 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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the European common currency and the political fractures from electoral earthquakes—like the 
most recent tremors in Finland, where elections revealed rising anti-EU sentiment.9 
However, it seems clear that developing a deterrence doctrine that is as politically credible as it is 
strategically sound requires thorough consideration of the transatlantic world in which it is being 
prepared. At the very least, policymakers need to consider how to structure and sell any deterrence 
regime to skeptical publics and deliberative bodies on both sides of the Atlantic. The credibility of 
deterrence will depend on showing how the strategy responds to contemporary political perceptions 
and realities. 
 
Questions for Consideration 
In constructing a sound and politically acceptable deterrence doctrine, policymakers should consider 
the following questions. Further review of NATO deterrence may reveal other questions to 
consider. 
 Will revisions to the deterrence strategy include sufficient burden-sharing components to 
satisfy the United States, while being marketable in Europe? Can the American people be 
convinced that NATO deterrence strategy is intended to serve American interests, not just 
to protect those ―damned Europeans?‖ 
 What does missile defense in Europe have to do with American security?  
 Moreover, if the US does not extend deterrence to its allies, would that create a less 
demanding and therefore less expensive strategic environment for US defense programs?  
 Would the presence or absence of a credible NATO Article V mutual defense commitment 
affect how European states respond to a serious crisis? 
 Will the strategy be credible in terms of threat perceptions? Will it respond to the sometimes 
differing views Americans and Europeans have of their vital interests?  
 Will it be vulnerable to accusations that threats are being manufactured, or at least 
exaggerated? Can Europeans be convinced that NATO deterrence strategy is based on 
European as well as American assessments of the threats it intends to deter?    
 How will the strategy reconcile the apparent logical disconnect between continued reliance 
on the threat to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear attacks, and the supposed 
goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons? 
 How will the strategy respond to arguments that crises can better be avoided through non-
military means, through the more effective use of diplomacy and other soft power tools? 
The audience at the Tallinn review conference was not immediately prepared to consider all these 
questions. One American participant confided that some of the Europeans present had asked 
whether perceptions of NATO in the United States were really as bad as I had suggested. She 
                                                 
9 Jussi Rosendahl, ―Anti-Euro Anti-euro populists surge in Finnish election,‖ Reuters, April 17, 2011 (Accessed at    
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3117086,00.html). 
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confirmed to them that my message reflected serious trends in political and strategic thought in the 
United States. 
 
The Gates Warning 
If the Europeans in the audience needed any further confirmation, it was provided by Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates in his valedictory address to a Brussels audience not long before his 
scheduled retirement from government service.10 In previous talks (for example at the 2008 Munich 
Security Conference), Gates had issued warnings about inadequate European contributions to the 
alliance. At that meeting, Gates cautioned that "A few allies in NATO shouldn't have the luxury to 
decide only for stabilization and civilian operations, thereby forcing other allies to bear a 
disproportionate share of fighting and dying…. We must not, we cannot, become a two-tiered 
alliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not.  Such a development, with all its 
implications for collective security, would effectively destroy the alliance."11 
Gates saved his most penetrating points for last, however. In Brussels, home to NATO 
headquarters, Gates acknowledged that, under current economic and political circumstances, the 
allies were not likely to increase defense spending to strengthen European contributions to the 
alliance. However, he pressed for more effective contributions, arguing that ―to avoid the very real 
possibility of collective military irrelevance, member nations must examine new approaches to 
boosting combat capabilities—in procurement, in training, in logistics, in sustainment.‖12 
The warning that was in the headlines almost immediately, however, was stark. Gates concluded his 
frank talk by observing ―…if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not 
halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the 
formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in 
NATO worth the cost.‖ 
Gates continued: 
―What I’ve sketched out is the real possibility for a dim, if not dismal future for the 
transatlantic alliance. Such a future is possible, but not inevitable. The good news is that the 
members of NATO—individually, and collectively—have it well within their means to halt 
and reverse these trends, and instead produce a very different future: 
 By making a serious effort to protect defense budgets from being further gutted in 
the next round of austerity measures; 
 By better allocating (and coordinating) the resources we do have; and 
                                                 
10 The Gates message was absolutely no conspiracy with this author in spite of the fact that we shared neighboring 
offices as Deputy National Intelligence Officers in 1974. 
 
11 ―Gates Presses Europeans to Back Afghan Mission,‖ Deutsche Welle, September 2, 2008 (Accessed at 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3117086,00.html). 
 
12 Robert Gates, ―NATO’s Future,‖ Department of Defense Transcript as published by The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 
201. (Accessed at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-
future/ ). 
 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 6
  
 By following through on commitments to the alliance and to each other.‖13  
The headlines and editorials that followed elaborated and, unsurprisingly, distorted the Secretary’s 
message. The most common mistake was to turn the Gates warning into a prediction, without the 
careful qualifiers in his text. However, the shot across the bow was warranted, and with far more 
impact than I could have expected in my cautionary note in Tallinn. 
 
Implications for Transatlantic Relations14 
The American response to the Gates speech has been impressive across the political spectrum. 
Everyone knows that the alliance is by no means a perfect arrangement, and that free-riding is an 
unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of cooperation between large and smaller powers. 
Yet, in spite of all the criticism, there has been a notable shortage of credible proposals for US 
strategic options other than remaining in close cooperation with its European allies. The United 
States and its allies certainly need to strengthen the alliance. One way to do so would be to put more 
emphasis on cooperation in nonmilitary responses to security challenges while encouraging the 
Europeans to take their military commitments more seriously.  
But if the United States tries shock therapy, as some advocates suggest, it might not get the hoped-
for results. Individual NATO members might opt to make their own deals—some with other EU 
members, some with the United States, some with Russia, and so on. Another possibility is that a 
united Europe might emerge, designed to compete against rather than cooperate with the United 
States. There are enough uncertainties to suggest that America would be better off trying to improve 
and strengthen the alliance than dump or devalue it.  
When searching for alternatives to NATO, Americans should take a look around the world and ask 
what other countries would be as willing and able as the European members of NATO to contribute 
to international security in alliance with the United States. The US faces security challenges in Asia, 
and has allies in Asia willing to contribute to global security, but there is virtually no potential for an 
organized alliance there to help the US deal with them. This does not mean that NATO should take 
on responsibility for Asian security, simply that it is the only viable framework for coordinated 
military responses to global security challenges, and one with which willing Asian democracies can 
associate, as they have in Afghanistan. 
Before consigning NATO to the scrap heap of history, Americans should consider what they would 
put in its place and whether it would serve US interests as well. Meanwhile, European governments 
need to ask themselves if they want to encourage continued US support for the alliance, and, if so, 
what they are prepared to do to earn it. 
The bottom line in all of this is that successful deterrence rests uneasily on perceptions: the 
perceptions of potential adversaries to be deterred, and of those allies intended to be reassured. 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Some of the arguments in the following paragraphs first appeared in: Stanley R. Sloan, ―Counterpoint: In Defense of 
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Perhaps even more important are the perceptions of the providers of extended deterrence, in this 
case the United States—perceptions that the benefits are worth the risks and costs of providing 
reassurance. 
It is important to remember that the strategic rationales are solid and logically defensible. The 
credibility of threats and reassurances is affected by whether or not the defense forces and systems 
are in place, or planned, to implement the chosen strategy. However, whether or not allies still base 
their policies and actions on a sense of shared values and interests provides the backbone of any 
NATO-wide deterrence strategy, as well as the credibility of the threats as seen by adversaries.  
Today, the Libya mission has raised new questions on top of those already provoked by 
Afghanistan. The idea that NATO must be relevant to challenges beyond Article V and collective 
defense blossomed out of the American debate about NATO’s future a few decades ago. It now has 
been accepted as gospel, most recently in the Lisbon strategic concept.  
However, there are serious questions about whether the commitment means anything in terms of 
American and European attitudes and investments. Such questions about transatlantic commitments 
should be kept fully in mind as allied representatives discuss the inside workings of deterrence 
strategy, its relevance to the strategic environment in which we live today, and the one we expect to 
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Rebuilding the Acropolis 




An acropolis is a city or part of a city that is fortified, normally dominating a high point to afford 
furthest vision and maximum defense. Since 1949 NATO has been the acropolis of the West. 
However, a failure to properly invest in the Alliance could lead in time to obsolescence. Strategic 
shock, such as another 9/11 or a state conflict on Europe’s periphery that demands a rapid Alliance 
response, could lead NATO to fail. It is precisely at such moments when the gap between strategic 
judgment, the willingness of states to invest in defense, and the capabilities available to armed forces 
is at its widest that alliances should serve as a force multiplier to narrow the gap. The opposite seems 
to be happening: states are losing faith in the Alliance, making the gap even wider. 
If NATO is to survive as a credible military alliance it is therefore necessary to look beyond 
Afghanistan to consider strategy in the round as well as NATO’s true role and purpose in meeting 
those challenges. To that end, this paper assesses NATO from three strategic perspectives: nuclear 
deterrence; the balance between security and defense; and the relationship between strategy and 
austerity. 
For much of the world the Alliance remains the military grouping par excellence. NATO is constructed 
around the experience gained since 1949 of working together. The Alliance’s so-called military 
interoperability standards are a ‘product’ and a world-beating one at that, enabling coalitions to 
embark on complex operations without having to reinvent the command and control wheel every 
time. Many partners benefited from those structures in Afghanistan and over Libya and, if used 
correctly, such structures could place NATO at the heart of a powerful, albeit informal, network of 
world stabilizing defense relationships. However, if left to wither, the impact will be disastrous, not 
only on Euro-Atlantic security but that of the wider world. 
While NATO does a relatively good job coordinating on low-level issues (such as tactical co-
operation on operations) and on the broad gamut of high-level politics, such as the drafting of 
strategic concepts, Alliance performance on what might be termed mid-level issues, such as pooling 
of equipment, specialization of national forces, common funding, and force development is 
lamentable. In the absence of these key components of a twenty-first century NATO defense 
posture, the Alliance will become progressively hollowed-out, forced to do ever more with ever less.  
It is the nature of politics to cite any particular moment as pivotal. However, as the US withdraws 
from Iraq and prepares to leave Afghanistan, and with much of Europe mired deep in debt, the 
assumptions upon which the transatlantic relationship rests are being challenged. In the United 
States there is a widespread belief that Europeans are imposing the costs of their defense on the US 
taxpayer. In Europe there is a countervailing popular belief that the US sees Europeans as cannon 
fodder for America’s global ambitions and wishes to instrumentalize NATO to just such an end.  
Given the pressures on the two pillars of the Alliance—the US and Europe—is a sustainable and 
enduring transatlantic bargain still possible and what would it look like? Would any European 
government faced with the Eurozone crisis be willing to consider taking on a heavier defense 
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burden within NATO if it reduced American influence? With the possible exception of France, the 
answer would appear to be no. In fact, whilst most Europeans might grumble about US policy, they 
seem content to let the US carry much of the burden—Europe’s leading power Germany being a 
case in point, which will shortly announce a cut of up to 10% in its armed forces. Equally, the US 
will want and frankly need the support of its allies in its global mission as the price of a continuing 
American commitment, but it is hard now to see from where such support would come from within 
the Alliance and what meaningful role would NATO play. 
NATO now faces a 1949 rather than a 1989 moment. As America considers its role in protecting the 
global commons on land, at sea, in the air and space, it must also consider to what extent it is willing 
to rely on its European allies for this global mission. The ‘mix’ that NATO must find, therefore, 
necessarily concerns a new balance to be struck between Alliance protection on the one hand and on 
the other, US-led projection on what will by its very nature be a much bigger strategic stage than the 
Eurocentric focus of much of NATO’s past. NATO’s purpose is not only to deter any and all 
threats via both conventional and nuclear means, but also to help shape the strategic environment in 
which the alliance must operate. To that end, NATO has no reason to exist other than to serve the 
strategic security and defense needs of its members. To meet that criterion the Alliance must remain 
relevant to today’s challenges which in this age of globalization and proliferation can no longer be 
confined to one neat geographical space. Specifically, in addition to ensuring the stability of Europe, 
Europeans need to help keep the US strong in Asia and the Middle East. NATO should be seen in 
that light.  
 
An Uncertain Strategic Future 
The fundamental challenge that NATO faces is that, for all the eloquence of the 2010 Strategic 
Concept and the ‘success’ in Libya, the Alliance remains divided and uncertain.1 For this reason, 
some believe the United States is losing interest in NATO. Put simply, as security and defense have 
become globalized, the Alliance has failed to evolve from being a regional defensive organization to 
the strategic tool for global influence that its members need if they are to collectively establish the 
shared strategic vision upon which defense expenditures can be justified.  
To that end, NATO leaders should focus on making the Alliance a global interoperability hub, with 
NATO acting as an ideas exchange for the modernization and integration of the European forces 
that are able to reach out to partners in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. It is NATO’s role as 
the incubator of military interoperability standards that is NATO’s unique selling point. 
Consequently, the failure to establish a global context for critical NATO missions makes the 2010 
Strategic Concept more of a wish list than a strategy. Indeed, collective defense, crisis management, 
and co-operative security as laid out in the Concept do not capture the nature and scope of the 
systemic change that has taken place since the 1999 Strategic Concept. Critically, the Strategic 
Concept remains Euro-regional in ambition. If a new balance between credible protection and force 
projection is not struck, an already outmoded, hollowed-out, and bureaucratic NATO will get in the 
way of security, not provide it.  
                                                
1 The NATO Strategic Concept was agreed at the Lisbon Summit on 20 November, 2010. Entitled “Active 
Engagement, Modern Defence’ the Concept established NATO’s three core missions over the next decade; 
collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security.  
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The lack of a shared strategic planning concept prevents NATO from establishing a sound 
framework for future force development even though the Alliance claims to be examining the new 
security agenda, undertaking a deterrence and defense posture review, and seeking to reform the 
Alliance command structure. Therefore, if NATO is to remain credible in a hyper-competitive, 
hyper-connected world, Alliance leaders must confront the world as it is, not as short-term political 
calculations deem it to be. Too often Europeans have chosen to ignore such realities and have 
instead retreated ever deeper into isolationism, using fortress NATO and the empty bureaucratism 
of the European Union (EU) as political cover for irresolution. The 26 October 2011 Euro Summit 
Statement called for further economic integration and eventual fiscal union as a first step towards 
resolving the Eurozone debt crisis could well exacerbate rather than ease these trends.  
The consequence of such strategic dissonance is seen at every level of Alliance strategy. Led by 
Germany, several NATO member nations are lessening their commitment to cooperative nuclear 
deterrence and collective nuclear defense while at the same time weakening their conventional 
forces. Yet beyond Europe’s borders is a growing nuclear renaissance with a potential for more 
states to acquire nuclear weapons, with Iran posing the most notable and pressing challenge. 
Moreover, Russia’s future political posture and defense orientation remains unclear. Moscow has 
committed to a 3% increase in its defense budget for 2011 and many of its actions, such as bomber 
sorties across Europe and the deployment of new short-range missile systems, when taken together 
with stated Russian concerns over the modernization of NATO’s collective defense architecture, 
suggest a future relationship that could well be fractious.  
 
A New Nuclear NATO? 
Although many Europeans, after having lived for so long with the specter of nuclear destruction, 
now find it hard to face the contemporary nuclear reality, deterring new nuclear powers will be part 
of NATO’s future strategy. NATO has always been a nuclear alliance, and with Europe’s 
conventional forces in steep decline, NATO’s nuclear arsenal is likely to become more important, 
not less so. The imbalance between conventional forces was exactly why the Alliance stuck firmly to 
its ‘first use’ nuclear policy during the Cold War when there was a profound imbalance between 
Soviet and Alliance conventional forces. For all the progress made in the February 2011 New 
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between Russia and the United States, nuclear weapons 
remain a fact of strategic life, particularly short and intermediate range weapons. There is no reason 
to believe that will change any time soon. In early September 2011 the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) drew attention to Iran’s renewed efforts to construct a nuclear weapon system at 
Qom.2 More could well follow. 
Nuclear technology is now over seventy years old, and its associated missile technology of a similar 
vintage. Many emerging global and regional powers aspire to such technological expertise both for 
reasons of prestige and deterrence, as well as for its peaceful benefits. While the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has held up remarkably well, evidence of proliferation is clear; nine states 
now possess nuclear weapons in 2011, compared with five in 1968. Moreover, globalization makes it 
                                                
2 On 2 September, 2011 a leaked IAEA report suggested that Iran had not stopped its enrichment activities and had 
moved much of the programme to hardened bunkers near the city of Qom. The report also cited "new information 
related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." See “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 
and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: IAEA, Report by the Director 
General, 2 September, 2011. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran.2Sept2011.pdf  
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easier for poorer countries to obtain advanced technology and manufacturing equipment, and to 
deal with more sophisticated illicit networks to develop nuclear capabilities. 
The reality of proliferation, but he difficulty of quantifying it, suggests that transatlantic tensions 
could well become focused on the search for agreement on what constitutes minimum deterrence. 
Two points of view have developed between the three NATO nuclear powers on the one hand and 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway on the other.3 The latter five 
NATO members have been pressing since 2010 for the removal of up to 240 US warheads from 
Europe. Implicit in this position is the expectation of low-cost defense indirectly subsidized by the 
American taxpayer via the US defense budget—at a time when an already over-stretched US is being 
forced by shifts in global power to the East to move its security center of gravity away from Europe. 
This demand for subsidized defense from those demanding an end to nuclear forces in Europe will 
paradoxically shift a greater burden of nuclear responsibility onto the three NATO nuclear powers – 
Britain, France and the US—while they also implicitly benefit from deterrence benefits. It is 
precisely such strategic contradictions that are hollowing out NATO politically and militarily. 
Unfortunately, President Obama’s support for the Global Zero campaign has to some extent further 
complicated NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) which will be presented at 
the Alliance’s May 2012 Chicago Summit. Allies are no longer sure of the future American 
commitment to NATO’s nuclear posture, which has in turn galvanized political forces in Europe 
that have always seen such weapons as an evil in themselves.  
In spite of the START treaties, NATO Europe’s immediate neighborhood is not nuclear neutral. 
Therefore, defining a new minimal deterrence posture will prove both difficult and divisive. Many 
Eastern European states remain wary of Russia. Its unwillingness to countenance further cuts, 
particularly in short-range systems, partly reflects the perceived weaknesses of its conventional 
armed forces (NATO faces the same dilemma), although that is now being addressed, but also 
Moscow’s traditional prickliness towards the West.  
In reality the Russian-NATO relationship remains complicated. Hard though it is to explain to 
Eastern European allies (for very obvious reasons), Russia over the medium term is unlikely to be 
the real strategic threat unless a divergence of interest takes place over time. Under current thinking 
NATO’s future deterrence and nuclear posture would ideally see the number of nuclear forces 
reduced, offset by a limited but capable missile defense system along with enhanced and deployable 
conventional military forces. Yet, the opposite is happening – several NATO Europeans are 
demanding the removal of American nuclear forces from their sovereign space, are cutting their 
conventional armed forces to the point of impotence and, in effect, offering Russia a veto on any 
future missile defense system. This position is defended even while the same countries expect the 
United States to pay for a missile defense system that will not actually defend the continental United 
States.4 In short, far from moving the Alliance forward, the Posture Review could well lock into 
                                                
3 Following the December 2008 launch of the Global Zero initiative and President Obama’s endorsement of it, NATO’s 
Strasbourg Declaration of February 2010 and the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit five NATO members; Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway moved to have all US nuclear forces removed from Europe.  
 
4 In late February 2011 five NATO member nations - Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Norway – called for the removal of all the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. See “NATO and Nuclear 
Weapons”, 29 November, 2011, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/nato/index.htm 
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future strategy the essential contradiction in the balance between strategic protection and projection 
from which NATO suffers.  
The contradiction between stated strategy and force posture is undermining the Strategic Concept, 
which is fast losing political momentum. Therefore, the role of nuclear forces in the Alliance is again 
fast becoming a metaphor for NATO’s strategic seriousness. Sooner or later, in the absence of the 
highly unlikely global nuclear zero or investment in sufficient numbers of advanced expeditionary 
conventional forces, the place and role of nuclear forces as part of a balanced NATO defense will 
need to be reconsidered. If the burden falls even more disproportionately on the Americans or the 
extended deterrence capabilities of the other NATO nuclear powers (France and Britain), then over 
time the Alliance will be rendered impotent.  
The debate over NATO’s nuclear future is thus part of a wider discussion over burden sharing and 
in particular the price hard-pressed Americans will demand from Europeans for continuing to act as 
the last resort guarantor of Europe’s defense. The role to be played by nuclear weapons and missile 
defense in offsetting European weaknesses in conventional deployable forces will be central.  
 
Balancing Security and Defense 
Just as NATO allies must adjust the balance between their nuclear and conventional forces, they will 
also have to adjust the balance between external defense and internal security, especially after the 
decade-long focus on counterterrorism. The death of Osama bin Laden would ideally ensure a 
return to a more classical concept of defense strategy after a decade of counter-terrorism. This is a 
difficult call to make so close to the tenth anniversary of 9/11. However, it is a mark of Al Qaeda’s 
strategic influence that a relatively small and marginal organization should have had such an impact 
on the consciousness, policy, and strategy of the West and, by extension, NATO. Counterterrorism 
has dominated the thinking of policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic at the expense of what 
might be seen as a more balanced assessment of the security and defense implications of the shift in 
sovereign wealth from west to east. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) will of course 
remain important, but NATO allies need to consider carefully the place of counterterrorism within 
broader grand strategy and whether cutting defense budgets to beef up security (counter-terrorism, 
intelligence and policing) budgets is the correct course of action.  
The European penchant for peacekeeping these past twenty years has led to several European 
armed forces that are little more than glorified constabularies with the result that the fighting power 
of NATO has been much reduced. Superior fighting power over all-comers is the creed of US 
forces and should be the sine qua non of NATO. Incredibly, many NATO Europeans have been all 
too happy use the COIN role as a cover to de-invest in armed forces. Armed forces equipped and 
able to exert real strategic influence on the twenty-first global balance of power are by their very 
nature extremely expensive, demanding large numbers of long-reach enabling platforms, network 
architectures, and networked soldiers. NATO should have been at the forefront of this drive but 
under-investment, a lack of political will, and a bureaucracy designed to serve enlargement rather 
than engagement has frustrated many attempts, including the NATO Response Force (NRF).5  
                                                
5 According to NATO insiders the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) for the latest NRF rotation is 
around 27%. 
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The focus on stabilization and reconstruction, combined with operational tempo and the rapid force 
rotations caused by efforts to win the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade, have 
further accelerated the retreat of European forces from effective fighting power.6 This in turn has 
led to a political determination never again to get involved in places like Afghanistan even if such 
operations are precisely what most European armed forces plan for. This now begs a fundamental 
question: just what are European armed forces for? 
European military weakness is also generating an implicit shift in strategy from the engagement in 
expeditionary stability operations to a form of fortress Europe. This, in turn, witnesses the 
consumption of defense budgets by internal security concerns with investments being shifted from 
armed forces to policing and intelligence. The United Kingdom is a case in point. The 2010 Strategic 
Defense and Security Review and the 17 July 2011 announcement to Parliament envisaged a 10% 
cut in the size of the British armed forces by 2015.7 In contrast, over the past decade 
counterterrorism intelligence and policing has seen a four-fold increase in funding. In effect, the UK 
is shifting from a deployable engagement strategy alongside the US built on a force concept of 
limited mass and maneuver, to a strike-and-punish force concept built around very lean, but very 
potent strike forces. 
This weakening of NATO’s relative military power has been further exacerbated by the failure to 
create a European defense industry able to produce hi-tech military equipment within a reasonable 
time and cost frame, the US refusal to properly share with allies key technologies, and on occasion 
the attempts by US defense manufacturers to offset costs by imposing exorbitant partnership costs 
on allies.8  
Thus far, the US Congress has not become too impatient over defense free riding. However, with 
Bin Laden dead and Western forces scheduled to leave Afghanistan by 2015, twenty-first century 
grand strategy will tend to shift back towards considerations of state power and with it the place of 
the Alliance in America’s Asia-centric global role. Moreover, so long as the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts were in progress, an implicit contract existed between the US and its European allies 
whereby some American presence in Europe would be maintained in return for European support 
for US-led operations. That contract will soon be over. Thus, in spite of Europe’s economic travails, 
the allies are unwilling to help the US square its own strategy-austerity circle. Better use of the 
Alliance could help to create the synergies vital at a moment of economic stress. Failure to use 
NATO to such an end could well lead to profound transatlantic political tensions sooner rather than 
later. Europeans need at least to be aware of this, even if they are insensitive to it. 
                                                
6 For an in-depth study of this phenomenon using the Netherlands as a case study see Lindley-French J & Tjepkema A. 
(2010) “Between the Polder and a Hard Place? The Netherlands and Defence Planning Challenges for Smaller European 
Countries” Whitehall Report 2-10 (London: Royal United Services Institute)  
 
7 General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, said: "If we get it right, this will result in a modern, hard-
hitting joint force still capable of operating at the divisional level across the full spectrum of conflict. It will deliver 
armed forces of which we can all be proud”. The cuts will result in the smallest British army for over a century, when 
Britain had by far the world’s largest navy. See “Liam Fox announces army cuts, but promises extra funds in future”. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jul/18/liam-fox-army-cuts. 
 
8 And not just on partners. According to Global Security.org the unit cost of JSF, averaged over variants, had almost 
doubled since the programme began (from $50 million in FY02 dollars to $92 million). See “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) Lightning II Program”@ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-program.htm 
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NATO is and always has been built on burden sharing, which concerns as much the sharing of risk 
as cost. The US (and the UK) gets very little of either from its continental European allies. The 
recent imbalance of effort may be tolerable for a time, but only for a time. However, there is no sign 
in Europe of any political will to resolve the imbalance by investing in defense proportionate to 
national economies. Given the world into which the Alliance is entering, the hollowness of NATO 
will at some point be cruelly exposed. 
 
Crafting Strategy from Austerity 
European reluctance to accept a greater share of NATO’s burden is compounded by budget cuts 
forced by the recent recession and continuing economic uncertainty. Such austerity confronts 
Europeans with a hard reality: Europe is too rich to hide, but too weak to influence the world 
around it. The facts speak for themselves.9 NATO Europe nations have a combined gross domestic 
product (GDP) of $18 trillion compared with the US GDP of $14 trillion, or some 124% of the US 
total. The combined 2009 defense budgets of NATO Europe totaled $267 billion compared with 
the 2009 US defense budget of $715 billion. NATO Europe thus spends some 37% of the US 
expenditure on defense, while enjoying a 14% higher GDP.  
Air operations over Libya have also revealed two lessons: a) no European force has the capacity for 
sustained, autonomous action to any meaningful extent; and b) the transatlantic defense-
technological gap has been reinforced by an intra-European gap with profound implications for 
military interoperability between Europeans, not just between Americans and Europeans. Indeed, of 
the $267 billion Europeans spent on defense in 2009, France and the UK together represented $114 
billion (43%), while France, Germany, and the UK represented $162 billion (61%). The so-called 
‘big three’ also spent 88% of all defense research and development in NATO Europe. Critically, 
sixteen of the twenty-six NATO Europe members spent less than $6 billion per year—and much of 
it inefficiently—with the ratios between personnel costs (salaries, pensions) and equipment budgets 
(armaments) particularly perverse, with too much spent on personnel costs and insufficient amount 
invested in equipment. Set in a global context the picture is stark. Between 2001 and 2008 NATO 
Europe spending on defense fell from $320 billion to $317 billion (not adjusted for defense cost 
inflation). Over roughly the same period the US has increased its defense expenditure by 109%, 
China by 247%, Russia by 67%, and Australia by 56%.  
The Franco-British relationship will be critical for generating political momentum in Europe 
towards a more balanced assessment of Europe’s defense needs. On the one hand the signs are 
encouraging. Since the Suez Crisis of 1956 Britain and France have been on opposing sides of the 
debate over European defense, with the UK by and large seeking US-centric solutions and France a 
European solution. Neither London nor Paris—nor even the two together—are of themselves 
sufficient, but both are still essential to Europe’s defense posture. The chance now exists to re-
energize the Franco-British defense relationship to the betterment of NATO, thanks mainly to 
French pragmatism and a British government that has finally had the courage to recognize that 
Washington, though important, is only one amongst several strategic partners. On the other hand, 
the Eurozone crisis and German-led moves to create an inner-core for the EU from which Britain is 
excluded could, over time, weaken the ability of even London and Paris to cooperate over defense. 
                                                
9 All the figures used herein are from the author’s own research using IISS Military Balance 2010 and 2011. 
 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 15
Without British and French leadership, much needed practical steps towards defense cooperation 
could falter. Pooling, specialization and common funding ideas have been around for many years, 
but under Franco-British leadership with American political backing, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that Europe’s defense rehabilitation could develop some momentum. This being Europe, 
most such efforts will see a mélange of projects, some state-led, some NATO-led, some led by the 
EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Small clusters of like-minded states coming 
together to share and/or develop capabilities would be vital to re-establish affordable armed forces 
on firm strategic principles, leading to defense policies and strategies that will, in time, make NATO 
once again relevant to the age. Sadly, such leadership is unlikely to come from the Alliance in its 
entirety because NATO is no longer capable of acting as a whole beyond the low-level operational 
or the high-level rhetorical, primarily due to a lack of political cohesion but increasingly due to an 
inability of NATO forces to operate safely and effectively together. If the big states do not lead, 
NATO’s steady retreat into irrelevance will sooner or later lead to failure.  
 
Putting Strategic Partnership at the Heart of NATO 
Critical to the future transatlantic relationship will be preserving and developing the strategic 
partnership at the heart of the Alliance. This will require the usual measures of greater defense 
spending by European allies, new technological solutions, and better strategic coordination to 
balance resources and capabilities. However, NATO must also recognize the growing role that 
coalitions are playing in international security and move to reconcile such coalitions with the well-
being of the Alliance. 
Now is the time when the nature of the strategic partnership must be reshaped. NATO is rapidly 
moving towards a post-Afghanistan age in which defense strategy, like that of the British, will tend 
to emphasize punish-and-strike rather than stay-and-stabilize. This would be a mistake, since 
strategic common sense would suggest that a balance needs to be struck between the two roles. It is 
an age that will likely witness the emergence of new nuclear powers, either for purposes of 
deterrence, prestige, or both. Effective conventional reach will also be critical, with dangerous crises 
all too likely in Africa, Arabia and Asia, with much of it focused on the littorals. After all, 75% of the 
world’s population lives less than 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the sea. 
Today, NATO Europe can only begin to perform what might be termed a strategic role by 
developing its defense capacity in and around Europe. Given that reality, the most that Washington 
can hope for from most of its NATO allies is a commitment to European defense to relieve the 
pressure on America’s security commitments in other regions. This will by no means prove an easy 
task, with North Africa, the Middle East (including Iran), Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia as Europe’s neighboring regions. That engagement will, of course, be mainly political 
and economic, but European armed forces must also be far better configured to play a meaningful 
influence role beyond international counter-piracy and aerial patrol, important though they are. Such 
roles will be no mean challenge. However, will the US accept its European allies playing such a 
significant role in Middle East security? Asia-Pacific is for the longer-term. Europeans clearly have 
interests therein but realistically only Britain and France may wield some influence there—and then 
only alongside the US and only very modestly. 
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Sound and shared strategic judgment will be vital to strike a credible balance between a reasoned 
assessment of the strategic environment, the level of national resources that can be invested, and the 
capabilities needed to provide a minimum level of credible deterrence. One key will be to make 
virtue out of necessity because NATO will need both small, hi-tech deployable forces and larger 
lower-tech forces that can offer presence far from Alliance shores—be it sea or space control or 
defense diplomacy.  
NATO’s ageing populations will also demand and require a defense strategy ever more reliant upon 
technological solutions. The very existence of high-tech deterrence in all its forms will act as 
strategic reassurance in its own right. Moreover, a far higher degree of protection of NATO’s 
populations will need to be realized before the Alliance as a whole can project force to resolve crises. 
Indeed, after the Afghanistan experience and the Libyan ‘success,’ those forces will be permitted to 
stay only for short periods and will need enhanced force protection. 
New forms of deterrence, such as cyber-deterrence will also be needed to reinforce renewed nuclear 
deterrence. In that context, NATO should be encouraged to look far into the future with confidence 
and not be constrained, as is currently the case, by short-term political strictures. Recognizing only 
as much future threat as can be afforded today is a sure-fire guarantee of Alliance failure in the face 
of future shock. Indeed, such a notion makes future shock likely. 
However, to realize NATO’s full potential in the twenty-first century, political reality must be 
grasped. The old mantra that security is indivisible is as empty as many of NATO members’ 
arsenals. Free-riding is here to stay, especially for the smaller NATO nations. Therefore, even 
though coalitions represent a threat to alliances, if NATO is to play its role in the legitimate security 
and defense of the West, then ultimately coalitions must be reconciled with the Alliance. That is the 
minimum price to be paid if future strategic concepts are to provide the planning guidance that will 
make them worth reading. In short, if nothing else survives of NATO into the twenty-first century, 
at least preserve the all-important force planning and interoperability standards vital to the efficient 
force generation of coalitions. 
The true test will be the extent or otherwise of the European allies to credibly support the United 
States in its global mission. Such a test will need to be passed—and seen by the US Congress to have 
been passed—if the US is to reaffirm its role as the guarantor of Europe’s security and defense.  
 
Rebuilding the Acropolis 
NATO is hollowed out. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it is now no longer possible to 
hide the gap between what NATO can do and what it should be aspiring to do, however deft the 
politics. Operation Unified Protector over Libya represented a moderate success, but it was a very 
limited effort. Such ‘success’ should not be confused with the pressing need to re-establish strategic 
credibility, which after ten tears of incompetence in Afghanistan is hanging by a thread. The trinity 
of strategy, defense, and deterrence rests inevitably on three essential political foundations: shared 
political vision and strategic ambition, a secure home base, and the means and determination to act 
with credible solidarity at the point of contact with danger. Unless the Alliance member-states 
patiently and with determination rebuild the strategic credibility of NATO, all that will be left is a 
bureaucracy, and Europe in particular already has too many of them. 
The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept rightly emphasizes the modernization of Article 5 through a mix 
of missile defense, cyber-defense, and deployable conventional forces, and by extension, strategic re-
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assurance. That, in turn, will require a new approach to collective defense in order for a new balance 
to be struck between affordable protection and projection while remaining relevant to today’s 
challenges as well as those that might emerge over the next decade and beyond. ‘Armed’ attack in a 
virtual age underscores the need for the home base to be secure from catastrophic cyber-attack, 
terrorism and missile attack.  
Effective defense will also require a new approach to collective security. It may seem strange to say, 
given the instability to NATO’s immediate south—Tripoli is, after all, only 294 kilometers (182 
miles) from NATO’s southernmost point. However, Asia is likely to be the epicenter of 
proliferation and instability and many of the tensions and frictions that arise, particularly so given 
the fractious relationships between China, India, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan and South Korea. 
NATO will have to plan for the role it will play in such situations, decide how the Alliance should 
best be organized, and move forward with the necessary reforms. 
Re-establishing NATO’s strategic credibility will thus require much more than vague adherence to 
the generalities of the Strategic Concept. Rather, it will require America to re-affirm a political 
commitment to the stability and defense of Europe, and for a Europe led by Britain and France to 
re-commit to a strategic partnership with the United States based on a genuine strategic vision.  
The West collectively has done much to make the world a safer place in the twentieth century and 
must continue to have the will and means to do so in the twenty-first century. Put simply, the world 
is a safer place when the West is strong. However, the cornerstone of that legitimate, collective 
strength is dangerously close to losing its essential position in that effort: NATO. At the very least a 
new contract must be struck between the allies because the twenty-first century will likely be as 
dangerous as the twentieth. If NATO fails, cowering Europeans will retreat into a fortress Europe, 
hoping against hope that in the end the US Cavalry will come riding over the horizon, but never 
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NATO: Prologue or Requiem? 
Brendan Wilson, PhD1 
 
It is often said that NATO is an organisation in search of a mission; that since the end of the Cold 
War, NATO is simply casting about for some reason to stay in existence.  
One recent example of this type of analysis was an article by Justin Logan, director of foreign policy 
studies at the Cato Institute, titled, “NATO is a Farce”.2 Among the points Mr. Logan made is that 
NATO’s European Allies do not pull their weight (offering the operations in Libya and Afghanistan 
as examples), US expenditures on behalf of NATO are excessive and unwarranted, and in particular 
that the US would have been better off if it had disbanded the Alliance at the end of the Cold War.3 
Underlying all such criticisms of NATO is the claim, stated or unstated, that NATO was somehow 
unprepared for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting altered political and military 
landscape. Detractors admit, although reluctantly, that NATO’s deterrent value did play a role in 
winning the Cold War. Beyond that they see it as an anachronism, unsuited for the modern 
environment, largely irrelevant and mired in delusions of past glory—a hammer looking for a nail.  
These claims should be evaluated against the larger picture of NATO’s recent history, its goals, and 
the steps it has taken—and continues to take—to achieve those goals. 
This article will present the case that the benefits of collective defence, deterrence, and efficiencies 
resulting from the pooling of resources and the sharing of the burdens of operations outweigh the 
relatively modest costs of NATO membership. Rather than a cumbersome Cold-War relic, NATO 
has been and remains on the forefront of both diplomatic and military transformation of the Euro-
Atlantic security environment. The US is a major beneficiary of this arrangement. 
 
Late Cold War Thinking 
In the late 1980s a debate had emerged in policy circles about how best to posture the United States 
and its allies to meet the demands of a changing security environment. At the risk of over-
simplification, let me set out, in general terms, the two major sides of that discussion. Paul Kennedy 
in his 1987 book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 
2000,4 articulated a view that the US was in the position of an over-extended empire. With troops 
stationed on foreign soil, entangling alliances, and burgeoning defence expenditures, the US risked 
catastrophe if it did not pull back, consolidate itself and concentrate on domestic priorities.  
                                                 
1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Dept. of 
Defense, the U.S. Government, or NATO.  
2 Justin Logan, “NATO is a Farce,” The CATO Institute. Accessed 1 November 2011.  
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13614 
3 For an excellent review of NATO critics see Loree Filizer “Skeptics at NATO’s 60th Anniversary: a Critique of the 
Criticism,” Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 3 (August 2009). 
4 Paul Kenedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Vintage Books, 1987 
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An alternate view, posited in 1990 by Joseph Nye in his book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power,5 countered that the US was not an empire in that it did not occupy foreign lands nor 
extract wealth or tribute; rather it provided stability, promoted free trade and encouraged self-
governing democracies in the areas where it extended its influence. He pointed out that US defence 
expenditures were only around some 6% of GDP, nothing like the enormous sustained defence 
expenditures of the empires, such as Rome and Spain, which Kennedy had used as his examples.  
But most important, at that time, Nye pointed to what he considered to be the impending collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The end of a bipolar balance of power in historical 
experience would mean instability and conflict as the newly sovereign states of a fragmented empire 
cast about for security, armed themselves, and joined in alliances against perceived threats. It is hard 
for us now to look back and not recognise the importance of his insight. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union could have led to regional fighting—including possibly even the use of nuclear weapons—
with the inevitable consequences of death, dislocation, and economic and environmental 
catastrophe. Nye’s recommendation was that the US and its Allies should move rapidly to fill this 
prospective security void with cooperative arrangements, together with political and economic 
assistance, in an effort to foster a peaceful transition to a new stability.  
  
Proactive Steps 
Whether or not NATO leaders subsequently followed Dr. Nye’s advice, NATO was already moving 
quickly to meet the new challenges. The 1989 NATO Summit Declaration recognised the changes 
that were underway in the Soviet Union as well as in other Eastern European countries and outlined 
the Alliance’s approach to overcoming the division of Europe and achieving its long-standing 
objective of shaping a just and peaceful European order. The following developments illustrate this 
point. 
At the Summit Meeting in London in July 1990, NATO leaders extended offers to the governments 
of the Soviet Union as well as Central and Eastern European countries to establish regular 
diplomatic liaison with NATO and to work towards a new relationship based on cooperation.  
Following a visit by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to Moscow, President Gorbachev 
in July 1990 accepted the future participation of the soon to be united Germany in the North 
Atlantic Alliance. His position was explicitly linked to the positive nature of the commitments made 
by Alliance governments in London.6 The Los Angeles Times reported: 
“Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, accepting an invitation to a future NATO meeting, 
called Saturday for a joint East-West declaration that would proclaim the end of the Cold 
War and move beyond it to establish a partnership ensuring European security. 
“Gorbachev told NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that decisions at the recent 
summit meetings of NATO in London and the Warsaw Pact in Moscow to reduce their 
armaments and reorient their defense strategies had confirmed that the long period of East-
                                                 
5 Joseph S. Nye. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books, New York, 1990 
6 For a comprehensive view of the role played by the US in the German unification process, see Condoleezza Rice and 
Philip D Zelikow, “Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft,” Harvard University Press, 1997 
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West hostility was over and that moves should be made quickly to build this into a new 
relationship.”7  
It is important to understand that this substantial reorientation of policy—away from Cold War 
deterrence based on a balance of military power and toward cooperation and transparency—began 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union.8  
On December 20th, 1990, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)9 met for the first time. It 
included all NATO foreign ministers and those of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. The Soviet Union sent its ambassador 
extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Nikolai Nikolaevich Afanasievsky. In the course of the meeting, 
Ambassador Afanasievsky was called from the room. He returned and read a statement requesting 
that the phrase Soviet Union be dropped from the final communiqué. The following day, as history 
records, the member states of the former Soviet Union signed the Alma-Ata Protocols, which 
formally dissolved the Union and established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
In very rapid succession, the fruits of these early diplomatic efforts led to many well-known 
successes, including the establishment of the NATO/Russia Charter, the NATO Ukraine 
Commission, and the Partnership for Peace, all of which offered both diplomatic and practical levels 
of cooperation to help guide this process. Perhaps the most overlooked aspect is NATO 
enlargement itself, which has allowed former Warsaw Pact nations, former Soviet Republics, and 
former component states of Yugoslavia to join NATO, securing their own independence as 
members of a powerful defensive alliance.  
Far from being taken by surprise, NATO, through a series of prescient diplomatic initiatives, was 
well-positioned to facilitate a peaceful transition to a post Cold War security environment.10  
 
Transformed Capabilities and New Military Operations 
Alongside NATO’s efforts to promote security by bringing neighbouring countries to the table is its 
ability to use military forces to prevent conflict, conduct peacekeeping, and protect civilian 
populations through selective interventions. The scorecard on this count reflects a string of hard-
won successes.  
Four years after that first meeting of the NACC, NATO’s reorientation for the post-Cold War 
environment was put to the test. Following the unsuccessful efforts of the UN to keep peace in 
                                                 
7 Los Angles Times, 15 July 1990, recovered on 25 August 2011. http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-15/news/mn-
266_1_soviet-leader 
8 The effort toward political détente began as early as 1967 with the issuing of the Harmel Report, which urged a 
lessening of tensions, a peaceful solution to the issues of the division of Germany, and the participation of the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European countries a diplomatic process in order to achieve “a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.”  Accessed on 5 September 2011 from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-14E9AA0A-A3E624ED/natolive/official_texts_26701.htm?selectedLocale=en 
9 The NACC has since evolved into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).  
10 The US played a significant role in the momentum to establish the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and used its influence 
as a NATO member to help foster this programme. In 1994 and 1995, Dr. Nye served as Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for International Security Affairs, where he was instrumental in the development of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
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Bosnia—a failure that was highlighted by the killing of up to 8,000 men and boys in Srebrenica and 
the deaths of up to 10,000 civilians during the siege of Sarajevo—NATO undertook robust military 
actions when asked to do so by the UN.  Following a naval blockade and the imposition of a no-fly 
zone, NATO conducted an air campaign that compelled the warring parties to agree to negotiations 
which resulted in the Dayton Peace Accord. Next was the establishment of an international 
peacekeeping force, IFOR. Within hours of being given the political green light on 20 December, 
1995, NATO began the deployment of the required forces in what was a well-planned and 
successful operation. Almost 60,000 troops from 30 nations deployed and took up peacekeeping 
duties in the first month.11  
It is worth noting that Russia played a substantial role in the peacekeeping effort, providing an entire 
brigade under a shared command arrangement between Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR) General George Joulwan and Russian Colonel-General Leontiy Shevtsov who served as 
Deputy to SACEUR for Russian participation in IFOR.  
The NATO bombing of Serbia from March to June 1999, code-named Operation Allied Force, 
curtailed the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, led to the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, and 
the establishment of UNMIK, a UN mission in Kosovo. NATO forces provided the military 
component (KFOR) of some 50,000 troops. As the security environment improved, that number 
has been progressively reduced and now stands at approximately 5,000.12  
 
NATO Invokes Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty  
On 12 September 2001, the day following the terrorist attacks on the United States, the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s highest governing body, invoked Article Five of the Washington 
Treaty, which states,  
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all.” 13   
However, from reading the views of NATO critics, one would never know that Alliance military 
operations in Afghanistan were the result of Europe’s offer to assist the US. For example, Mr. 
Logan writes: 
“[T]he overall European contribution to the war [in Afghanistan] has been trivial compared 
to America’s. Despite Europe’s size and wealth, it is a military dwarf compared to the United 
States.” 
This view overstates the disparity of military effort between the US and its Allies and is not 
supported by the timeline for involvement in that theatre. Together with the UK, the US entered 
                                                 
11 All NATO nations, then numbering 16, participated in IFOR. They were eventually joined by 16 Non-NATO nations 
including; Austria, Bangladesh, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.  
12 Although Russia objected to the use of force in Serbia, it played a major role in mediating the withdrawal of Serbian 
forces from Kosovo and the entry of NATO forces under a UN mandate.  
13 North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949. Accessed on 31 August 2011. 
 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 
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into Afghanistan in October 2001, an intervention which resulted in the removal of the Taliban 
from power.14 This was not conducted under a NATO umbrella. Thereafter a new Afghan 
government was established in December 2001 with the support of an International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). This force, created under a number of UN security council resolutions, 
was initially led by the UK, then later Turkey, and subsequently jointly by Germany and the 
Netherlands. In 2003, NATO took over the ISAF mission and responsibility for Kabul and the 
surrounding area. It was not until 2006 that NATO took responsibility from the US for the 
embattled southern region. Since NATO’s first involvement, non-US NATO Allies have deployed 
substantial forces to Afghanistan, suffering more than 900 fatalities, accounting for some 32% of all 
coalition casualties in that conflict.15  That NATO critics would paint this substantial, prolonged 
effort and sacrifice by Allies as trivial suggests a biased interpretation of the facts.16  
 
Costs and Burden Sharing 
Critics also argue that NATO is expensive (in particular to the US). As Mr. Logan writes:  
“If the current Washington climate of austerity can serve any fruitful end, surely it should be 
to reconsider such foolish alliances.” 
What this statement ignores is the relatively low cost and the considerable efficiency evident in 
NATO operations. First, one needs to understand that, because the 28 NATO Allies pool their 
resources, their individual defence expenditures are lower than they would otherwise be. The end of 
the Cold War saw US defence expenditures drop from a high under President Reagan of some 6.2% 
of GDP to a low of approximately 3% in the last years of the Clinton administration.17 While it is 
true that US defence expenditures have doubled in real terms since that time, this is due almost 
entirely to the expenditures related to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.18 The idea that US 
expenditures for NATO have contributed to this increase is simply not the case.  
Based on cost sharing arrangements, the US contributes approximately 22% of NATO common 
funding. One often hears quoted the collective budget for NATO is less than 1% of the collective 
defence expenditures for NATO nations. This actually overstates the cost. For 2012, the US 
President requested $807 million for its share of the contribution to NATO common funding;19 this 
represents approximately one tenth of one percent of the US defence budget. Even these figures 
                                                 
14 The UK and US were quickly joined by other nations, both from NATO nations and those not members of the 
Alliance. By the spring of 2002, special forces from Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and Norway were on the 
ground as coalition Partners.  
15 Source: iCasualties.org, retrieved 22 November 2011, http://icasualties.org/oef/ 
16 Some Allies have made substantial sacrifices which, because of their relatively small size, are often overlooked. 
Estonia, with its population of 1.34 million, has suffered nine fatalities, a higher per capita rate of battle deaths than the 
United States.  
17 “Historical tables, Budget of the US Government, Fiscal year 2011; Office of the management and Budget; accessed 8 
December 2011. www.budget.gov.  
18 According to an analysis by the Strategic Studies Institute in 2009, if the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom are 
excluded, average US defence expenditures from 2003-2008 are only 3.25% of GDP, Joel R. Hillison, “New Nato 
Members: Security Consumers or Producers?” Strategic Studies Institute, pg. 7, April 2009  
19 Carl Elk, “NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 
March 10, 2011. 
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overstate the relative burden to the US. As only one of 28 Allies, the 22% US share might appear to 
be an excessive contribution. However, US GDP is approximately equal to the combined GDP all 
other NATO members.20 If the NATO common funding formula were to be rigidly applied, the US 
share would exceed 50%.21   
One of the reasons for this relatively low overall cost is that NATO has been, and remains, a 
streamlined organisation. Despite the addition of twelve new members since 1999, and the added 
burden of operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, maritime counter-terrorism and counter-
piracy operations, and most recently operations in Libya, NATO maintains a relatively small cadre. 
NATO employs some 1,200 civilians in its HQ in Brussels.22 Planned reductions in its command 
structure will cut the number of military posts from 13,000 to 8,000. Reform of NATO agencies is 
also underway and will reduce the number of agencies from 13 to three, with a corresponding 
reduction in personnel.   
The cost of belonging to NATO should be compared against the cost each nation would face if 
required to provide for its own security independently or through alternative cooperative 
mechanisms. If the Alliance ceased to exist, the US would need to seek alternate security 
arrangements with its strategic partners, increase its defence spending, or substantially alter its 
foreign policy objectives.23 
One also needs to remember that the US has critical interests in Asia, and thus maintains large land, 
air, and maritime forces in the Pacific that have nothing to do with NATO. An indication of how 
seriously the US takes its strategic commitments in the Pacific is the size of the military forces 
assigned to US Pacific Command (USPACOM). With a total of some 325,000 military and civilian 
personnel, six carrier battle groups, 180 ships and 1,800 aircraft,24 USPACOM would rank as the 
third largest military in NATO, after the US and Turkey. It is arguable that these forces, including 
those on the west coast of the US, in Okinawa, Korea, and Hawaii, are affordable in part because 
the US’s NATO Allies are, to a considerable extent, protecting US interests in the European theatre.  
 
Operational Contributions in Context 
A final point worth addressing in the common criticism of the Alliance is the jaundiced view of 
European operational efforts, considering these to be so lamentable that the US has to repeatedly 
come to the rescue. In reference to the operation in Libya, Mr. Logan states: 
                                                 
20 For a very though analysis of burden sharing among NATO allies, including defence spending as a percentage of 
GDP, see Hillison, “New Nato Members: Security Consumers or Producers?”, April 2009 
21 Elk, “NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues,” pg. 6. In 2003 US GDP was 53% of 
the combined GDP of the US and NATO’s allies. However, the addition of new members since that time and the 
reintegration of France in 2009 to the integrated military structure have resulted in a slight decrease in the US burden for 
common funding.  
22 In comparison, the European Commission has some 38,000 and the Pentagon houses a daily working population of 
some 24,000.  
23 Beyond the benefits of shared logistics, intelligence, basing and over-flight rights the US, as a member of NATO, is 
able to operate with both Allies and Partners entirely in English, thanks to 60-plus years of NATO standardization.  
24 Source: USPACOM fact sheet, retrieved on 22 November 2011, accessed 11 November 2011. 
http://www.pacom.mil/web/Site_Pages/USPACOM/Facts.shtml 
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“Germany and other NATO members sat out the fight. The U.S. military provided most of 
the surveillance capabilities, largely via drones, that enabled NATO pilots to bomb Col. 
Moammar Gadhafi’s loyalists. European air forces ran out of precision-guided munitions 
and had to come begging for Uncle Sam to provide some. Thus, Washington essentially 
borrowed money from China to buy ordnance to give to Europe to drop on Libya. The 
post-Cold War NATO rationale is that we agree to spend and fight and the Europeans agree 
to support us - sometimes.” 
This is a distorted view. Within the NATO framework, allies pool their resources to produce a mix 
of tailored capabilities that can accomplish military missions as directed by the North Atlantic 
Council. This means that individual allies provide capabilities in areas where they have existing 
capacity and expertise, each one complementing the efforts of the others. The result is that NATO 
seeks to provide a combined tailored capability to carry out the full spectrum of military missions.25 
NATO benefits from the division and specialization of labor, and there is little need for nations to 
duplicate each other’s capabilities.  
Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are a case in point. Although NATO members are, in general, 
responsible for arming their own aircraft, in NATO it is common procedure to cross-level or share 
the available PGMs when necessary to achieve an operational effect. No nation, including the US, 
stockpiles unlimited quantities of these very expensive resources. For the US to provide PGMs to 
those Allies who were doing the heavy lifting in Libya is normal and expected. This type of cross-
levelling is a healthy and positive expression of cooperation, not a sign of inherent weakness. Allies 
routinely reimburse each other or provide in-kind support in accordance with existing agreements,26 
as will be the case with PGM expenditure in the Libya operation. NATO contributions are carefully 
negotiated with the capabilities and interests of the both the Alliance and its individual members in 
mind. 
 
Libya in Perspective 
Now that the operation in Libya has been completed, it is worth considering in some detail what 
took place. NATO took over the mission on 31 March 2011, in a smooth transition from national 
authorities that had already begun operations under the associated UN Security Council resolutions. 
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) had three components: an air component to enforce a no-fly 
zone; an arms embargo, enforced primarily by sea; and a mission to protect civilians and civilian 
population centres. In total, NATO Allies conducted a total of over 26,000 sorties, including almost 
10,000 strike sorties.27 Mr Logan complains that not all Allies have physically contributed to this 
effort. While this is true and there will always be room for improvement, it is also true that not all 
                                                 
25 In February 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for further measures to “pool and share 
capabilities, to set the right priorities, and to better coordinate our efforts.” NATO web page, Accessed 11 November 2011. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70327.htm 
26 The basic framework for cooperation in military logistic matters is the establishment of Acquisition and Cross-Serving 
Agreements (ACSAs).  This mechanism, established by US Law (USC 10, 138), allows for the exchange of logistic 
support, supplies and services on a reimbursable basis between the US, NATO Allies and Partner nations. Source: 
Global Security.Org, accessed 22 November 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/acsa.htm 
27 Source: NATO and Libya, Operational Update, 23 Oct 2011, Accessed on 22 November 2011,  
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111024_111024-oup-update.pdf 
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Allies are needed or desired for every operation, and some Allies have increased their contributions 
elsewhere.   
Relatively small nations like Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have each contributed 
six F-16s to the operations.28 Proportionately, this is a large contribution for such small countries to 
make. The four nations together have a combined population of 38 million, i.e. approximately one 
eighth the size of the US population. If the US were to contribute combat aircraft in the same 
proportion, it would have to provide almost 200 F-16s. In the end, non-US NATO and Partner 
nations flew 75% of all sorties.29 The significant contribution of the US, including critical enablers, a 
large maritime component, and dozens of aircraft, needs to be seen in the light of its much larger 
size. Commentators should recognise the substantial contribution and sacrifice European allies are 
making in this effort. It is important to remember that almost twice as many people live in New 
York City as in all of Norway.  
All NATO nations contributed to OUP either directly or indirectly.  Turkey, for example, operating 
under national, rather than NATO authority, conducted one of the largest and most successful non-
combatant evacuations in modern history.30 Beginning within 24 hours of the outbreak of hostilities 
in Libya, it used its civilian fleet of ferries and its national airline, in conjunction with military air and 
sealift, to evacuate 28,600 civilians, including 8,600 non-Turkish nationals from 57 countries. The 
entire operation was completed within 14 days. 
   
Criticism Revisited 
It is worth revisiting the arguments of NATO’s critics once again in the light of the information 
provided above. Mr. Logan contends that NATO is an expensive farce which should have been 
disbanded at the end of the Cold War. While we cannot possibly know what would have happened 
without NATO’s efforts in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is hard to imagine that 
events would have been better had it followed Mr. Logan’s advice and disbanded.  We should not 
forget that President Gorbachev publicly said that his acceptance of a reunified Germany was 
conditioned on Germany remaining embedded in the NATO Alliance.31 NATO could not have 
disbanded after German reunification without serious risks.  
NATO has helped usher in a world that includes a peaceful, reunified Germany; a prosperous, stable 
and free Eastern Europe; and a united Alliance that delivered on the promise to protect and defend 
member states when attacked. It remains every bit as vital to security and peace in Europe as it was 
during the Cold War. This steadfast political commitment over time has meant that NATO nations 
can individually reduce defence spending to levels lower than they would be if they were not 
members of the Alliance. The US is a major beneficiary of these arrangements; its commitments in 
the Pacific would likely not be affordable were it not for the European Allies’ strength and 
                                                 
28 Source: The Guardian, accessed on 23 November 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#data 
29 Source: NATO Media Operation Centre, response to query. 23 November 2011.  
30 Turkey also contributed frigates and submarines to the maritime arms embargo and fighters to the enforcement of the 
no-fly zone.  
31 Klaus Wiegrefe, “Germany’s Unlikely Diplomatic Triumph,” Spiegel Online, accessed on 22 November 2011. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-719848,00.html 
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preparedness. Actual costs for NATO are very small in both real and relative terms. The permanent 
NATO staffs and command arrangements are lean and efficient. The pooling and subsequent cross-
balancing of military capabilities is not a weakness or failure, but rather a strength acquired through 
NATO’s careful defence planning and operational tailoring.  
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NATO’s Policy in Africa 
Initiated in Sudan, Continued in Libya  
Glen Segell 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a regional security alliance comprising the 
United States, Canada and 24 European states with a treaty agreement to assist each other on the 
basis of one for all and all for one. The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), upon which NATO is based, 
conforms to Chapter VIII Article 52 of the United Nations Charter (1945). It foresaw regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security.1 
Throughout the bipolar two-superpower Cold War, NATO acted under the leadership of the United 
States to counter another regional organization, the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union. NATO 
collaborated with other regional organizations such as CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS that operated 
in the Cold War era but have since ceased to exist. In the post Cold War era of the early 1990s, 
NATO and the United Nations reaffirmed their desire to share a commitment to maintaining 
international peace and security. At that point it was not clear the source or nature of threats to 
peace and security. NATO states prepared for local, regional, and global eventualities. When threats 
emerged the United Nation’s Security Council Resolutions provided NATO with a mandate for 
operations outside of its traditional North Atlantic region in Afghanistan and a framework for the 
NATO training mission in Iraq.2 NATO also undertook disaster relief operations in Pakistan and 
escorted merchant ships carrying the World Food Programme’s humanitarian supplies to Somalia. 
Other regional organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the Africa Union (AU) adopted 
peace and security mechanisms in their own regions even though they had primarily been created for 
economic considerations. NATO and these regional organisations were like-minded in sharing 
similar goals which saw joint operations. This was first witnessed in the Balkans (1995-2004) 
between NATO and the EU and in Sudan (2005) between NATO and the AU. Consequently 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept was adopted at the Summit meeting in Lisbon (November 2010) 
stressing that NATO develop new capabilities and partnerships.3  
The NATO operation in Libya is a continuation of this policy in three aspects 1) its desire to 
maintain international peace and security, 2) its desire to do so in collaboration with the United 
Nations and other regional organisations, 3) and its policy in the North Africa region resulting from 
its first mission to Africa (Sudan 2005) for humanitarian purposes. On the first two, NATO 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya implemented United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1973 (17 March 2011).4 It called for UN member states and regional organisations to take ―all 
necessary measures‖ to protect citizens in Libya. In doing so NATO did nothing more and nothing 
less than meeting its obligations under the United Nations Resolution – no NATO ground troops 
participated in the operation.5 The latter is the most important to detail why NATO decided to 
become involved in Libya and will continue to be involved both in Africa and in collaborating with 
other regional security alliances. 
                                                          
1 United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 52, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml (2 
December 2012) 
2 NATO’s relations with the UN, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm  (2 Decemnber 2012) 
3 NATO adopts new strategic concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68172.htm  (2 December 2012) 
4 United Nations Security Council, SC/10200, 17 March 2011, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm  (2 December 2011) 
5 NATO and Libya, Operation Unified Protector, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm?  (2 
December 2011) 
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No NATO treaty obligates its member states if there is no direct threat to a NATO member state. 
Yet, this is exactly what took place in Sudan and was replicated in Libya. From April 2005 to 
December 2007, NATO agreed to provide airlift, logistics, training, and related support to the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) which was deployed to the Darfur region on humanitarian 
grounds. The main contributing NATO countries were the United States, United Kingdom, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany. In the deployment of NATO forces, there was no mention 
of which article of which treaty was being invoked. Hence, NATO and the African Union (AU) did 
not have any formal relations except on the functional level. Similarly in Libya NATO operations 
were launched on humanitarian considerations. No formal relations existed between NATO or any 
of its member states with any of the Libyan rebel forces. Although NATO forces are not currently 
engaged in operations in either Sudan or Libya, it is important to understand how and why NATO 
first became involved in the region, why it did so on humanitarian considerations and to maintain 
international peace and security, why it collaborated with another regional security alliance and why 
it would do so again.  
 
The formulation of NATO policy to humanitarian intervention in Africa  
The Darfur region of Sudan is no different from other parts of Africa, or indeed the world, that 
have faced tribal conflict for centuries over the territorial imperatives related to the ownership, 
settlement or usage of land and water. British colonial rule over the region from the late 19th to mid 
20th century was unable to ameliorate this particular conflict. More recently, conflict erupted in 
Darfur in February 2003 when local rebels in Darfur took up arms, complaining of discrimination 
and oppression by Sudan’s Arab-dominated government. The government was accused of 
unleashing Arab tribal militia, known as the Janjaweed, against civilians in a campaign of murder, 
rape and arson. In 2008, the president of Sudan was faced with an indictment from the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and crimes against humanity. During the period of NATO 
assistance to the AU, between 2005 and 2007, the conflict could be described as low-intensity in 
military terms between local armed groups, militias, the armed forces of Sudan and Chad, and bandit 
groups sponsored by both sides. Accurate figures are hard to come by, but there is little doubt that 
by 2005, when the AU requested NATO assistance, there were few left in Darfur who had not felt 
the conflict. The international attention in 2005 focused predominately on internally displaced 
persons (IDP), refugees in neighbouring Chad, and atrocities inflicted on civilians on a scale and 
magnitude that required outside intervention. 
The event that initiated NATO involvement commenced formally on 26 April 2005. It was well 
known at the time that NATO member states had been expressing deep concern since 2003 over 
the conflict in Darfur and atrocities against civilians. They were uncertain on how to ameliorate the 
situation but were engaged in ongoing diplomatic efforts, especially at the United Nations (UN). 
Numerous debates and limited sanctions were levelled at the Sudanese government, yet  the Security 
Council was unable to pass a resolution to authroize armed intervention. A permanent member of 
the Council, China, had shown reluctance to see such a resolution and would probably have vetoed 
it if one had been proposed. However, the AU had reached agreement amongst its members to send 
a peacekeeping force – AMIS – based on provisions of its Constitutive Act that permitted it to do 
so. However, the AU lacked the capabilities to deploy this force and AMIS lacked the necessary 
experience to undertake the mission.6  
                                                          
6 Glen Segell, ―The United Nations Africa Union Mission in Darfur – UNAMID‖, Strategic Insights, Volume VII, Issue 1, 
February 2008 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Feb/segellFeb08.pdf (12 October 2011). 
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It was no surprise that on 26 April 2005 the AU requested assistance, in a letter from the Chairman 
of the Commission of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konaré to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer. The letter requested NATO logistics assistance to expand the AMIS force aimed at ending 
violence in Darfur and improving the humanitarian situation. At the same time, the European Union 
(EU) received a similar request. In clarification of the letter of request, Mr. Konaré, visited NATO 
Headquarters on 17 May 2005 – the first ever visit to the headquarters by an AU official. 
It is important to stress that this was the first time in NATO’s history that another regional political-
security alliance with no NATO members had requested such humanitarian assistance . It therefore 
appeared that no NATO member state had any obligation to commit forces to NATO and that 
NATO had no treaty obligation to provide any assistance. Sudan was not within the regional remit 
of NATO’s operations and no NATO member state faced any direct security or defence threat from 
what was taking place in Darfur. However, it was also apparent at the time that it would be hard 
pressed for NATO to resist providing some form of assistance to the AU, given the magnitude of 
atrocities and the inability or lack of willingness of anyone else to take action.  
It could be assumed that the leadership of NATO would be intricately involved in the intervention. 
A study analysing the speeches of De Hoop Scheffer shows that he was a cautious public advocate 
for extensive and sustained NATO operations in Darfur.7 This was despite his openly favoured 
position that the world could not turn a blind eye to atrocities against civilians. Despite his caution, 
he was an instrumental arbiter in the ongoing debate among European states over whether  NATO 
should be the sole forum for military cooperation or whether the EU should assume a more 
prominent role. 
When the request of the AU was made known to NATO member states, they took the same 
position they had for many years: the best way to deliver security to Darfur was through those with 
the primary responsibility to do it – the government of Sudan. However, they also knew that the 
government of Sudan was not going to do this and, indeed, was the cause of the problem. This 
posed a dilemma over which international actors should assume responsibility for protecting 
civilians being killed as a direct result of Sudanese government policies. After the problems 
experienced in Iraq, NATO states were reluctant to pursue policies of ―regime change‖. Taking this 
into consideration, on 27 April 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) asked the Alliance’s military 
authorities to provide, as a matter of urgency, advice on possible NATO support to the AU and, if 
possible, whether this could also be done in co-ordination with the EU. This advice was prepared in 
full consultation, transparency and complementarity with the AU, the EU and the UN.  
On 24 May 2005, the NAC, after receiving advice from NATO military authorities, agreed on initial 
military options for possible NATO support. These options included support to the AU in the areas 
of strategic airlift deployment, training (for example in command and control and operational 
planning), and improving the intelligence capabilities of the AU mission in Darfur.8 Such support 
did not include the provision of combat troops. In announcing this, De Hoop Scheffer  said that 
NATO ―will consult in the coming days with the AU and others on how to transform these initial 
offers into concrete proposals responding to a specific request‖.9 The Secretary General stressed that 
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the AU remained ―in the driving seat to solve this difficult conflict and that the Alliance’s role is to 
contribute to strengthening the AU’s capability to meet this challenge‖.10 
An elaboration of De Hoop Scheffer’s thinking and NATO’s policy and strategy towards Africa 
highlighted that NATO member states no longer believed that they were constrained by the treaty 
obligations that had been formulated during the Cold War. NATO member states had voiced their 
intent to undertake some sort of action in the forum of the UN and EU in support of the AU as all 
were concerned about the plight of civilians in Darfur. NATO member states, especially the United 
States, saw NATO as a means to implement what they stood for as sovereign states caring for 
humanity at large. De Hoop Scheffer explained that Darfur showed the need for close cooperation 
between international organisations as an element of what he called ―modern security‖, and that 
Darfur showed that the international community was ready to support the AU. As a result, NATO 
commenced a non-combatant military operation in close consultation and in coordination with the 
EU, the UN and the AU.  
The lessons of Iraq were noted and it was clear that any military operation would have to take into 
account the government of Sudan. The situation in Darfur was a direct consequence of  Sudanese 
government policy. NATO was not intending to embark on a change of regime in Sudan. Yet 
NATO would airlift foreign forces onto the sovereign territory of Sudan to protect and engage in 
efforts against the policy of the government of Sudan and its implementation by the Sudanese armed 
forces. So NATO made clear that it would only implement its policy once the government of Sudan 
had given the green light to the AU. This was a difficult issue since there was no direct relationship 
between NATO and the government in Khartoum, and there was also no intention of establishing 
one. Furthermore, the largest potential contributor, the United States, had a dichotomy of interests 
as 1) it wished to maintain Khartoum as an ally in the war on terror, and 2) it believed that genocide 
was being perpetrated in Darfur.11  
These factors were not considerations for the AU. The founding documents of the AU, signed in 
2000, establishes ―the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of 
the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity‖.12 Although the AU favours African solutions for Africa, it is also pragmatic, and this was 
one such situation where it recognised that it needed help from other international and regional 
organisations. 
When NATO announced its decision to provide non-combatant military support to the AMIS 
mission, six former foreign ministers from different countries wrote a joint newspaper article 
showing moral support for the ethics of NATO’s intended action. They called for NATO to use its 
Rapid Response Force. This was not beyond the will of NATO member states, but it would require 
authority from the UN Security Council for a Chapter VII resolution, especially to declare a no-fly 
zone over Darfur. It was clear, however, that China would oppose this. So NATO pursued the basic 
option of logistical airlift support and training.13 
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While the diplomatic process pressed on, the North Atlantic Council turned to General James Jones, 
then the Supreme Allied Commander Europe  (SACEUR), asking him to take the lead in putting a 
liaison team on the ground to support the mission. General Jones looked to his command centre in 
Heidelberg, Germany, and asked Allied Land Component Command Headquarters (ALCC HQ 
HD) to take the lead in providing a liaison team on the ground. He chose Brigadier General Andre 
Defawe, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to be his Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO). 
The other Heidelberg members of the liaison team were Sergeant Major Pascal Wijkman (Senior 
NCOIC), Lieutenant Colonel Carsten Petersen (Operations Cell Director) and Lieutenant Colonel 
Ed Mead (Military Assistant to the SMLO).14 
Operationally, the NATO mission was undertaken by Joint Command Lisbon, Portugal – under the 
overall command of Allied Command Operations – where the local responsibility for the NATO 
SMLO team operating from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The SMLO team was NATO’s single military 
point of contact in Addis Ababa with the AU. In addition, it was NATO's military point of contact 
with the representatives of the various countries contributing troops to the AMIS operation, the 
representatives of the donor nations pledging support to the AU, as well as the UN, the EU, and 
various embassies. 
While the military machinery was being put into place—predominately US Air Force transport 
aircraft—the diplomatic process continued. The NATO Secretary General participated in a meeting 
in Addis Ababa on 26 May 2005, chaired by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and AU 
Commission President Konaré, where he pledged international support for the AU’s mission in 
Darfur.  
Following that meeting, and based on further clarification and confirmation of the AU’s 
requirements—as well as consultations with the AU, the EU and the UN—the NATO NAC agreed 
on 8 June on the detailed modalities and extent of Alliance support. The decision to support the AU 
with strategic deployment and staff capacity building was formally announced on 9 June, at the 
meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence in Brussels.15 
 
Implementing the strategy and policy 
Despite the agreement in principle to provide support to the AU, it was not as straightforward in 
implementing it. A few days before the 9 June NATO announcement, an open split broke out 
between those states favoring an EU option and those favouring a NATO option on which 
organisation should coordinate measures in support of AMIS.16 In particular the United States (US) 
and Canada preferred NATO (through SHAPE, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), 
given that the US and Canada were not EU members, while France preferred the EU.17 The United 
Kingdom (UK) was amenable to both the EU and NATO, since the UK was already providing 
direct financial assistance to AMIS (£32 million in 2004 which increased to £52 million in 2006), as 
well as a chief police expert from  the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to advise the AU 
police commissioner on the AMIS mission's civil policing aspects.18 Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Norway remained undecided. An important factor for the European members of NATO who 
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preferred the EU above NATO was that, unlike NATO, the EU Rapid Reaction Force had a 
defined purpose that included humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations. The EU had been 
helping the AU since 2004 when NATO had not appeared particularly interested in Africa. The EU 
also had recent experience on the African continent: Operation Artemis (June-September 2003) in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which sent 1,700 troops to secure the town of Bunia, 
allowing the return of 60,000 refugees.19  
The escalating situation on the ground in Darfur was the deciding factor which shortened the 
disagreement, leading both the EU and NATO to provide support to the AU-led military group in 
Addis Ababa, with the choice of organisations (EU or NATO) being left to individual member 
states of both regional organisations.20 Given that United States would provide most of the aircraft 
for the airlift operations, it was clear that NATO would be the main airlift-supporting organisation 
to AMIS. France worked solely through the EU, while the UK worked through both the EU and 
NATO.21 Other countries, like Norway and the Netherlands, provided vehicles and equipment as 
part of their commitment to both the EU and NATO. 
There was open relief in NATO over the quick resolution to the quarrel, and throughout the 
mission there was complete transparency between the EU and NATO. Despite this, there remained 
some apprehension that the Berlin Plus framework had not been invoked – this being the December 
2002 agreement between the EU and NATO regarding cooperation on international security. The 
Berlin Plus agreement was seen as essential to European regional security, given that the 
membership of both organisations overlapped to a great extent and that the EU Rapid Reaction 
Force and the NATO Rapid Reaction Force would draw from the same limited pool of deployable 
European forces and equipment. Such apprehension on the availability of forces was exemplified by 
the commitment, if not the over-commitment, to other ongoing conflicts, including Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and peace-support operations in the Balkans. 
The Berlin Plus agreement was significant for NATO assistance to the AU, given the perceived need 
for a common NATO-EU planning centre or chain of command. However, establishing a common 
command centre could have distracted and delayed assisting the AU by months or even years. 
NATO consequently planned through SHAPE, while the EU used the Strategic Airlift Coordination 
Centre (SALCC) in Eindhoven, Netherlands. Any apprehension was short-lived since on the 
ground, the military achieved tactical cooperation to ensure mission success and, within a few weeks, 
Darfur was being presented as a perfect example of NATO-EU cooperation in assisting the AU.22 
The longer-term ramifications are still be to be evaluated, especially on whether both the EU and 
NATO could have done more at the time and how they could do it better in the future.  
Turning back to the case, cooperation on the ground between the AU, EU, and NATO started 
when the NATO liaison team from ALCC HQ arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in mid-June 2005 
and immediately began to set up the NATO/AMIS liaison headquarters. The mandate from the 
SACEUR was to liaise with the AU and Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), which was co-located 
with the AU Headquarters in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, and coordinated support in three specific areas:  
1) strategic airlift (deployment of AMIS forces into Darfur);  
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2) support of the UN-led map exercise (MAPEX); and  
3) execution of staff capacity-building training for the DITF staff and the force headquarters.23 
In a rapid display of capability, NATO was able to launch its airlift operations in support of AMIS 
with the first movement of Nigerian troops on 1 July. This was achieved by having NATO 
personnel deployed on the ground to coordinate NATO’s airlift support. In reality, this only 
required eight people – seven in Addis Ababa and one in Nigeria. These were later transferred to 
other countries based on the airlift schedule. Airlifts of personnel from Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa continued through July, August and September. The initial airlift 
was performed by United States C-130 and C-17 and carried approximately 680 troops to the region, 
while the United Kingdom later supported the airlift of another 680 troops.24 
Thus, the first task of NATO support to the AU, immediate and decisive strategic airlift, was 
successful within a three-month period. Integral to the success was the movement and control 
specialists and the NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer team. The latter succeeded in the main 
task to coordinate the planning and execution of cargo and troops between the troop contributing 
nations (TCN), the DITF Headquarters and various NATO air movement centres. On paper, the 
task seemed easy and the numbers seemed relatively small. However, it was a complex task because 
the troop movements had to be coordinated around eleven different Aerial Ports of Embarkation 
(APOE) and three different Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APOD).25 It was clear that NATO was 
thus able to engage in a trans-regional military support operation in Africa without previous 
expertise. 
This foray into Africa intrigued the world, and NATO was publicly questioned by the press over 
which NATO Treaty was being invoked, which NATO member state was being threatened and, if 
none, then why NATO was becoming involved in Africa. Jamie Shea (NATO Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General for External Relations) responded,  
NATO needs to use its forces in a reasoned manner with clear objectives which might 
not only include active conflict but also situations to address human indignities 
certainly as in Darfur, and I think that it's very appropriate that we do have that 
involvement in a contingency like Darfur.26 
While the airlift was underway, NATO commenced its second task – that of staff capacity-building 
training. The NATO liaison team for this task worked with the DITF staff leadership and the 
tactical commanders on the ground to collect the staff capacity-building training requirements. A 
plan was formulated, and NATO responded by providing two phases of training, targeting two 
different training audiences. 27  
The first phase was conducted in August 2005 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the DITF Headquarters 
and was designed to train the DITF staff members on strategic level tasks. The second phase of the 
training was conducted in El-Fashir, Sudan, at the AMIS Force Headquarters compound and was 
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designed to train the Force Headquarters on operational and tactical level tasks. This training was 
widely accepted and in total, 114 Force Headquarters and Sector Headquarters staff officers were 
trained from all the combined Force HQ components (Military, Civilian Police, CIMIC and NGOs). 
NATO support was not confined solely to supporting the AU directly. As part of the initial 
diplomacy, it was clear that NATO would support UN initiatives to the AU as well as the EU in its 
assistance to the AU. As regards NATO support to the EU in its assistance to the AU, it was on 7 
August that NATO airlifted the first team of 49 AU civilian police as well as an additional 533 
military peacekeepers into Darfur.28 
Given these successes in airlift support and training, NATO then turned to the third critical mission 
that was requested. This was NATO support to the UN-led map exercise (MAPEX) designed to 
help AU personnel understand the theatre of operations and operate effectively within it, as well as 
to build their capacity to manage strategic operations.29 
Towards the end of August 2005, staff capacity-building activities started in Nairobi, Kenya. NATO 
helped to train AU personnel in key headquarters functions such as command and control, logistics, 
and planning. The UN asked NATO for assistance in helping to write the scenarios for the exercise 
and then to provide exercise controllers both in the Force Headquarters and the Sector 
headquarters. In a cost-effective operation, only sixteen NATO personnel were deployed to conduct 
the exercise and another eight to organise the staff capability building. In the words of both the AU 
and UN leadership during the exercise and in the after action review, ―NATO involvement and 
participation in the MAPEX was pinnacle to the success of the entire operation.‖30  
Thus, within six months of the initial request and within three months of the start of operations, a 
unique milestone was established. This was the first time that NATO was involved in an operation 
on the African continent where the NATO contingent was accepted as a full partner by the AU 
leadership and the collective group of partner nations from the AU, the EU and the UN. This 
resulted in the appointment of a NATO Civilian Senior Representative (NCSR) from the Norwegian 
embassy in Ethiopia on an informal basis to assist with the political contacts and to work directly 
with NATO Headquarters. Clearly, this particular NATO mission opened a whole new array of 
opportunities for the NATO alliance and cast a very positive light on its member states’ intentions 
to the international community  
Given this state of affairs, it was no surprise that on 21 September 2005 that the North Atlantic 
Council agreed to extend the duration of NATO’s airlift support in order to ensure the airlift of the 
remaining peacekeeping reinforcements in Darfur until 31 October 2005.  
 
Sustaining the strategy and policy 
The rapidity of the decision to support the AU had not left time to justify the actions to an eager 
public audience nor to undertake an introspective review of the decision and the initial 
implementation successes. In a show of transparency, an open discussion panel was therefore 
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organised on 30 September 2005 with the topic ―NATO, the AU, the UN and Darfur‖.31 The panel 
was chaired by Jamie Shea, with a panel of Eirini Lemos (resident UN expert on the NATO 
international staff), Dr. Klaus Becher (Associate Director of Wilton Park, UK) and Professor Mats 
Berdal (Kings College London). The panel highlighted that the policy was not a spontaneous 
decision. It had been clearly defined in political terms with military participation. The military had 
been given the ability and capability to undertake the mission. Strategic and tactical goals were clearly 
defined and limitations were clearly demarcated. The panel accepted that NATO’s success meant 
that it could expect more such requests in the future and it would be hard pressed to reject them, 
given this precedence.  
Since the NATO contribution to the AU missions had suffered no casualties and even gained 
immense public support following the panel discussion, the NAC agreed on 30 September 2005 to 
continue to offer support to the AU until 31 March 2006. The policy and strategy remained the 
same – the coordination of strategic airlift during further troop rotations of the peacekeeping forces 
as well as additional staff capacity building, in order to add to the military skills of the AU officers. 
Having reviewed the AU troop rotation schedule on 9 November 2005, the NAC amended this 
support until end May 2006.32 
Ultimately, NATO relies on its member states commitments and such decisions required high-level 
political consent. Clearly, the pressure was on for more to be attempted in Darfur. For example, on 
17 February 2006 President Bush called for a sizeable UN force and a bigger role for NATO in the 
peacekeeping effort.33 Similarly, the United Kingdom’s International Development Secretary 
frequently suggested that Darfur ―represented the most serious humanitarian emergency in the 
world today‖.34 
Hence, by mid-March 2006, Pentagon authorities were tasked with and had completed a review of 
various options, and were ready to back sending a large team of NATO advisers to Darfur. Secretary 
of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was briefed on the proposal and approved it for discussion with the 
White House and State Department. However, a larger force with a different mandate was never 
approved. A number of reasons were cited. Foremost, NATO relied solely on contributing member 
states; no single member state was willing to make a significant increase in forces, arguing that 
NATO as an alliance had a growing role in securing Afghanistan, and Darfur might distract from 
this role.35 Another concern was the fear that sending significant numbers of Europeans and North 
Americans could inflame regional sensitivities, particularly if the mainly Muslim Sudanese 
government opposed such a NATO deployment. This fear in part emanated from an Osama bin 
Laden tape that accused the United States of igniting strife in Darfur. Last, but not least, was the 
minimal domestic interest in Western countries about Darfur, in the sense that political elites 
perceived that they would neither gain nor lose any electoral or popular support by either invoking a 
smaller or larger military commitment through NATO or unilaterally. It was no surprise when 
NATO HQ announced on 29 March that NATO was neither planning, discussing, nor considering 
a NATO armed force on the ground in Darfur, though NATO would continue to provide what it 
                                                          
31 NATO STOPWATCH, Debate 1: NATO, the African Union, the United Nations and Darfur Special Interactive 
Video Forum Series with Jamie Shea, 30 September 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050930a.htm (12 
October 2011). 
32 NATO Documents, NATO’s Assistance to the African Union for Darfur, 2 April 2008, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/darfur/practice.html (12 October 2011). 
33 Jim Van der Hei and Colum Lynch, Washington Post Editorial, 17 February 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/09/AR2006040900957.html (12 October 2011). 
34 UN Document A/60/L.1 (Sixtieth Session, 20 September 2005), paragraphs 138-140. 
35 Bradley Graham and Colum Lynch, ―NATO Role in Darfur on Table‖, Washington Post, 10 April 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/09/AR2006040900957_pf.html (12 October 
2011). 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 36
was already providing.36 
It was at this stage that the UN escalated its efforts. First, the UN Security Council, for the first 
time, imposed sanctions on Sudan regarding issues relating to atrocities in Darfur. Secondly, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan formally appealed to NATO by way of a phone call to the NATO 
Secretary General on 27 March for help in fortifying the ability of the AU force to restrain armed 
groups and to ensure the safety of civilians.37 Lacking the mandate from a UN Security Council 
Resolution, all that the NAC could do was announce its readiness to continue NATO’s current 
mission. The formal statement to this effect came on 13 April, when the NAC announced its 
readiness to continue NATO’s current mission until 30 September 2006 in full consultation, 
transparency and complementarity with the EU, the UN and all other donors concerned.38 
Despite the good intentions and successes, all those involved knew that more was needed, and on 30 
May 2006 the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Egeland, visited 
NATO HQ to discuss Darfur and the role of the military in disaster relief. This was complemented 
on 2 June when the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, requested that 
NATO extend its airlift and training support. The NAC consulted the contributing NATO member 
states and decided to extend NATO’s assistance to AMIS until the end of 2006. 
Affirming this on 8 June 2006, NATO Defence Ministers stated NATO’s willingness to expand its 
training assistance to AMIS in the fields of Joint Operations Centres, pre-deployment certification, 
and lessons learned. They also stated NATO’s willingness to consider support to an anticipated 
follow-on UN mission to the AMIS mission.39 This follow-on AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping mission 
was at the time in the planning stage but was formally announced on 16 November 2006 in Addis 
Ababa, and would later be officially created in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (31 August 
2006). It would come into being on 1 January 2008 as UNAMID when AMIS was disbanded. 
Egeland’s efforts were successful to the extent that his initiatives were in time to be placed on the 
agenda of the NATO Riga Summit held on 28-29 November 2006. At the Riga Summit, NATO 
reaffirmed its support to the AU and its willingness to broaden this support. It also reiterated its 
commitment to coordinating with other international actors and regional alliances. 
Some 18 months after the first lift, NATO decided to extend its support mission for six additional 
months. This was after a meeting on 15 December 2006 between the Secretary General of NATO, 
Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, and US Ambassador Andrew Natsios, US Special Envoy to Darfur. 
Ambassador Natsios had just returned from an extensive mission in the region. They discussed the 
security and humanitarian situation in and around Darfur and concluded that any larger NATO 
commitment would be expensive, difficult due to the terrain especially the lack of water, could not 
be set up in a hurry and would be met by strong resistance from the government of Sudan who 
might view it as an act of war.40 Having concluded that a NATO reaction force intervention was not 
possible, other options for enhanced support were considered, and on 15 January 2007 NATO 
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announced that it would provide staff capacity training at the AU Mission HQ in Khartoum, in 
addition to training provided in El Fasher and Addis Ababa.41  
 
Conclusion 
Drawing a line on the chronology of NATO involvement in Sudan is possible, since AMIS was 
disbanded and replaced by a United Nations force (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007. However 
NATO continued to assist the AU. Shortly after the termination of the Sudan mission, NATO 
began to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).42 Assistance to the African 
Union has also continued in capacity building support to its long term peacekeeping capabilities, in 
particular to the African Standby Force (ASF). NATO coordinates it assistance missions principally 
with the United Nations and the European Union, but is also expanding such missions to include 
bilateral partners as well.  
From March to October 2011, NATO Operation Unified Protector in Libya implemented United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The Sudan and Libyan missions shared several 
similarities: 1) NATO did not provide combat troops on the ground, 2) the decision to be involved 
was based on concerns for the lives of individuals who were unable to defend themselves, i.e. 
humanitarian reasons, 3) there were no relations nor contact between NATO and the governments 
of the states were the NATO air forces were used, 4) the deployment of military force was 
authorized by a United Nations mandate, and 5) there was collaboration with other regional security 
alliances.  
Inherent to NATO’s policy are three factors 1) its desire to maintain international peace and 
security, 2) its desire to do so in collaboration with the United Nations and regional security alliances 
3) its desire to be involved in the Africa region on humanitarian considerations. The successful 
outcome of such missions and operations show that regional security alliances such as NATO have 
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NATO’s Relations with New Members and Partners 
Contributions to Peacekeeping, Counterterrorism, and Humanitarian Missions 
Ivan Dinev Ivanov1 
 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a profound transformation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO): the introduction of new missions designed to meet the new demands 
in international security, the development of allied capabilities to execute these missions, and the 
incorporation of a dozen new allies from Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, NATO’s 
increased role in international security led to enhanced cooperation not only with its former 
adversaries, but also with other nations around the globe that were interested in expanding 
cooperation with the organization. In the course of the last two decades, NATO developed a 
number of partnerships with nations from the Caucuses, Central Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa, and even the Pacific Rim. The 2010 Strategic Concept recognized that the wide network of 
partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe is intended to “further 
promote Euro-Atlantic security” as these partnerships make a “concrete and valued contribution to 
the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.”2 
How do NATO’s relationships with its new members and partners affect these nations’ decisions to 
participate in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and humanitarian operations? This study surveys the 
involvement of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic partners (EAPs) and new members in various international 
operations; it argues that the alliance’s success in drawing new participants into international 
operations is largely determined by three different groups of variables: (1) the prospects for 
membership; (2) the presence of unresolved disputes with neighboring countries and; (3) the degree 
of internal political divisions in these transitional societies. This article will examine these three 
variables. First, it will show that when NATO upgraded its relationship with prospective members 
and signaled high chances for membership, these nations significantly increased their participation in 
international operations. Second, it will discuss how the presence of unresolved conflicts could 
effectively paralyze integration into NATO as was the case of Macedonia and Georgia thus 
constraining these countries’ involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, it will illustrate how deep political 
divisions in Ukraine led to a plummeting public approval for membership and subsequent 
withdrawal of support for NATO-led operations. The three variables together point to the 
conclusion that the alliance was overall fairly effective in persuading the new members to participate 
more actively in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian missions. At the same time, it has 
had a mixed record in engaging its Euro-Atlantic partners (EAP) to become involved in various 
international efforts. Although NATO’s incentives have facilitated EAPs’ contributions to 
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian missions, these incentives have not always proven 
sufficient to overcome neighbors’ opposition or domestic resistance to membership. 
                                                
1 The author wishes to thank Dinshaw Mistry, Michael Schoeder, Carrie-Jo Coaplen, Richard Harknett and the 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. He is also grateful to 
the graduate students at the University of Cincinnati for their assistance with this research and insightful feedback. 
2 “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 19 November 2010, Lisbon, Portugal. http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-
2010-eng.pdf (accessed May 30, 2011). 
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Explaining the Impact of NATO Membership and Partnerships 
In the course of the past two decades, NATO managed to develop an advanced web of partnerships 
in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the now defunct North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
that was created in 1991 and replaced in 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
The latter provided the framework for the oldest and largest partnership program—Partnership for 
Peace (PfP)—and served as a foundation for several additional partner relationships with selected 
PfP nations. These included the Individual Partnership Action Plan Program (IPAP), the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC), and the NATO–Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (NUCDP). 
For those nations interested in expanding their relations with NATO and possibly seeking 
membership, the organization offered Intensified Dialogue and even a Membership Action Plan. New 
partnerships also emerged outside of the Euro-Atlantic area in the Greater Middle East (the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) and with such countries as 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, which have partnered successfully with NATO in the war 
in Afghanistan.3 
The introduction of Euro-Atlantic partnerships underwent several major stages of adaptation. The 
Brussels Summit of 1994 officially approved the program, which at that time constituted a novel, 
cooperative framework and “a diplomatic invention of first order.”4 Nonetheless, this flexible 
format of cooperation was hardly able to meet the expectations of most leaders in Eastern Europe 
who sought NATO membership as their ultimate foreign policy goal. Similarly, PfP extended no 
formal guarantees or clear promises for membership as Brussels tried to insure itself against possible 
accusations from Moscow that these partnerships were intended to entice the former Soviet 
satellites into the Western camp. First step toward expansion was taken at the Madrid Summit in 
1997 when three countries from the Visegrad group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) 
were invited to join NATO. Since then, two additional rounds of expansion occurred in 2004 and 
2009 with a total of nine new members joining the organization. 
Scholars of international alliances do not hold uniform understanding as to the reasons that NATO 
needs these new members and partners, and how these nations benefit from their enhanced 
cooperation with the alliance. Institutionalists argue that alliances expand beyond mere aggregation 
of military capabilities; they serve as security coalitions differing in their purposes and “degree of 
their institutionalization.” Alliances also engage smaller nations to participate in their decision-
making process, thus providing for transparency, consultation, and incentives for cooperative 
strategies.5 NATO membership offered unprecedented security guarantees to the new members 
under Article Five. In contrast, the EAPs do not extend any formal security commitments to their 
participants; they only provide an opportunity for these nations to participate in an enhanced 
security dialogue, to exchange ideas about military transformation and adaptation, to discuss their 
possible contributions to global military operations, and occasionally seek advice on how to handle 
terrorist challenges.6 
                                                
3 For further details about NATO partnerships see Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson 
(eds.) The Power of Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, New York; London, 2011). 
4 Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the battle for consensus (Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries, 
Herndon, Virginia, 1997), p. 83. 
5 Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, “Risk, Threat and Security Institutions” in Power and Governance in a Partially 
Globalized World (Routledge-Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2002), p. 97. 
6 Ryan Hendrickson, “Potential NATO Partners – Political and Military Utility for NATO” in NATO: The Power of 
Partnerships, eds. Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson (Palgrave Macmillan, New York; 
London: 2011), pp. 163-80. 
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Democratic peace theorists justify the extension of new membership or partnership invitations as a 
strategy of reinforcement used by NATO to bring about and stabilize political changes inside these 
new countries, such as the consolidation of the rule of law, democracy, the promotion of human 
rights, and the modernization of civil-military relations in these nations.7 This strategy, known as 
political conditionality, is strictly rewards-based, i.e., it means that if the new members or partners 
comply with the expectations, they will be rewarded for their behavior by the international 
organization. NATO has used both invitations for membership and the extension of various 
partnerships as such rewards. 
Previous studies have shown that the transformation of the military establishment, the 
modernization of civil-military relations, and effective contribution to NATO’s overseas operations 
have been an integral part of NATO’s conditionality. As a result, new members were required to 
undergo significant restructuring and adaptation of their armed forces prior to their admission into 
the organization.8 However, existing literature does not provide much insight into how specifically 
the admission of new members and the introduction of new partnerships affects these nations’ 
decisions to participate more actively in international peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and 
stabilization efforts. The following section will focus on how political conditionality, specifically the 
prospects of membership, has contributed to an effective engagement of new participants in 
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarianism. 
 
Membership Prospects as Political Conditionality for Participation in International 
Operations 
When the Partnership for Peace framework was developed in the mid-1990s, every country that 
joined the program signed an individual Peace Framework Document and was required to submit a 
Presentation Document. This requirement exemplified NATO’s early conditionality for participation 
in PfP and, as ethnic violence spiked out of control in the 1990s, multinational peacekeeping was 
recognized as a key area where cooperation was most needed. The scope of these operations 
remained relatively limited—it primarily included humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and search and 
rescue. The first PfP exercise—Cooperative Bridge— took place in Poland in 1994 and included 600 
soldiers from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, the Netherlands, Ukraine, UK and the U.S.9 Gradually, all parties understood the need for 
diversification and specialization in the forms of cooperation among individual partners as the 
number of these exercises soared in mid- and late-1990s. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, NATO leadership realized that the PfP framework was insufficient to 
accommodate the aspirations of all participants. In order to distinguish between potential entrants 
and the rest of the partners, NATO leaders officially introduced the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP), designed to help aspirant nations prepare for the burdens of membership, review the 
                                                
7 Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in 
Eastern Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 21 (April 2007), p. 126. 
8 Frank Schummelfenning, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 3. 
9  “Exercise Cooperative Bridge 94,” 12 September 1994, NATO Handbook/ NATO e-Library. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-8BD9D109-6EB228F2/natolive/news_24256.htm (accessed December 9, 2011). 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 41
progress of every individual applicant, and provide candid feedback.10 East European states like the 
three Baltic Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia used PfP as a 
stepping stone to join MAP and, thus, upgrade their relationship with NATO in order to receive 
much desired membership invitations. 
Therefore, MAP represented a more sophisticated mechanism of political conditionality introduced 
by NATO officials to improve the aspirants’ transformation and adaptation, but also to stimulate 
their further commitment toward international peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and 
humanitarianism. It also indirectly influenced the decision of the potential entrants to participate in 
international missions due to their expectations to enjoy membership benefits in the future.  
Overall, the plan was considered a success as it led to the 2002 Prague Summit (2004) which decided 
to extend membership invitations to seven countries from Central and Eastern Europe.11 In the 
aftermath of the Summit, an interagency team led by Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO, found that all of them were making efforts to reform and modernize their defense 
establishments as outlined in their individual plans. To ensure that all new allies would remain on 
track with the military reforms, they were asked to submit individual Timetables for the Completion of 
Reforms prior to the signing of Accession Protocols. 
The timetables constituted important mechanisms to enforce NATO’s political conditionality; they 
also represented commitments undertaken by the invitees to guide them through the accession 
process and beyond. These documents also helped inform NATO and the allied parliaments about 
the status of the applicants’ preparedness to meet the responsibilities of membership. Indicators for 
such preparedness included a commitment to spend a minimum of 2% budget appropriations on 
defense. Furthermore, NATO explicitly asked the new members to identify the steps that they had 
undertaken or planned to undertake to reach full interoperability in order to fully participate in 
overseas operations. These included a number of specific measures by the seven invitees to ensure 
that connectivity of air space, the availability of secure communications (voice and data), adequate 
military education, effective training, and national defense planning systems were set in place at the 
time of accession. These technical measures were clearly geared toward more effective participation 
in NATO-led peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and stabilization missions.  
Therefore, key events such as the introduction of PfP and MAP, and the extension membership 
invitations led to these nations’ higher contributions in the subsequent years. For example, PfP 
mobilized additional support for peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia between 1995 
and 1997. Nonetheless, after 1998 NATO partners became fairly inactive on the international arena. 
The decisions of the Washington Summit (1999) and the Prague Summit (2002) once again catalyzed 
additional overseas troop deployments by these countries in 2000 and 2003 as shown in Figure 1 
below. 
NATO Heads of State and Government agreed at the Prague Summit that three of the MAP 
participants (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) were not prepared to meet the responsibilities of 
membership. Nonetheless, they were encouraged to continue with reforms geared toward 
transformation of their civil and military institutions, the implementation of the rule of law, and the 
improvement of their cooperation with international institutions as required by NATO’s 
                                                
10 “An Alliance for the 21st Century,” Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm. (accessed June 5, 2007). 
11 The seven invitees in 2002 were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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conditionality for membership. Albanians, Croatians and Macedonians remained active in the 
international arena and their contributions for NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan surged. As a result, 
Albania and Croatia’s efforts were rewarded with membership invitations at the subsequent NATO 
Summit in Bucharest (2008), while Macedonia was the only holdout, due to a Greek veto related to 
an outstanding dispute over the country’s name. 
 
Figure 1: Deployment of Troops Overseas for Twelve Nations That Were Admitted to NATO in 1999, 2004 and 
2009 (per million citizens) 
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Source: The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1995/96 through 
2006/07. 
 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which included all NATO members and PfP partners, was 
designed to serve as a security forum for dialogue and consultation about political and security-
related issues. This multilateral body dealt with cooperation in the areas of peacekeeping operations, 
arms control and proliferation, defense planning, and policy implementations in the context of 
regional conflicts, terrorism, emergency planning, and civil-military cooperation.12 Gradually, new 
tiers of partnerships surfaced within EAPC allowing for a flexible framework of cooperation. Thus, 
the new Council effectively comprised of four distinct categories of partners: (1) Russia and Ukraine 
who upgraded their relations within the framework of the new bilateral Councils; (2) seven EAPs 
whose interest in cooperating with NATO varied substantially and who would be offered Individual 
Partnership Action Plans13; (3) six “advanced” West European NATO partners (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland); and (4) six relatively inactive PfP nations with practically 
                                                
12 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era,” Strategic Forum 206 (March 2004), p. 1. 
13 The seven IPAP nations jointed during different periods of time and included Armenia (December 2005), Azerbaijan 
(May 2005), Bosnia (January 2008), Georgia (October 2004), Kazakhstan (January 2006), Moldova (May 2006), and 
Montenegro (January 2008). 
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no intention in developing individual partnerships (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).14 
The Prague Summit fundamentally revamped NATO’s partnerships in several ways: First, the 
partnerships with Russia and Ukraine were upgraded. The new permanent NATO-Russia Council 
built on the goals and principles of the 1997 Founding Act. In July that same year, the alliance 
signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Ukraine. The dialog with Russia on the issues of counterterrorism was regarded especially promising, 
while for Kiev the partnership presented an opportunity to deepen ties with the alliance. Second, the 
new format of the partnerships with Russia and Ukraine was followed by the introduction of the 
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). IPAPs were geared toward nations that had intent to 
deepen their relationship with NATO but ultimately were unfit to pass the membership 
conditionalities any time soon. Georgia was the first partner to join the new program in 2004, 
followed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova.15 In 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro decided to pursue participation in IPAPs. Additionally, the new individual plans 
introduced an explicit expectation that the partners would participate more actively in the allied 
efforts in Afghanistan. NATO encouraged these countries to identify their own specific areas of 
contributions and provided guidance for military reforms as needed.16 
                                                
14 Jeffrey Simon had offered previous classifications of the PfP participants. For further details see Simon, “Partnership,” 
p. 3. 
15 Georgia is probably the only notable difference in this respect as Tbilisi joined IPAP with clear intention to pursue 
NATO membership. The alliance, on the other hand, remained cognizant of the fact that Georgia was locked into the 
unresolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and offered Tbilisi IPAP as an alternative to MAP. 
16 “Individual Partnership Action Plans,” NATO Handbook. http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html. (accessed 
June 1, 2011).  









High Level of Participation 
In International Operations 
Low Level of Participation  
in International Operations 


















Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 44
Finally, a new partnership called Intensified Dialogue that included Bosnia, Georgia, and Montenegro, 
was introduced in 2005 an intermediate step toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The Dialogue also 
facilitated joint planning, improved interoperability between allies and their partners, and ensured 
higher partners’ participation in joint operations. Nonetheless, this form of partnership was cautious 
about offering any immediate prospects for membership and, therefore, has had a more limited 
impact on the partners’ decisions to deploy troops overseas.  
The overwhelming evidence suggests that participation of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic partners in 
international peacekeeping, counterterrorism and humanitarian operations is linked to the level of 
institutionalized cooperation between these nations and the alliance as summarized in Figure 2. For 
example, full members and MAP nations that await membership invitation are the most likely 
contributors to NATO’s overseas missions. Furthermore, participants in Intensified Dialogue like 
Georgia, Montenegro and Ukraine are somewhat likely to participate in international operations. 
Alternatively, IPAP nations and other PfP participants (with the exception of the “advanced” West 
European NATO partners) are somewhat unlikely to join NATO-led international operations. 
Therefore, partners’ willingness to maintain enhanced relations with the alliance, determines their 
varying degree of contributions to international operations. 
Nations that participate in PfP but have not upgraded their relationship with the alliance are less 
likely to participate in international peacekeeping, counterterrorism and humanitarianism, as shown 
in the cases of Belarus, Serbia and the Central Asian republics (Figure 3). Kyrgyzstan and Serbia’s 
decisions to deploy troops under a UN mandate in Burundi, Liberia and Sudan (a total of 15-20 
civilian observers) is unrelated to their participation in MAP and has minimal effect on international 
peacekeeping. Alternatively, individualized partnerships (e.g., Intensified Dialogue or MAP) are much 
more likely to contribute to international efforts. This tendency is illustrated by the cases of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, whose participation in Afghanistan and Iraq peaked between 2004 
and 2009 following the introduction of the IPAPs and Intensified Dialogue (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3: Deployment of Troops Overseas by NATO’s PfP Nations (per million citizens) 
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Source: The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1999/2000 
through 2009/10. 
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Figure 4: Deployment of Troops Overseas by NATO’s IPAP Participants (per million citizens) 
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Source: The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1999/2000 
through 2009/10. 
 
Furthermore, the Individual Partnership Action Plans constitute a transitional category that offered a 
substantial degree of flexibility to the participants but lacked unity of objectives. For example, 
Georgia’s entry into the program in 2004 was regarded a waiting room preceding Tbilisi’s admission 
into MAP and an opportunity to enhance the country’s membership bid. As a result, the country 
participation in Iraq and Afghanistan increased exponentially between 2005 and 2008 as shown in 
Figure 4. For Azerbaijan, IPAP presented an alternative to MAP because Baku was considered 
ineligible for membership in the foreseeable future due to its substantial democratic deficit. 
Armenia, which joined the program shortly after Azerbaijan, had not declared any expressed 
intentions to pursue NATO membership in the near future, and have decided to maintain low 
overseas troop deployments. Azerbaijan and Armenia have no realistic chances of entering MAP any 
time as long as both nations remain locked in the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Albeit 
for different reasons, the same observation applies to the cases of Bosnia, Kazakhstan and Moldova. 
Ukraine’s fluctuating performance can be attributed the unstable domestic environment and will be 
discussed separately. 
 
Unresolved Disputes with Neighboring Countries as a Restraint for Membership and a 
Disincentive for Participation in International Operations 
The cases of Macedonia and Georgia illustrate that while enhanced cooperation tends to stimulate 
the partners’ involvement in international operations, this process is further complicated by the 
presence of unresolved ethnic, political or territorial disputes with neighboring countries. For 
example, the dispute between Greece and Macedonia dates back to the early 1990s when Athens 
refused to recognize this newly independent nation under its constitutional name, the Republic of 
Macedonia. The argument behind Greece's staunch opposition to Macedonia’s constitutional name 
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is that the name “Macedonia” is historically inseparable from Greek culture, ever since the ancient 
Kingdom of Macedonia which gave rise to Alexander the Great. Despite the fact that the two 
neighboring nations concluded an Interim Agreement in 1995, no permanent settlement has been 
reached since then. As a result, Greece used its veto power in 2008 to block Macedonia’s admission 
into NATO and to halt any further negotiations with the EU. The North Atlantic Council 
reluctantly accepted Greece’s veto despite vehement protests by the United States and other allies. 
In response, Macedonia filed a lawsuit in the International Court of Justice arguing that Greece's 
decision is illegal because it fails to comply with previous agreements between the two neighbors. 
This decision to postpone Macedonia’s invitation into the alliance once again indicates the 
complexity of membership conditionality. The recent judgment of the International Court of Justice 
which found that, by using its veto power, Greece essentially failed to comply with its obligations 
under international law, does not alter significantly the bargaining dynamics.17 U.S. Ambassador in 
Skopje Paul Wohlers signaled once again that the Macedonia’s admission to NATO must be 
preceded by the settlement of its outstanding dispute with Greece in a non-coercive manner.18 
Similar to Macedonia, Georgia’s further integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures is practically 
paralyzed by its outstanding dispute with neighboring Russia over the break-away republics of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia was among the first to join PfP in March 1994, but it indicated 
no membership aspirations in the 1990s when governments in Tbilisi attempted to carefully balance 
between a pro-Russian and pro-Western foreign policy. The Rose Revolution brought a profound 
change of Tbilisi’s foreign policy orientation. The reformist government led by President Mikhael 
Saakashvili took a course that pursued fundamental institutional reforms, improved transparency, 
reduced corruption, and sought closer integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Recognizing 
Russia’s concerns, NATO acted cautiously and offered Tbilisi an Individual Partnership Action Plan 
in 2004. 
The introduction of the IPAP was followed by large-scale military cooperation between Georgia and 
the United States. By and large the extensive training programs of the Georgian military were funded 
and supervised by Washington and the accomplishments of this cooperation were significant. Prior 
to 2002, the state of Georgia’s armed forces was deplorable—they were a collection of loosely 
organized, poorly disciplined units with corrupt leadership and limited modern combat skills.19 With 
the help of U.S. military aid, Georgia’s participation in international operations increased 
dramatically—within five years Tbilisi had 2,000 troops deployed in the cities of Tikrit, Baghdad and 
Al Kut in Iraq. Furthermore, after 2006 this former Soviet Republic became the largest contributing 
nation among all IPAP nations to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and 
second largest per capita contributor (after the U.S.) in international operations among all NATO 
allies and partners.20 Georgia’s forces in Afghanistan were not merely conducting stationary 
                                                
17 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), 
The International Court of Justice, 5 December 2011, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf. (accessed 
December 5, 2011).  
18 “Wohlers: First the Name; NATO Membership will Follow Then” (Волерс: Прво името, па членство на 
Македонија во НАТО), Denvnik Daily, Skopje, 5 December 2011. 
19 Robert E. Hamilton, “Georgian Military Reform—An Alternative View,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 
February 2009. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090203_hamilton_militaryreform.pdf. (accessed June 17, 2011). 
20 Georgia deployed on average about 280 soldiers per million in overseas operations between 2006 and 2008. During 
the same period the United States maintained about 650 military personnel per million, Britain and Slovenia had 
approximately 220-250 soldiers; and NATO’s average contribution was 175 soldiers per million people. It is also worth 
noting that more than half of the allies contributed with less than 100 military personnel per million. For detail see The 
Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2006/07 through 2009/10. 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 47
peacekeeping, but also patrolled high-risk areas in Kabul and participated in full-scale combat 
operations in the Helmand Province, often with significant U.S. assistance. Tbilisi introduced very 
few caveats for its troops, which is why U.S. commanders preferred to operate with Georgian units 
over those from other partners.21 U.S. military assistance was geared mostly toward the acquisition 
of capabilities to participate in overseas operations and was specifically intended not to enhance any 
Georgian capabilities to fight with Russia or other neighboring countries. 
As a result, Georgia became a preferred partner and potentially a very strong applicant for future 
NATO expansion as the country was admitted to Intensified Dialogue in September 2006. This new 
cooperative framework represented recognition of the headway made by this former Soviet 
Republic. To strengthen its case in favor of NATO membership, Georgia held a referendum on 
January 5, 2008, in which the voters backed its membership bid with overwhelming approval of 
72.5%.22 Georgia drastically increased defense spending to more than five percent of the nation’s 
total budget as a part of its efforts to restructure and improve its armed forces.23 The new resources 
tremendously helped modernize the army with training and equipment that meet NATO standards.  
Nonetheless, the status of the two break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again 
became a major obstacle for its future Euro-Atlantic integration.24 After the break up of the Soviet 
Union, the majority of the population in these autonomous regions remained loyal to Moscow and 
wanted to eventually join the Russian Federation. Multiple diplomatic attempts by President 
Saakashvili to reach a comprehensive agreement reached a stalemate. In the summer of 2008 
Georgia began a military operation in South Ossetia, aimed at repelling the Russian tanks 
approaching the conflict zone in the break-away republic. Russia responded immediately with a full 
scale military invasion in Georgia by air and land, and even launched a cyber attack against online 
media starting August 8, 2008.25 Independent reports have pointed out that both the Russian and 
Georgian sides had contributed to the reciprocal escalation of tension prior to the outbreak of the 
conflict.26 The Russian assault was short-lived, and peace was brokered within a week with the 
mediation of France and the United States. 
The Georgian-Russian conflict of August 2008 had a major impact on Tbilisi’s relations with NATO 
and its future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. First, the war substantially decreased 
Georgia’s chances for NATO membership prior to a final settlement of the status of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. The West expressed sympathy with Georgia’s position regarding the status of 
Abkhazia and Ossetia, but Washington and Brussels recognized that Tbilisi’s progress toward Euro-
Atlantic integration would be contingent upon improved relations with Moscow. In fact, the 
settlement of all territorial disputes with aspirants’ neighbors has always been a core principle that 
guided NATO’s expansion in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Second, the Russians, who have always 
disapproved Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO, were quite pleased with this outcome as it 
provided Moscow with a de facto veto power to block Georgia’s further Euro-Atlantic integration.  
                                                
21 Hamilton, “Georgian,” 3 February 2009. 
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24 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are located in Georgia’s North and Northwest close to the border with Russia. Both 
entities broke away from Tbilisi in 1992 and sought protection for independence from Russia. 
25 Johanna Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: the Path to War in Georgia,” in The Guns of August 2008 eds. 
Svante Cornell and Frederick Starr (M. E. Sharpe, New York, 2009), pp. 150-2. 
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More importantly, the 2008 war had a major impact on the reforms of Georgia’s armed forces. The 
loss of the war to Russia appears to have been a catalyst for re-armament, but also for significant 
doctrinal and personnel reorganization within the Georgian armed forces. As a result, the 
government in Tbilisi focused on completing military reforms at home and decided to minimize its 
overseas deployments following the withdrawal of the 3rd Infantry Brigade from Iraq. The war with 
Russia inadvertently undercut Georgia’s commitment to international peacekeeping as most of the 
military resources were re-directed toward territorial defense. The country once again returned to 
international operations in April 2010 when the 3rd Infantry Brigade was deployed in Afghanistan, 
where the Georgian contingent carried out a full spectrum of security operations side by side with 
the U.S. military.27 As long as NATO membership remains distant, Georgian leadership feels that 
current status quo creates disincentives for Tbilisi to deploy larger contingents overseas in support 
of NATO- or UN-led missions. 
 
Weak Domestic Support as a Restraint on Participation in International Operations 
Finally, strong public support at home may be a decisive factor for partners’ future Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The level of public support for membership varied among the twelve new allies. 
Nonetheless, a wide consensus emerged among their political elites who were able to persuade the 
general public about the utility of NATO membership and the long-term benefits from active 
participation in international operations. Ukraine, however, presents a specific case of cooperation 
with NATO that departs from the general patterns of Euro-Atlantic integration in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This country’s foreign and security policy has been complicated, in part, by the 
heavy divisions between the pro-Western and pro-Russian camps that reflect geographical, political, 
social, and ethnic boundaries. These divisions contributed to highly polarized political elites on key 
issues, such as national security policy and alliance orientation, and effectively paralyzed the nation’s 
Euro-Atlantic integration and also led to a significant drop of Ukrainian participation in international 
operations. 
Ukraine enjoyed a special relationship with NATO in the years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. As previously discussed, Kiev was a founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as well as an active participant 
in the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In 1997 Ukraine and NATO signed a Charter on a Distinctive 
Partnership and five years later a NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was introduced at the Prague Summit. 
Its purpose was “to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its 
aspirations towards full integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures.”28 
The Orange Revolution of 2004 changed this dynamic when the new pro-Western President, Prime 
Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament sent a letter to Brussels officially asking NATO to accept 
the country into the Membership Action Plan as a first step on the path to full membership. 
However, this step was met with disapproval and skepticism at home by the pro-Russian opposition 
and a majority of the Ukrainian public. Officials in Kiev and Brussels agreed that the country needed 
a thorough public debate before its entry into the alliance.29 The political change in 2004 also 
                                                
27 “Participation in International Missions,” Webpage of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia. 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/index.php?page=-10&Id=34&lang=1 (accessed June 17, 2011). 
28 “Introduction to the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,” NATO Handbook, Brussels, Belgium. 
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brought new momentum to Ukraine’s preparedness to participate in international peacekeeping, 
counterterrorism, and humanitarian operations. The Yushchenko government adopted a New 
Strategic Defense Doctrine and a New Military Doctrine, in which interoperability with NATO 
forces and command structures was identified as a key area of defense reform so that Kiev could 
meet adequately the needs of the UN and other international organizations.30 Upon the advice of its 
Euro-Atlantic partners, Kiev began to explore its comparative advantages in certain niche 
capabilities such as Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF), Main Defense Force, and Strategic 
Reserves.31 
Unlike the other East European societies, the Ukrainian political elite was never able to forge a 
consensus on its future NATO membership. As a result, the public opposition to NATO 
membership steadily increased in the years following the Orange Revolution as the ratio between 
opponents and supporters of NATO membership reached 2:1 in 2009. This high level of 
disapproval for NATO membership stands in sharp contrast to the rest of Eastern Europe, where 
improved integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures led to increased public support for NATO 
membership.32 As a result, Ukrainian political leadership felt compelled to draw down its military 
contributions to international operations. The presidential elections in February 2010 brought to 
power the pro-Russian and anti-NATO candidate Victor Yanukovych from the Party of the 
Regions, who withdrew Kiev’s application for accession into the MAP. This wavering relationship 
between Ukraine and NATO, coupled with the lack of consensus at home and indecisiveness to 
move forward with the issue of membership, adversely affected military reforms and constrained the 




The cases of Georgia and Ukraine illustrate how NATO’s individual partnerships could effectively 
engage the partner countries to increase their international deployments in support of various 
missions led by international organizations or multinational coalitions. NATO persuaded Kiev to 
invest significant efforts into “strategic” peacekeeping, thus boosting the nation’s international 
deployments between 2000 and 2006. Georgia, on the other hand, took advantage of U.S. military 
assistance after 2005 to improve its peacekeeping capabilities, thus becoming a major contributor in 
Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, sources of domestic opposition or unsettled disputes with neighbors can effectively 
paralyze the improvement of relations between the alliance and its partners, which ultimately reduces 
the partners’ participation in various NATO and UN-led overseas missions. In the case of Ukraine, 
the unpopularity of NATO membership dissuaded the Yanukovych government from further 
engagement in NATO-led international operations. Similarly, Georgia’s active involvement in 
international peacekeeping surged after the United States started providing military aid and 
mentorship. However, the conflict with Moscow in 2008 convinced the military and political 
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31 Green Book on Ukrainian Defense Policy (Зелена книга з Питань Оборонної Політики України), Kiev 2010, p. 
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leadership in Tbilisi that traditional territorial defense should once again remain a core priority in the 
Caucasus. 
These observations bear several theoretical and policy implications. First, the security guarantees 
extended by NATO membership represent the highest reward for prospective members. Thus, 
membership prospects present robust stimuli for partner nations to adapt their armed forces by the 
organization’s standards and participate actively in its overseas operations. Second, partnerships with 
international security organizations can be effective tools in engaging new partners, persuading 
nations to participate in international military and political efforts and, ultimately, building broader 
international coalitions for military and civilian campaigns. At the same time, however, NATO 
partnerships have limited mechanisms at hand to influence the participation of non-members, 
especially countries with divided societies and political elites, competing allegiances at home, and 
stubborn neighbors. Third, applying a one-size-fits-all approach to all NATO partnerships, 
nonetheless, would be inappropriate and impractical. While EAPC and PfP present a viable 
framework for cooperation, only individual partnerships customized to meet each country’s needs 
for cooperation can successfully persuade partners to cooperate more actively with international 
organizations. Finally, on the policy side, NATO’s regional or global partnerships can be useful and 
effective tools for engaging new partners in a meaningful “intensified” dialogue. Scholars and policy 
makers should be cognizant of the limitations emanating from this form of security cooperation and, 
therefore, have realistic expectations about its success in the future. 
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 Transatlantic Defense Troubles 
Richard Weitz 
 
In his last major policy speech as Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates on June 10 made his most 
public rebuke ever of Europe‘s failure to provide adequate defense resources in international 
missions. Before a meeting of the influential Security and Defense Agenda in Brussels, Gates 
complained that NATO had finally become what he had long feared: a ―two-tiered alliance‖ divided 
between those few allies that engage in ―hard‖ combat missions and the overwhelming majority of 
those members that can only contribute extensively to ―soft‖ non-combat humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, and development missions. Gates noted that proposed NATO-wide reforms and 
efficiency measures would at best have a limited impact; ultimately, our European allies would need 
to spend more on defense. He cited the Libyan campaign as providing ample evidence of the 
problems arising from lackluster European defense spending.1  
During his first visit to Europe as Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta echoed much of what his 
predecessor had said four months earlier. Speaking at an event hosted by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace on October 5 in Brussels, Panetta recognized the contributions of NATO 
members in the Libya campaign but pointed out the ―significant shortfall in capabilities‖ of NATO 
allies, specifically citing the shortage of supplies and munitions that ―forced the United States to sell 
millions of dollars or ammunition, repair parts, fuel, technical assistance and other support items 
simply to keep the operation going.‖ He further went on to state that ―nowhere was the gap more 
obvious than in the critical enabling capabilities, refueling tankers, and the provision of ISR 
platforms…without these capabilities Libya Operation would have had a very difficult time getting 
off the ground or being sustained.‖ Panetta expressed his concern that NATO would not be able to 
again sustain operations such as Libya and Afghanistan without the U.S. taking on even more of a 
burden, something he emphatically stated would not occur when he said that ―as for the United 
States, many might assume that the U.S. defense budget is so large that it can absorb and cover 
alliance shortcomings, but make no mistake about it; we are facing dramatic cuts with real 
implications for alliance capability.‖2  
European NATO members suffer from low personnel levels and a lack of adequate material. 
Furthermore, each member‘s armed forces have poor interoperability with those of other members. 
A lack of specialization creates excessive redundancies. Though plans have been put forward to 
address these issues, they are rarely implemented, often because of domestic politics. The ongoing 
financial crisis has led many European states to reduce their defense budgets. Their defense 
spending has dropped almost 2% annually for a decade, even in the face of continuing NATO 
operations in Afghanistan.3 Even without the crisis, European public opinion is frequently against 
higher defense spending. Often, European governments are keen to preserve their independent 
defense industries at the expense of greater integration and specialization. As a result, the United 
States increasingly sees itself as having to fill this funding gap, leading to Gates‘ complaint of a ―two-
tiered alliance.‖  
                                                 
1 Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Brussels, Belgium, U.S. Department of Defense, June 10, 2011, 
<http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>. 
2 Speech by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Brussels, Belgium, U.S. Department of Defense, October 5, 2011, 
<http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1618>. 
3 Ibid. 
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 Though an international alliance, NATO is funded from national governments and so domestic 
politics plays a crucial role in questions of funding. The largest European NATO members have 
passed austerity measures and are cutting the size and budget of their armed forces, decreasing 
future capabilities. There is a risk that Europe would thus become increasingly irrelevant and unable 
to promote stability even in nearby regions. Defense specialization and collaborations has already 
been mooted by EU and NATO leaders as a cost-effective way of maintaining European military 
strength. National interests have often proven to be a stumbling block, however. European 
militaries are often cumbersome and based around territorial defense. Moves towards expeditionary 
forces are overdue. NATO itself is currently experiencing a funding gap. Plans to reduce NATO 
structures will likely cause acrimonious debates among members. 
Why is this funding issue such a problem? In his speech, Secretary Gates stressed the injustice and 
political impossibility of perpetuating a situation in which some NATO members are ―apparently 
willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in 
European defense budgets.‖ Gates cited severe capability shortfalls with the NATO missions in 
Afghanistan and Libya to illustrate how slumping European defense budgets were depriving 
European militaries of essential capabilities. He lamented how, despite having more than two million 
military personnel and an aggregate $300 billion in defense spending, the non-U.S. allies struggled to 
maintain 25,000 to 45,000 soldiers in the field in Afghanistan. Furthermore, European militaries 
have consistently proven unable to provide adequate helicopters, transport aircraft, and support 
assets. As a result of the Obama administration‘s surge of forces into the conflict, what had been a 
genuine coalition effort—with an approximately equal number of American and European troops 
engaged—became Obama‘s War, in which some two thirds of the foreign soldiers fighting against 
the Taliban are American. The problem is that most European militaries spend excessively on 
territorial defense capabilities, leaving relatively little to meet global challenges through expeditionary 
forces. Gates did praise the allies for sustaining the Afghanistan mission for so long—NATO forces 
have been there for almost a decade and have gradually overcome integration problems, such as the 
insistence of many governments on limiting how their forces are employed through ―national 
caveats.‖ But he warned against any ―rush to the exits‖ now that victory was in sight, arguing that 
the only way to induce the Taliban to negotiate seriously about reconciliation was to convince them 
that they cannot win on the battlefield.  
Gates was even more critical of the NATO effort in Libya, which dominated the previous two days 
of meetings among the alliance defense ministers. He lamented that, while all the NATO members 
had voted in favor of Operation Unified Protector, less than half of them had participated in combat 
missions, and even fewer were engaged in strike operations. In particular, Gates noted that the lack 
of European intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and aerial refueling planes 
has required the United States to provide the largest share of these planes despite its own strike 
aircraft disengagement from that mission. And the United States had to make up the ammunition 
shortfall European air forces began to experience only a few weeks into the campaign. The irony 
was that, as Gates noted, if ever there was a NATO operation that should be European-led, Libya 
was it. Operation Unified Protector encountered little domestic political opposition, did not involve 
NATO ground forces on Libyan territory, and was occurring right in Europe‘s own backyard. Yet, 
while singling out Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway for pulling above their weight in 
contributing to the air strikes, Gates bewailed that these cases represent a handful of exceptions in 
an otherwise gloomy picture. According to Gates, ―many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so 
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 not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can‘t. The military capabilities 
simply aren‘t there.‖4  
Gates advanced these ideas in a similar speech on February 23, 2010, warning that European 
governments‘ failure to meet their minimum defense spending obligations was creating ―funding and 
capability shortfalls [that] make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats.‖ 
Perhaps the main reason for this enduring problem was what Gates had then termed ―the 
demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to 
military force and its attendant risks. He colorfully called this ―an impediment to achieving real 
security and lasting peace in the 21st century.‖5 It is much easier to mobilize support among 
European publics for peaceful purposes even if their governments want them to go to war. Panetta 
reinforced all of these criticisms in his speech in October. While recognizing that Europe took on 
the brunt of the combat operations ―after the United States employed its unique assets in the first 
week of the conflict,‖ he noted as well that without U.S. supplies, especially ammunition and ISR 
platforms, the operation could not have been sustained.6 
Since then, many European defense budgets have fallen even further while that of the United States 
has until recently been on the ascent. Indeed, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) calculates that total military expenditure in Europe in 2010 was $382 billion – a 2.8% 
decrease from 2009.7 Although this figure is 11.9% higher than in 2001, much of that increase can 
be attributed to the spending on combat operations in Afghanistan and the 21.9% increase in 
military expenditures by the United Kingdom in that same period8 – a trend unlikely to continue in 
light of the cuts already being evoked by the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) 
instituted by the coalition government. If the SDSR will prove to be the norm for larger European 
members, the situation could deteriorate even more drastically due to the large cuts in the smaller 
countries such as Bulgaria (28%), Latvia (26%), Estonia (23%), and Albania, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Slovakia (all more than 10%).9  
According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, during the Cold War the United 
States and the other NATO members spent roughly equal sums on defense, whereas the United 
States currently accounts for 75 percent of all NATO defense spending, though the massive $1.34 
trillion U.S. budget deficit could soon force some reductions in U.S. defense spending.10Since the 
end of the Cold War, defense spending by the European NATO countries has fallen by almost 20 
percent, while their combined GDP has risen by around 55 percent. This inverse relationship 
between military spending and GDP growth portends poorly for the future. Rasmussen does not 
believe that NATO lacked military capabilities during the Libya operation, but that any shortfalls 
were primarily due to political, rather than, military constraints. However, Secretary General 
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 Rasmussen did acknowledge that if the precipitating downward trends in European defense budgets 
continue at the current pace, that it would be difficult to envision how Europe would maintain 
enough military capability for a similar scenario as in Libya.11 
This paper shows how NATO members have been struggling to overcome these problems of 
decreasing collective capabilities due to declining spending on troops and equipment as well as less 
than desirable interoperability and specialization. The allied governments clearly recognize these 
problems, try to address them through collective policy initiatives, and have demonstrated some 
progress in certain areas. But this article shows how many of their plans to reduce these gaps are 
uncoordinated and incompletely executed. Many of the recent cuts have been occurring with little 
coordination among the states. Often a country will announce a reduction without even informing 
NATO allies in advance, let alone soliciting their views on their plans.12 The European governments 
have also been cutting capabilities without making much effort to preserve essential capabilities. The 
text ends with some recommendations for further progress—or at least damage limitation. For 
example, the allies need to ensure that, if they prune essential capabilities, these will remain available 
with partners—at least transatlantic ones if not within Europe.  
Even so, several independent variables are driving this widening gap in transatlantic defense 
spending and related problems—such as declining European influence in global affairs—and 
making it difficult for the commonly prescribed solutions to overcome it. These variables include 
Europe‘s deepening financial crisis, limited public support for sustaining defense expenditures at the 
expense of welfare spending, domestic politics and political processes that make it difficult for 
leaders to resist these popular sentiments (especially during times of economic crises), and the ability 
of special interest groups such as defense companies and labor unions to promote inefficient 
defense industrial practices that allocate large portions of military spending to employment and 
industrial policy concerns. Nationalism and sovereignty concerns also work against greater defense 
specialization within the alliance. Finally, the willingness of the United States to pick up the slack 
and sustain high levels of defense spending (and if necessary bail out allied militaries as in Libya) 
combined with ―buy America‖ defense procurement policies that further weaken transatlantic 
defense integration reinforces these problems of the sub-optimal allocation of defense resources. 
 
Transatlantic Capability Shortfalls 
Although Gates focused on the current NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya in his Brussels 
speech, the capabilities shortfall problem spans a range of Alliance issues. The deep defense budget 
cuts adopted by many NATO members recently, on top of years of insufficient military spending, 
call into question whether the Alliance can maintain and develop the expanding capabilities called 
for by the 2010 Strategic Concept, which lists a growing range of security challenges requiring an 
Allied response. The November 2010 NATO heads-of-state Summit in Lisbon that adopted the 
Concept also approved a so-called Lisbon package of priority capability needs. These ten critical 
capabilities—ranging from missile and cyber defenses to improved protection against improvised 
explosive devices in Afghanistan—aim to bolster the Alliance‘s ability to address global threats. For 
example, NATO‘s newly expanded cyber mission will require significant, accelerated, and efficient 
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 modernization among alliance members to guarantee security across communications, military, and 
energy networks. In addition, the development and deployment of the NATO-wide system to 
protect European populations from missile attacks from Iran and other rogue states may prove 
uncertain given that equally important projects are already encountering funding difficulties. 
Furthermore, sustaining NATO‘s nuclear capabilities will require the Alliance to maintain a means to 
deliver those nuclear weapons it decides to retain. Europe‘s fleet of expensive dual-capable aircraft 
able to drop U.S. nuclear bombs has reached the end of its operational life and must now be 
replaced with new delivery systems. 
On October 19, 2010, the British government released its Strategic Defense and Security Review. If 
implemented as described, it will cut military personnel by ten percent, scrap forty percent of the 
army‘s artillery and tanks, withdraw all British troops from Germany within ten years, force the early 
retirement of the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and the Harrier jump jets, forego the new Nimrod 
maritime patrol aircraft, delay construction of a new fleet of Trident nuclear submarines, and 
eliminate 25,000 civilian jobs in the Defense Ministry. Prime Minister David Cameron described the 
proposal as an effort to streamline and modernize the ―overstretched, under-equipped and ill-
prepared‖ armed forces.13 Altogether the military spending cuts amount to an approximate eight 
percent reduction in overall military expenditures and are one component in Cameron‘s promise to 
eliminate more than $130 billion in government expenditures by 2015. As pointed out by critics, the 
decommissioning of the Royal Navy‘s only aircraft carrier nine years before its replacement comes 
online makes Great Britain virtually unable to project military power to meet its own strategic needs 
without significant American support.14  
British austerity measures are neither unique nor the most severe being considered by NATO‘s 
European members as their governments struggle to overcome individual and collective financial 
crises. In late October 2010, then-German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg 
announced plans to reduce defense ministry staff from 3,300 to 1,600 and troop levels from 250,000 
to 180,000, with a final decision to be made by January 2011.15 Similarly, France has announced 
plans to curtail outlays by $1.77 billion over the next three years and Italy is planning to cut its 
defense budget by nearly ten percent.16 Elsewhere, Spain has postponed the procurement of a new 
Armored Fighting Vehicle, and the Netherlands has reduced its planned purchase of new F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighters from 85 to 50.17 Smaller countries like Denmark are also following suit, with plans to 
cut $500 million by 2014.18  
 
• • • 
 
                                                 
13 John F. Burns, ―Britain Announces Severe Military Cutbacks.‖ New York Times, October 19, 2010,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/world/europe/20britain.html?scp=9&sq=nato%20austerity&st=cse>. 
14 Tony Karon, ―Britain‘s Defense Cuts: Grim Portent for U.S. Military?‖ Time, October 21, 2010, 
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2026961,00.html>. 
15 ―Germany Undertakes Major Military Restructuring.‖ Bloomberg, October 26, 2010, 
<http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9J3AP580.htm>. 
16 James Joyner, ―NATO in an Age of Austerity,‖ World Politics Review, October 26, 2010. 
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6839/nato-in-an-age-of-austerity> 
17 All data from ―NATO‘S Defense Budgets 2011,‖ Atlantic Council of the United States, November 19, 2010, 
<http://www.acus.org/files/ISP/111910_ACUS_Kordosova_NATOBudget.pdf>. 
18 Ibid. 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 56
 Best Laid Plans? 
Europeans concerned about falling into strategic irrelevance due to a lack of military power can 
easily point to the 1998 St. Malo Declaration between Britain and France, which inaugurated the 
European Security and Defense Policy. It declared that: ―The Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.‖ The declaration further called for 
―strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a 
strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.‖19 Despite the passage of more 
than a decade since the two EU members with the largest defense budgets issued this declaration, 
the EU has made little progress in developing a collective military capacity.  
At the September 2010 informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Ghent, French Defense 
Minister Hervé Morin warned his colleagues that Europeans needed to pool their defense 
capabilities more effectively or risk Europe ―gradually becoming a protectorate - 50 years from now 
we'll become a pawn in the balance between the new powers and we'll be under a joint dominion of 
China and America.‖20 Morin has long been pressing EU governments to make defense a more 
important priority, telling one interviewer a few years ago that having a common defense policy was 
at least as important to the EU as having a common currency. 21 At Ghent, Morin argued that, 
without sufficient military capability, Europe could not exert significant influence in the world. He 
was particularly concerned that Europe was neglecting the key interest of maintaining stability in 
Africa, where Islamist militancy was on the rise, often in countries that were separated from Europe 
merely by the Mediterranean Sea.22 Morin argued that, notwithstanding their defense cuts, European 
governments could enhance their overall military capabilities by deepening their defense 
cooperation. He proposed that all 27 EU states compile a list of their military capabilities and specify 
those that should be shared and those that should remain under the control of the individual nation 
states. 23 German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg likewise thought that the EU could 
mitigate the adverse effects of their declining military budgets by agreeing to specialize in different 
defense areas and by combining their defense procurement orders ―to secure better deals.‖24  
Guttenberg proposed a three-step program to promote such defense specialization and 
collaboration. First, EU members would determine which defense capabilities the individual 
members had to retain as national assets. Second, they would assess which areas would produce 
savings if procured collectively. Finally, the members would distribute defense assets among the 
individual members, which would make these capabilities available to other members if necessary.25 
The EU‘s foreign affairs chief, Catherine Ashton, attending the UN General Assembly session in 
New York in September 2010, said  that ―we [Europe] need to turn the crisis into an opportunity‖ 
by ―pooling and sharing‖ the increasingly limited EU defense resources. Ashton proposed that the 
EU exploit ―joint research programmes‖ for dual-use items, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
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 (UAVs), which could be used to monitor the EU's external borders and in several civilian 
applications. She also called for making better use of the European Defense Agency to develop new 
common projects. Ashton further called for pursuing ―greater complementarity with NATO‖ in 
developing joint defense capabilities, noting that the European Council gave her a clear mandate ―to 
move forward on EU-NATO co-operation in crisis management.‖26 Belgium‘s Defense Minister, 
Pieter De Crem, optimistically noted that the EU was making progress in pursuing collective defense 
efforts. He specifically cited an agreement signed earlier that month in which Belgium, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands agreed to place 200 transport aircraft under a single command. The 
governments of Spain and Luxembourg are considering joining the project.27 Crem told reporters 
that the economic crisis could actually prove beneficial to furthering EU defense cooperation. Using 
language similar to that of Lady Ashton, Crem said that ―we have to turn this into an opportunity to 
develop cooperation in capabilities.‖ 28 The head of the liberal grouping in the European Parliament, 
Guy Verhofstadt, even thought the imperative to cut military budgets had now perhaps created the 
necessary incentives to take the ultimate step of creating a common European army: ―There are two 
million soldiers in Europe, but only 300,000 in the US, and I think that the American army is more 
efficient than the European forces. So that's a good reason to start this.‖ 29 Seeking to make this 
position more credible, Verhofstadt noted that the EU would simply be replicating the progress it 
had made in the diplomatic realm in the related area of defense: ―We have now a diplomatic service, 
which is very important, but we also need the other instrument - a common European defense, a 
common European army.‖30  
Few expect the EU to seek a common European army, but whether the Union can achieve even the 
more limited proposals to pool defense assets and significantly expand their collective defense 
procurement efforts is questionable. At Ghent, the ministers asked the European Defense Agency 
to evaluate how the EU states could enhance their military cooperation and report back at a formal 
meeting of defense ministers in December.31  Since its creation in 2004, the Agency has proved 
unable to promote the bloc's collective defense capabilities, largely due to its miniscule budget of 
€30 million ($40.2 million US).32 The EU defense ministers have consented to Morin‘s suggestion to 
compile lists of national capabilities, but one should not be too optimistic about this initiative. The 
EU governments have yet to implement earlier agreements to deepen joint military training and 
education, logistics, and surveillance. They are even less likely to share their even more sensitive 
combat capabilities. At best, the EU members seem prepared to establish a multinational helicopter 
wing that could be used for disaster response and other emergencies as well as to support combat 
operations.33 
Defense budget cuts could be realized without hampering capabilities as there is much scope for 
reform within and among the European armed forces. At present, European defense spending is 
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 misallocated for meeting governments‘ self-described global security requirements. Funds go 
overwhelmingly toward paying for personnel and operations and not towards developing or buying 
weapons.34 In 2009, more than half of European defense spending went to military personnel, while 
only one fifth was used to procure equipment. These distributions will not soon change due to the 
rigidity of many military pay structures. Furthermore, most European militaries still devote most 
spending for capabilities related to territorial defense—a legacy of their Cold War orientation—
rather than for meeting global challenges.35 Of the two million European active duty forces, only 3-
5% of them are readily deployable and sustainable at strategic distances from Europe in complex 
contingencies, such as stabilization, counter-piracy or peacekeeping missions. These deployments 
address emerging threats that directly affect Europeans‘ interests if not necessarily their national 
frontiers.36 NATO needs dynamic and flexible forces to address these threats rather than legacy 
forces that suck up funds but provide relatively little defense capability. At present, only British and 
French forces are able to join their U.S. counterparts as equals in the initial phase of a war (as in the 
two invasions of Iraq in 1990 and 2003). The other European powers now generally lack sufficient 
advanced weapons systems required to support out-of-area missions against a regional power like 
Iran—and these are precisely the procurement projects likely to be degraded by the recent wave of 
budget cuts.  
At the aggregate level, only 5 (Albania, Britain, France, Greece and the United States) out of 28 
NATO members in 2009 met alliance requirements to spend two percent or more of national GDP 
on defense. Bulgaria and Turkey fell below that threshold after meeting it in 2008.  
Yearly military expenditure levels from 2001-2010 highlight the huge disparity between spending 
levels of the U.S. and NATO. For the U.S., military expenditures totaled (in millions): $379, $425, 
$484, $528, $553, $562, $576, $619, $669, and $687 in that time frame. In contrast, NATO Europe 
accounted for: $277, $285, $286, $296, $290, $293, $293, $299, $308, and $298.37  
Without major changes in these conditions, Americans could become even more annoyed at 
perceived European free riding. The defense cuts could also increase tensions among European 
countries since some, such as Britain and France, spend much more on defense than others with 
roughly equivalent economies and populations, such as Germany and Italy. In fact, there is a five-to-
one ratio between the highest and lowest European country in terms of spending on military R&D.38 
For the moment, the United States is committed to remaining a major European security player 
despite NATO‘s spending problems. On April 8, 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense announced 
that it was revising its 2004 plan to withdraw two of the four U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams 
(BCTs) currently stationed in Europe.39 Consultations with allies and the NATO Strategic Concept 
reviews led the Obama administration to decide to retain three BCTs in Europe. Their missions are 
to maintain a flexible and rapidly deployable ground force to meet the U.S. commitments to NATO, 
to conduct a robust engagement mission with NATO members and partners, and to address the 
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 broad range of 21st-century security challenges. The fourth BCT will be removed in 2015, when 
Pentagon planners anticipate a reduced demand for U.S. ground forces in the European region. The 
remaining three BCTs in Europe after 2015 will consist of a Heavy, Stryker, and Airborne BCT. The 
Pentagon noted that these BCTs will be complemented by other U.S. capability enhancements, 
including the forward deployment of U.S. Navy Aegis ships to conduct BMD missions, land-based 
missile defense systems in Poland and Romania as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, 
forward-stationing of special operations aircraft, and a new permanent aviation detachment in 
Poland. These efforts were strengthened in October with the international agreement to base Aegis-
equipped ships at Rota, Spain, about 60 miles northwest of Gibraltar.40  
In early June 2011, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a 
comprehensive report on European countries‘ defense economic and industrial policies. Thus far, 
European governments have devoted sufficient resources to keep their deployed forces in a state of 
high readiness. Often this has required special funding mechanisms such as supplementary 
appropriations kept separate from their countries‘ regular defense budgets. Furthermore, since the 
size of most European national armed forces has decreased more rapidly than their governments 
have cut defense spending, the result has been that spending on the remaining military personnel has 
increased for the average individual soldier.41 The combined effect of these two trends—a general 
per capita increase in spending and extra resources flowing to select deployable units—has been that 
some of their forces, particularly those regularly sent to Afghanistan, have received adequate training 
and equipment to develop the expeditionary capabilities needed by NATO and the EU for sustained 
post-conflict stabilization operations. 
Unfortunately, these few military units represent the exception. For the most part, European 
governments have kept their other non-deployed forces at lower readiness levels. In addition, they 
have deferred many of their defense procurement and modernization programs. These funding and 
capability shortfalls have created major problems in unit readiness levels. In the current Libyan 
campaign, many European militaries have experienced major shortages in precision-guided 
munitions and other essential equipment, ordnance, and other capabilities. The United States, which 
had been eager to limit its resource allocations to the Libyan War to prioritize the Afghanistan and 
Iraq conflicts, felt compelled to fill these gaps by supplying almost all of the aerial refueling, 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defenses for the campaign.42 
Furthermore, whatever the per capita effects, Europe‘s aggregate defense capacity has probably 
already declined due to decreased defense budgets and force levels. For example, the number of 
active duty military personnel in the 37 European countries studied in the CSIS report (not all were 
NATO members) declined from 3.5 million in 2001 to about 2.3 million in 2009.43   
Furthermore, although the CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives Group found that many European 
countries have protected their defense budgets during the last few years from the most severe cuts—
often because of commitments to NATO, industrial policy considerations, or contractual 
obligations—the analysts anticipate that this figure will fall as European countries experience major 
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 structural economic problems in the next decade. These macroeconomic challenges will include slow 
growth, high unemployment, enormous fiscal deficits, and an increase in the ratio of retired 
pensioners to taxpaying workers. All these trends will squeeze defense budgets still further. 
Presuming military personnel levels stabilize, the result will be declining per capita spending on 
soldiers and a decrease in their ability to contribute to NATO missions, most of which will involve 
expeditionary rather than territorial defense operations.44 The end of the Afghanistan War could 
further encourage decreasing European defense spending in the future since that would remove one 
argument (alliance solidarity in current missions) defense ministries have used to sustain their 
spending. 
 From 2001 to 2009, aggregate European defense spending fell from €251 billion to €218 billion (a 
negative compound decline of 1.8 percent annually). Over the same period, aggregate spending per 
soldier increased in constant terms, from €73,000 to €91,000 (a compound annual growth rate of 2.8 
percent). These same broad trends can be found in the narrower defense spending categories. For 
example, European military research and development (R&D) spending in Europe fell from €12.3 
billion45 in 2001 to €10.3 billion in 2008, but R&D per active duty member rose somewhat from 
€6,700 in 2001 to €7,200 in 2008. Operations and maintenance fell the least during the 2001-2009 
period, largely because of the need to sustain the missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and 
elsewhere during this decade.46 
 
Glass Half Full or Half Empty? 
Optimists hope that the downward pressure on military spending will force European governments 
to take long-needed measures to reduce procurement duplication and pursue greater military 
specialization and interoperability. NATO and EU leaders have cited the cost pressure as giving 
them an opportunity as well as an imperative to secure more military value for defense spending 
through such measures as reducing unwanted defense duplication, reallocating resources based on 
collective rather than national priorities, encouraging more national military specialization on niche 
capabilities, as well as pursuing more collaborative research, development, and procurement based 
on common funding mechanisms. In some cases, NATO can act as a force multiplier, allowing 
members to contribute to expensive projects that they could not have afforded to pursue on their 
own. The Alliance has achieved some success in such collective defense capability initiatives, such as 
in the case of the Strategic Airlift Initiative (a helpful resource for NATO‘s mission in support of the 
African Union in Darfur) and the Allied Ground Surveillance System. NATO Secretary-General 
Rasmussen and others have cited the timeshare operations for C-17 transport aircraft based in 
Hungary as another worthy example of emulation.47 Another example of success in collaborative 
research, development, and procurement is the joint Franco-Italian FREMM (Frégate Européen 
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 Multi-Mission) program, developed in part due to recognition of impending and future budget cuts 
and potential European naval shipbuilding consolidation.48  
The best hope for keeping transatlantic capabilities somewhat in harmony would be greater defense 
specialization on select military acquisitions by country, increased multinational cooperation in 
procuring and using military capabilities, and a commitment by NATO governments to concentrate 
their remaining resources on developing smaller, more expeditionary-capable forces.49 These steps 
would best ensure that NATO‘s collective capabilities more closely match the sum of its individual 
members‘ contributions. 
Unfortunately, pessimists can point to enduring obstacles to enhanced European defense industrial 
coherence, and wonder if progress will come soon, or prove sufficiently widespread, to have much 
of an impact on their military capabilities. Industrial policy concerns such as sustaining domestic 
employment as well as a natural national reluctance to rely on other countries for important military 
capabilities typically exert much more influence on NATO or EU spending than collective security 
considerations. For this reason, proposals to extend NATO- or EU-wide defense procurement have 
never made much progress. NATO defense investment continues to be diluted across an excessive 
number of projects, with the most important military powers seeking to sustain national aviation, 
shipbuilding, and other high-technology sectors (valued for their stimulus to economic development 
as well as the skilled jobs they produce) despite the resulting duplication, inefficiencies, and 
insufficient economies of scale.50 For example, the European tradition of relying on state run or 
majority state led defense contractors such as Navantia in Spain and DCNS in France highlights a 
hurdle in the move towards a cohesive European defense industry. Even in European countries with 
large aggregate defense budgets, such as Germany and Turkey, spending is not optimized to 
NATO‘s expanding international security obligations since money flows predominately to 
manpower and maintenance rather than researching, developing or procuring new weapons 
systems.51  
The key question is whether Europe‘s most important military powers pursue similar policies. The 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany represent about 65 percent of all defense expenditure in 
Europe and 88 percent of all military research and development in Europe. Most other allies can 
only make small or niche contributions to expeditionary missions, while still requiring that they keep 
defense spending sufficiently high to permit their military personnel of valuable potential training 
opportunities. Despite budgetary strains, their governments are still planning to retain major 
expeditionary military capabilities—having the ability to deploy some 10,000 to 30,000 troops within 
a few months on a multi-month mission—for the next few years. But the end of the Afghanistan 
mission around 2014 combined with probable future demographic trends such as expected rises in 
welfare spending due to aging national populations and other fiscal pressures will likely result in 
further reductions over time in force levels, military readiness, and defense procurements.  
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 The NATO Group of Experts that helped write the Strategic Concept cautioned in their May 2010 
report that the transatlantic capabilities gap ―could undermine Alliance cohesion.‖52 The United 
States spends almost five percent of its GDP on defense when one includes the supplemental 
expenditures relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even after the latest round of budget cuts, 
Britain will still spend more than two per cent of its GDP on defense, and retain the ability to surge 
forces into distant theaters of war. But many other European governments have been keeping 
military expenditures to minimum levels well before their recent austerity reductions. In 2009, only 
five out of 28 NATO members met NATO‘s requirement that they spend at least two percent of 
national GDP on defense. Yet, achieving a global capability, and sustaining domestic political 
support for the transatlantic alliance in Washington, requires that the European allies have some 
capabilities that they can commit to non-European missions. 
NATO itself now has an operating deficit for the first time in its history, estimated at perhaps as 
much as €500 million.53 The alliance is cutting some collective expenses by reducing committees and 
through improved auditing, but more radical proposals—such as reducing the number of 
headquarters from 11 to 6 or NATO defense agencies from 14 to 3—are encountering severe 
resistance since every member wants a few high-profile positions and installations.54 In any case, 
NATO‘s entire military and administrative budget is only €2 billion, or less than 0.5% of the allies‘ 
combined defense budgets, and any savings would be distributed among many members. And 
cutting funds supporting common operations and equipment could lead less wealthy members to 
shun foreign deployments, which could weaken these missions‘ political legitimacy (renewing cries 
of Anglo-American imperialism). Hopes to improve these figures through a further rationalization 
of defense spending will depend on overcoming some long-standing barriers in this area. NATO 
and EU members‘ defense practices sometimes appear more responsive to industrial policy 
considerations than collective or even national military needs.  
European leaders have proposed reducing duplication of military investment across NATO and EU 
member states by promoting further cooperation between the two organizations. But collaborating 
on defense procurement has proven surprisingly difficult in the past and nothing new has occurred 
to suggest things will prove any easier now. Turkey constrains NATO collaboration with Cyprus 
while Cyprus limits Turkey‘s engagement with the EU; their mutual vetoes restrict broader 
institutional collaboration. European governments pledge the same forces to both organizations 
while hoping they do not receive simultaneous requests for the same assets. Meanwhile, Europeans 
view with skepticism proposals to create a transatlantic defense market by citing protectionist 
pressures within the United States. For example, they point to alleged favoritism shown Boeing 
against European companies in the bidding for the next U.S. mid-air tanker. The NATO 
governments will probably avoid another transatlantic blowup soon over the issue because, even 
while cutting overall defense spending, most European governments have sought to sustain their 
combat presence in Afghanistan to address the evident priority concern of the Obama 
administration. For example, French Defense Minister Herve Morin said that, while his ministry 
would cut spending by some €3 billion through 2013, France would maintain its Afghan operation at 
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 current levels. Similarly, the Italian government has announced plans to cut back on military 
hardware, such as by buying fewer Eurofighters, but conduct its own surge in Afghanistan, to 4,000 
soldiers by the end of this year. Most prominently, the UK SDSR did not cut defense spending as 
much as was feared in Washington. According to the figures released by the UK government, 
Britain can still participate in future missions like Iraq or Afghanistan, but with a contribution of 
about one-third fewer forces. British defense planners anticipate being able to sustain a 6,500-troop 
brigade on an overseas mission, while having the capacity to surge to as many as 30,000 troops for a 
short period. The corresponding figures for Afghanistan now and Iraq in 2003 are 9,500 and almost 
50,000 personnel. The accelerated withdrawal of British ground forces from Germany and the 
increased spending on transformational forces and capabilities—such as those for cyber defense—
coincides well with alliance priorities and could be profitably emulated by other NATO allies as they 
try to sustain their military power while cutting their defense budgets once again. The Netherlands 
have already left Afghanistan, and Bulgaria is cutting almost a third of its troops there.55 
Two issues merit further detailed discussion. First, the recent British-French defense treaties raise 
the possibility of enhanced military industrial cooperation between some European countries. Under 
its terms, Britain and France will jointly procure some items, share other military assets, and create a 
joint expeditionary force of 10,000 personnel.56 Rasmussen said that the Anglo-French defense 
collaboration treaties could point the way forward for other allies as they seek to balance reduced 
military spending with their alliance obligations. The United Kingdom and France are the largest 
European military powers (45% of the continent‘s military budget, 55% of battle-ready forces and 
70% of military research and technology), so their bilateral defense collaboration has the potential to 
have the greatest impact on European military capabilities.57 The UK defense budget in 2011 will be 
around 34 billion British pounds.58 In September 2011, the French Ministry of Defense said that its 
defense allocation next year would amount to €31.1 billion, though the current plan hinges on the 
successful €1.1 billion sale of unused military radio frequencies to private operators. Additionally, 
the continued rise in the polls of the French Socialist Party, which has traditionally been less inclined 
to spend on defense, could result in cuts in 2012 or even the cancellation of the 2009-2014 six-year 
military spending program.59 Most recently, Germany and Italy have announced plans to cooperate 
more in the procurement of defense equipment and modernization of their respective armed 
forces.60 Until now, though such defense cooperation does occur between NATO allies—especially 
between Britain, France, Germany, and the United States—it normally involves a limited number of 
partners (typically two) and a few select systems.  
Second, the German situation is complex since the pressure to reduce defense spending is coinciding 
with proposals to abolish conscription and switch to an all-volunteer military. That transformation 
could make the German forces more usable since currently conscripts cannot be forced to 
                                                 
55 Elizabeth Konstantinova, ―Bulgaria to Cut Three Quarters of its Troops in Afghanistan,‖ Bloomberg, November 30, 
2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-30/bulgaria-to-cut-three-quarters-of-its-troops-in-afghanistan.html. 
56 Patrick Wintour, ―Britain and France Sign Landmark 50Yyear Defence Deal,‖ Guardian, November 2, 2010, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/02/britain-france-landmark-50-year-defence-deal>.  
57 Neuger, ―NATO Says Europe Risks Becoming ‗Paper Tiger‘.‖  
58 Ben Jones, ―Franco-British Military Cooperation: a New Engine for European Defence?,‖ European Union Institute 
for Security Studies Occasional Paper no 88 (February 2011), p. 12, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Setting_a_standard_for_stakeholdership-JPZ.pdf 
59 J.A.C. Lewis, ―France Eyes Asset Sale as Way to Maintain Spending Levels,‖ Jane‘s Defense Weekly, October 5, 2011, 
23. 
60 Sabine Pirone, ―Germany, Italy May Cooperate in Defense-Equipment Alliance,‖ Bloomberg, November 30, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-30/germany-italy-may-cooperate-in-defense-equipment-alliance.html. 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 64
 participate in foreign combat missions. Currently, only some 10,000 German soldiers can easily be 
used overseas. Still, Germany‘s already low levels of defense spending might not be able to purchase 
all the modern equipment the additional forces would need.61 And in this regard, former German 
Defense Minister Guttenberg has noted that the democratic nature of EU military policy constrains 
both defense spending and the actual use of national or collective armed forces on military missions. 
Like many EU militaries, the Bundeswehr is a parliamentary force answerable to the German 
legislature. Within the EU, not only do all 27-member governments need to support a collective 
defense mission, but also the members‘ national legislatures, which enjoy considerable influence in 
many European countries and whose members are highly responsive to their constituents‘ 
opposition to foreign military adventures, have to endorse every foreign mission.62 
 
The Way Ahead 
European defense cuts are threatening core NATO military capabilities and deepening fears of the 
emergence of a ―two-tier alliance‖ with a small number of important military powers and a large 
number of essentially free riders. Public preferences and a stringent budgetary climate are leading 
European members to reduce the size, quality, and funding of their armed forces. The recent Libyan 
intervention has demonstrated how these developments have hampered Europeans‘ ability to act 
independently and increased the dependence on the capabilities of the United States.  
Many European members have inefficiently organized armed forces. A lack of specialization and 
interoperability across states prevents them from working together effectively. There is no lack of 
intelligent proposals, but thus far an element of political inertia and perhaps national pride has 
hindered substantive integration. Some argue that the current deep crisis offers an impetus to much-
needed reform and integration. Belgium, Denmark, and Norway were able to provide valuable 
contributions during the recent Libyan War thanks to their intelligent use of limited resources.  
There are several examples of how NATO countries have been able to develop the dynamic and 
flexible forces the Alliance needs to address emerging threats rather than legacy forces that suck up 
funds but provide relatively little defense capability. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway have 
all been able to make important contributions to the NATO operation in Libya despite their limited 
defense spending because they have concentrated their resources on developing expeditionary 
capabilities such as strike aircraft. 
There are several additional ways in which NATO could help overcome these budgetary problems. 
NATO can save money collectively by reducing the size and rationalizing the management of the 
Alliance‘s numerous commands, defense agencies, and other support structures and processes. The 
November 2010 Lisbon Summit endorsed proposals to make NATO‘s new command structure 
more effective and flexible—specifically by making these structures more easily deployable outside 
the Euro-Atlantic area. At the summit, NATO committed to adopting a new, streamlined Command 
Structure, which should reduce costs by around 35%.63  Such a move will decrease the number of 
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 high-end headquarters from eleven to seven, and reduce military personnel by about a third.64 The 
number of NATO agencies is set to fall from fourteen to three in a similar effort to achieve greater 
efficiency.65  
Even so, a great deal rests with national leaders. They have deferred deciding which specific cuts to 
make—and the individual allies can be expected to bargain hard to retain their share of these 
dwindling assets. How much integration can be achieved in NATO‘s administration and logistics 
support functions, and with what effects, is also uncertain. Even if these changes in NATO‘s 
support structures and processes are extensive, the history of almost all modern defense 
organizational reforms suggests that realizing massive financial savings or huge efficiency gains is 
improbable. The appropriate capabilities—and even strategy and tactics—required to fulfill the new 
NATO missions, such as ensuring members‘ cyber and energy security, have only begun to be 
studied. 
The NATO organization could assist the defense cooperation initiatives of its individual members 
by improving its long-term force planning processes to ensure better coherence and integration 
among allies‘ future defense programs, especially for the less visible so-called out-year forces whose 
procurement will occur at least six years beyond the current budgetary cycle. This could also allow 
NATO members, including the United States, to develop complementary future capabilities that 
avoid gaps and leverage synergies. Some of this is already occurring through existing alliance-wide 
processes as well as initiatives among a few NATO members. For example, the 2010 British-French 
treaties has led both countries to consider how to ensure that their various naval capabilities are 
complementary and even provides for the sharing of an aircraft carrier. The Visegrad Group, the 
Weimar Group, and the Nordic countries are also engaging in more pooling, sharing, and integrated 
defense planning. But the procedure needs to be extended to cover more capabilities and countries, 
including the United States, which has many defense programs that proceed largely independent of 
NATO.   
The best hope for keeping transatlantic capabilities somewhat in harmony would be if the Allies 
would pursue greater defense specialization through more selective military acquisitions by country, 
increased multinational cooperation in procuring and using military capabilities, and a commitment 
by NATO governments to concentrate their remaining resources on developing smaller, more 
expeditionary-capable forces.66 These steps would best ensure that NATO‘s collective capabilities 
more closely match the sum of its individual members‘ contributions. As such, the onus remains on 
national governments making intelligent decisions. A reduction in funding need not mean a 
reduction in capability when there is so much scope for reform already within the system. If 
European members wish to retain power and influence within the Alliance, they will need to 
overcome their political concerns and take serious steps towards reform. 
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Implications of  the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union’s 
Common Security Defense Policy and the Emerging Strategic 
Partnership Between NATO and the EU 
Major Andreas Winter and Dr. David A. Anderson 
 
Introduction 
The Lisbon Treaty is a monumental step toward fully integrating European Union (EU) military 
capabilities within its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). An underlying concern 
resulting from the treaty is the amount of  redundancy it creates with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). NATO and the EU had already developed redundancies in military 
capabilities. To some extent, this duplication is healthy and necessary to allow Europeans to further 
develop their military capabilities. On the political level, the line between healthy and unhealthy 
redundancy can be thin. This is particularly true when one organization attempts to take on the role 
of  the other creating competition rather than cooperation.1 The purpose of  this paper is to 
determine the extent the Lisbon Treaty actually promotes a complementary relationship between 
NATO and the EU in the field of  Security and Defense Policy. 
After providing a brief  historical background, the investigation begins with a review of  NATO‘s 
relationship with the EU and its CSDP and the existing cooperation between both organizations. 
This sets the stage for the subsequent assessment of  the Lisbon Treaty within the framework of  
NATO-EU relations. In this part, the analysis briefly assesses the decisions implemented by the 
Lisbon Treaty in relationship to the major changes it creates within the CSDP. Then, the analysis 
focuses on the implications of  these changes for the NATO-EU relationship. This includes the 
impact on the strategic orientation of  CSDP, the effects of  the Lisbon Treaty‘s changes on the EU‘s 




The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO has been the cornerstone for European security for more than sixty years and remains a vital 
component of  the global security framework for both the United States (US) and European 
members.2 Since its foundation in 1949, critics often inaccurately portrayed the organization‘s 
condition and calculated the Alliance‘s death in view of  its record of  perpetual internal political 
conflict, epitomized by such events as the Suez crisis of  1956, the French withdrawal from NATO‘s 
integrated military command in 1966, or the stationing of  Pershing II missiles in Europe in the early 
                                                 
1 The reviewed literature shows that in international relations ―competition‖ is predominantly used in a negative sense of  
―rivalries‖ and opposing interests. The paper will follow this definition. 
 
2 NATO, Letter from President Obama (January 20, 2009), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090120a.html 
(accessed April 26, 2011). 
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1980s. However, the Alliance has repeatedly proven its ability to overcome internal crisis and 
diplomatic strategic challenges by successful dispute resolution and effective adaptation.3  
From a historical perspective, the Yugoslavia Wars in the Balkans caused the Alliance to transform 
into an active provider of  security outside its territories for crisis management. Member states 
agreed on a new Strategic Concept in 1999, which defined wider security risks for NATO and 
shifted the focus of  the organization to more global security matters.4 In order to meet new threats 
where they occur, it became necessary to transform NATO member‘s large and conventionally 
focused units into agile and deployable expeditionary forces. Thus, member state political leaders 
endorsed the Defense Capabilities Initiative during the Washington Summit in 1999 to ―ensure the 
effectiveness of  future multinational operations across the full spectrum of  Alliance missions in the 
present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability 
among Alliance forces.‖5 Promoting security and stability in Europe, the Alliance also reached out to 
the east: Poland, Bulgaria, and Albania – among other countries – joined NATO in 1999, 2004, and 
2009. With this, NATO doubled the number of  its members in barely ten years. 
Two years later, the appearance of  international terrorism posed a new threat for the Alliance. In the 
wake of  the 9/11 attacks, when NATO invoked collective defense under Article 5 for the first time 
in its history, the member states showed their willingness to adapt to new threats but also revealed 
that they had not yet transformed their forces sufficiently to close the gap between US and 
European military capabilities. Consequently, the Alliance refined the Defense Capabilities Initiative 
during the 2002 Prague Summit and agreed to improve military capabilities in eight specified areas 
under the Prague Capability Commitment.6 The Prague Summit also introduced the NATO 
Response Force. This high readiness force should serve as a catalyst for focusing and promoting 
improvements in these areas and should equip the Alliance with a high quality, self-sustainable, 
expeditionary capability to respond to any crisis within thirty days. The transformation process 
initiated in Prague 2002 is ongoing. NATO remains heavily dependent on United States‘ forces and 
capabilities today and European countries have not yet aligned their efforts and resources within the 
Alliance sufficiently.7 Besides the ongoing transformation process in NATO, twenty-two of  NATO‘s 
twenty-eight members have also pushed forward their integration in security and defense within the 
European Union in an equally dynamic, comprehensive, and politically transformational way. 
                                                 
3 NATO is also often referred to as the ―Alliance‖. Both terms will be used synonymously in this article. Ryan C. 
Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of  NATO's Death," Parameter (Spring 2007): 101-104, 112. See also Lawrence S. 
Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of  an Alliance (London: Praeger, 2004), 13, 31-34, 91-94.  
 
4 NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (April 24, 1999), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed April 26, 2011). 
 
5 NATO, Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) Overview (December 1999), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9912-
hq/fs-dci99.htm (accessed April 26, 2011). 
 
6 NATO, Prague Summit Declaration (Brussels, 21 November 2002): 1, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm 
(accessed 20 April 2010). 
 
7 Sally McNamara, NATO Summit 2010: Time to Turn Words into Action (Backgrounder No. 2498, Washington D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation, 2010), 8. Carl W. Ek, NATO's Prague Capability Commitment, CRS Report for Congress (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1-6. NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance (Brussels, 29 November 2009), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm (accessed 5 September 2010). Mats Berdal, and David Ucko, "NATO 
at 60," Survival (Mai 2009): 60. 
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 European Integration in Security and Defense 
During the Cold War, the primary focus of  European integration lay on economic integration and 
economic cooperation through a common European market within the European Communities. In 
1992, the Treaty of  Maastricht merged these Communities into the European Union and expanded 
the level of  cooperation among the members including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Given the ongoing NATO transformation process triggered by the Balkan Wars, the EU also chose 
to rethink its approach towards crisis management. This led to revived interest in the idea of  a 
European Common Defense concept.8 
NATO‘s intervention in Bosnia revealed a huge imbalance between European and US military 
capabilities and led to the creation of  a European pillar within the NATO framework, known as the 
European Security Defense Initiative. This approach, favored by US President Clinton‘s 
administration, implied that any political decision on European defense cooperation would always 
require de facto US approval. The initially hesitant US attitude towards an engagement in the 
Kosovo conflict in 1998 again demonstrated the inability of  European countries to provide security 
in Europe and convinced European powers to create a European Defense within the EU rather than 
within NATO.9 Consequently, the British-Franco Saint Malo initiative of  1998 proposed that the EU 
should handle Europe‘s joint defense and that European countries should correct imbalances in 
Euro-American security cooperation. The initiative is often referred to as the ―birth certificate‖ of  
the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).10 This development raised serious questions 
among non-EU NATO members, particularly because of  fears that CSDP would duplicate NATO 
assets, discriminate against non-EU NATO members, and decouple the United States from Europe. 
Hence, the Prime Minister of  the United Kingdom (UK), Tony Blair, reaffirmed CSDP‘s limitation 
to peacekeeping missions, particularly ―where NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged.‖11 With 
                                                 
8 The forming of  the Western European Union was the ―first attempt at a common European defense alliance.‖ 
However, the organization was soon marginalized due to the founding of  NATO. The Western European Union 
nevertheless existed until 30 June 2011. The second attempt to integrate in the field of  security and defense was the 
French proposal of  a European Defense Community. The treaty failed to come into effect in 1954, mainly because of   
France‘s fears that such an agreement would threaten its national sovereignty. Margarita Mathiopoulos and István 
Gyarmati, ―Saint Malo and Beyond–Toward European Defense,‖ Washington Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 65. 
GlobalSecurity.org, European Defence Community (EDC) (July 09, 2011), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/edc.htm (accessed August 17, 2011). 
 
9 The Kosovo conflict was one major contributing factor to the British shift in attitude towards European Defense 
within the EU rather than the European Security Defense Initiative within NATO (the St. Malo initiative), particularly if  
the US does not want to be engaged. Europa, European Security Defense Identity (2010), 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_identity_en.htm (accessed April 26, 2011). 
Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 66, 68. 
 
10 The EU officially introduced CSDP – originally referred to as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – during 
the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999. Asle Toje, The EU, NATO and European Defence–A Slow Train Coming 
(Occasional Paper, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 11. LTC (GS) Peter Fischer, European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) After Ten years—Current Situation and Perspectives (Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
School of  Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 7. 
 
11 Secretary of  State Madeleine Albright spelled out the US concerns and the US policy towards CSDP using the ―three 
Ds‖ and Donald Rumsfeld repeated this warning addressing the Munich Conference on Security in 2001, expressing US 
policy-makers‘ and defense experts‘ skepticism regarding the value of  CSDP. Fischer, 13. Kori Schake, Constructive 
Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on US Military Assets (Working Paper, London: Center For European Reform, 2002), 5. 
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these peacekeeping missions, Blair referred to the Petersberg Tasks that the EU had already adopted 
in 1997. The Union later extended these tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military 
advice and assistance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization.12 To fulfill the Petersberg 
Tasks, the member states of  the EU needed to transform their militaries and to gain access to the 
military planning capabilities and forces of  NATO to avoid unnecessary duplications. To meet these 
two requirements, the EU adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal of  1999 and the ―Berlin Plus‖ 
agreements in 2002.13 The Helsinki Headline Goal, later transferred into the Headline Goal 2010, set 
out a general capability requirement with the objective to hold a corps size force of  50,000-60,000 
deployable within 60 days with the ability to sustain them for at least one year. Subsequent analysis 
identified five key shortfalls in European military capabilities: strategic and tactical airlift; 
sustainability and logistics (including air-to-air refueling); effective engagement technologies 
including precision weapons; rescue helicopters; and Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems.14 
The rapid development potential within CSDP motivated EU member states to create an EU 
Security Strategy for cooperative defense.  This set for the first time a policy framework for CSDP, 
which led to the adoption of  the Headline Goal 2010, and introduced the European Battle Group 
concept.15 This should enable the EU to contribute more visibly to external security and to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 Initially, the Ministerial Council of  the Western European Union introduced the Petersberg Tasks in June 1992, which 
comprised humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management 
(including peacemaking). The EU adopted these tasks from the Western European Union by the Treaty of  Amsterdam 
of  1997, amending the Maastricht Treaty. The extension of  the Petersberg Tasks goes back to a report of  Michael 
Barnier, who suggested creating a European Civil Protection Force in 2002. Assembly of  Western European Union, 
"Security and Defence Aspects of  the Lisbon Reform Treaty," Europa Varietas Institute (January 31, 2008): 2-3, 
http://europavarietas.visuart.eu/files/combarieulisbonneen.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). Julian Heß, Das Verhältnis von 
NATO und EU–Eine Analyse unter Berücksichtigung des Lissabonner Reformvertrages (Munich: AVM-Verlag, 2009), 4. Martin 
Reichard, The EU-NATO Relationship–A Legal and Political Perspective (UK, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 73. European 
Union, Consolidated Version of  the Treaty on European Union, (May 09, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF (accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
13 Berlin Plus has its roots in the ―Berlin Agreement‖ that allowed European countries already limited access to NATO 
planning capabilities as part of  the European Security Defense Initiative. NATO, Final Communiqué (June 03, 1996), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed April 30, 2011). Javier Solana, "Remarks by Javier Solana, 
EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy following the agreement on the establishment of  
EU-NATO permanent arrangements," Consilium (December 16, 2002), 1, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-
%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
14 European Council, "Annex IV of  the Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council," Consilium (December 10-
11, 1999): 5, 9-11, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-
%20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). European Parliament, 
"The European Security and Defence Policy: from the Helsinki Headline Goal to the EU Battlegroups," The European 
Parliament (September 12, 2006): 4, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede030909noteesdp_/sede030909noteesd
p_en.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). European Union, "The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell," 
Consilium (February 2005): 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf  (accessed April 30, 
2011). 
 
15 A Battle Group is a combined arms battalion of  approximately 1,500 troops; reinforced with combat support 
elements, and associated with a Force Headquarters as well as pre-identified transport and logistics elements; deployable 
within fifteen days; and sustainable for 120 days. Ibid., European Council, "Headline Goal 2010," Consilium (June 17-18, 
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transform European forces more rapidly. To avoid duplicating NATO‘s command structure, the 
member states of  Alliance and the EU also agreed on the Berlin Plus agreement, which granted the 
EU access to military planning capabilities and enabled the EU to lead military missions.16 With 
regard to the EU‘s goal of  more effective crisis management, CSDP also needed to include civilian 
capabilities and effective structures to lead operations following a comprehensive approach. From 
May 2000, the EU thus started to create the structures to plan and coordinate civilian crisis 
management and to deploy civilian capabilities of  its members.17 The last step in European 
integration marked the Lisbon Treaty, established in December 2009. Its impact on CSDP made the 
three-pillar model obsolete, which has described the functioning of  the EU until 2009.18 The 
significant progress in CSDP and the ongoing transformation in NATO increased the need to 
improve the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty in Light of  NATO-EU Relations 
NATO and the EU are founded on common values and strategic interests, particularly in the fields 
of  security, defense, and crisis management. NATO and the EU‘s cooperation are primarily directed 
at supporting the fight against terrorism, strengthening the development of  coherent and mutually 
reinforcing military capabilities, and cooperating in the field of  civil emergency planning. From a 
NATO perspective, there is no doubt that a ―stronger EU will further contribute to our common 
security.‖19 NATO strives for improvements in the strategic partnership with the EU, which can be 
summarized by the following four premises: closer cooperation, higher transparency, greater 
efficiency, and continual autonomy.20 To achieve a closer cooperation and higher transparency, 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004): 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf  (accessed April 30, 
2011). 
 
16 The agreement of  2002 determined the EU-NATO framework for permanent relations. Operation Althea in Bosnia 
Herzegovina was the first mission in which the EU accessed NATO command structures under Berlin Plus. Before the 
EU could take over the mission from NATO, the member states had to agree on the terms, which proved to be difficult 
due to the Turkish-Greek conflict on Cyprus. This dispute resulted in three years of  difficulty negotiations before Berlin 
Plus became eventually effective on 17 March 2003. Solana, 1. Council of  the European Union. "Presidency 
Conclusions," Institute of  European Integration and Policy, (October 24-25, 2002), 17, http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr/cn-
Brussels%20Octob%202002.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). Reichard, 284, 286, 287. 
 
17 Andreas Winter, ―The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for the CSDP in the Light of  the Emerging Strategic 
Partnership Between NATO and the EU‖ (Master‘s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff  
College, 2010), 38-43. Manfred Lange, ―Militärische Aspekte der ESVP aus der Perspektive des deutschen EU-
Vorsitzes,‖ Militärische Aspekte der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Lichte der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft (Michael 
Staack (ed.), WIFIS No 26, 2008), 20.  
 
18 From 1992 until 2009, the ―three pillar model‖ explained best the functioning of  the EU. Supranational treaties (the 
original European Communities) characterized the first and strongest pillar. The second and third pillars represented the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs (transferred into Police and Judicial Co-
operation on Criminal Matters by the Treaty of  Amsterdam in 1997). 
 
19 NATO, Riga Summit Declaration (Brussels, 29 November 2006): paragraph 41, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed 5 September 2010). 
 
20 Ibid. NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration (Brussels, 3 April 2008): paragraph 14, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 18 September 2010). NATO, Strasbourg/Kehl 
Summit Declaration, (Brussels, 4 April 2009): paragraph 20, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 9 August 2010). 
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NATO took various initiatives within the NATO-EU Capability Group—a forum established in 
2003 to allow formal coordination between both organizations besides the existing informal NATO-
EU staff-to-staff  dialogue.21 To achieve greater efficiency in NATO operations, the Alliance also 
agreed to integrate civilian public service planners (e.g., police) into the planning and conduct of  
military operations, following the idea of  a ―comprehensive approach‖ for conflict resolution. 
Considering the scarce resources of  its members, NATO cannot afford to develop its own civilian 
capabilities and thus relies on cooperation in this field with other organizations, namely the EU.22 
Avoiding unnecessary duplications would also allow greater efficiency to get more (capabilities) out 
of  less (resources). Particularly, NATO encourages nations to re-prioritize financial resources, 
―including through pooling and other forms of  bilateral or multilateral cooperation.‖23 However, 
two major political obstacles prevent closer cooperation, higher transparency, and greater efficiency 
between NATO and the EU. First, France and the UK differ substantially in their political end state 
of  CSDP and the question of  how to progressively carry forward European integration in the 
defense sector. Second, the Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus blocks effective cooperation within 
the NATO-EU Capability Group. The missing  security agreement between the EU and NATO 
allows Turkey to block cooperation with Cyprus. In return, Cyprus and Greece oppose Turkey 
having closer relationships with the EU, particularly through administrative arrangements with the 
European Defense Agency (EDA), which hinders effective cooperation between NATO and the 
EDA. Those political obstacles have a huge impact on NATO who is struggling to define how the 
Alliance wants to achieve an effective strategic partnership with the EU, how to achieve greater 
transparency in its relations with the EU, and how CSDP could effectively contribute to NATO‘s 
missions and vice versa. Particularly, this materializes in sharing information and intelligence in such 
missions, the development and employment of  military and civilian capabilities, and the overcoming 
of  the highly fragmentized European industrial defense market, which is a major factor in military 
capability shortfalls of  European countries.24 
The Lisbon Treaty and CSDP 
The effect of  the Lisbon Treaty on the EU, and in particular, on the Union‘s CSDP is considerable. 
The changes concern three areas: the strategic goal and orientation of  CSDP, the modification of  
institutional structures responsible for carrying out CSDP, and the procedures for future capability 
development under the head of  EDA.25 The modified strategic goal for CSDP is a continuation of  
the provisions of  the European Security Strategy, which aimed at strengthening ―mutual solidarity of 
the EU [to make the EU] a more credible and effective actor.‖26 This will eventually lead to a 
common defense and solidarity among EU member states in case of an armed attack, a natural 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21 Paul Sturm, ―NATO and the EU: Cooperation?‖ European Security Review No. 48 (February 2010): 1, http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_445_eu-nato-capabilities.pdf  (accessed 20 September 2010). 
 
22 NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance, paragraph 7e. 
 
23 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
 
24 Winter, 55, 61-62, 90-91. 
 
25 For a more detailed assessment of  the changes of  the Lisbon Treaty: Winter, 62-73. European Union, Treaty of  
Lisbon–Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Brussels, 3 December 
2007), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf  (accessed 20 September 2010). 
26 European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World–European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12 December 2003): 1, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  (accessed 11 September 2010). 
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disaster, or a man-made accident. Additionally, the EU also adopted the extended Petersberg Tasks 
for CSDP from the Western European Union, which now include ―joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of  combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilization.‖27 
The major changes to the institutional structures and main decision making bodies responsible for 
implementing CSDP impact various areas. First, the Treaty establishes the European Council as an 
official institution, which is now chaired by a long term and full-time President in contrast to the 
former six month rotation cycle of  the Presidency. Second, the treaty adapted the office of  the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR) and, third, establishes the European 
External Action Service as a diplomatic service of  the EU.28 With this step, the EU merges two 
former areas of  EU foreign relations and takes the next step towards more coherent and consistent 
external relations. The bureau of  the HR is in fact a new and independent office, which now 
coordinates and conducts CSDP as a link between the Council of  the EU.  The European 
Commission now also serves as head of  the European External Action Service, and as president of  
the EDA. Lastly, the EU integrates EU civilian and crisis management structures at the strategic 
planning level introducing the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).29 The 
directorate will streamline existing structures responsible for civilian crisis management, will unify 
civilian and military planning at the strategic level as integral part of  EEAS, and will serve as the 
highest institution of  civilian crisis management planning within the EU.30 
The treaty also officially introduces Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense (PSCD) as a tool 
to foster the military capacity of  its member states and to harmonize, pool, and specialize military 
needs, means and capabilities – including higher cooperation in the fields of  training and logistics, 
particularly through EDA. The Lisbon Treaty elevated the EDA from Joint Action to Treaty level, 
which provides a much firmer legal base to work from and clarifies existing practices in armament 
cooperation. EDA is now an official part of  CSDP and–under the direction of  the HR–identifies 
                                                 
27 After the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the Western European Union treaty was terminated in 2010 and the 
organization ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. The extended Petersberg Tasks can be executed within the Union 
framework only by a group of  member states, ―which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task.‖ 
Western European Union, Western European Union (Brussels, 27 May 2011), http://www.weu.int/ (accessed 28 November 
2011). European Union, Treaty of  Lisbon–Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (Brussels, 3 December 2007): 47, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf  
(accessed 20 September 2010). 
 
28 The EU also renamed the post to ―High Representative of  the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.‖ 
 
29 Although not introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, CMPD is very important for gaining a better understanding of  the 
Treaty‘s impact adapting its institutional level. European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Statement on Civilian-Military 
Integration in European Security and Defence Policy (Brussels, 6 January 2009): 8, and 14, 
http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLO_Statement.pdf  (accessed 21 June 2010). 
 
30 Carmen Gebhard, ―The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct 
Capacities,‖ CFSP Forum Vol. 7, No. 4 (Vienna, Institute for Advanced Studies, July 2009): 8, 
http://carmengebhard.com/CFSP_Forum_vol_7_no_4_Gebhard.pdf  (accessed 3 July 2010). 
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operational requirements and implements any measures needed to strengthen a competitive 
European defense market and a strong European industrial base.31 
 
The Lisbon Treaty and its Effects on the NATO-EU Relationship 
The Lisbon Treaty constitutes a very important juncture for CSDP and its strategic orientation, even 
though the Treaty does not resolve the Union‘s lack of  strategic culture. First, by unifying the EC 
and the EU, the EU undoubtedly assumes a single legal personality, which strengthens the 
organization‘s position in negotiating international agreements (the treaty making power) using its 
entire means. It also allows the Union to establish bilateral diplomatic relations with international 
actors, by speaking and acting as one body. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty provides a possible end 
state for CSDP (mutual defense), amends its spectrum of  future missions (the extended Petersberg 
Tasks), and specifies its strategic vision of  a ―more active, more coherent, and more capable‖ 
Union.32 
Despite these important strategic effects on the EU, it is equally important to address remaining 
shortcomings in European strategy development. The EU has not initiated a continuous progression 
in its strategic thinking, even though it is already demanded by the EU Security Strategy and 
suggested by a variety of  international scholars. The absence of  corresponding objectives for the 
Union‘s political, diplomatic, military, civilian, and trade and development activities actually fosters 
internal disputes and internal division about strategic objectives and priorities, which leads to EU 
actions that appear unpredictable and weak to external actors.33 However, the Lisbon Treaty as a 
next step towards higher integration in the European defense sector would address all of  the 
shortfalls in European strategic development.34 
 
Mutual Defense and the Solidarity Clause 
At first glance, the intent of  mutual defense duplicates NATO‘s role of  providing a common 
defense of  member states. This would be contradictory to achieving a complementary relationship 
and probably promote competition between both organizations. However, for the EU to act as 
                                                 
31 Jean-Pierre Darnis et. Al., Lessons Learned from European Defence Equipment Programmes, Occasional Paper (Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 18. Ibid., 89. European Union, Treaty of  Lisbon–Amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 46. 
 
32 European Union, Treaty of  Lisbon–Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 11. Klaus Olshausen, ―Zehn Jahre Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,‖ Der Mittler-Brief 24. Jg 
(Herford, 2009), 5-6. Lange, 17. Sven Biscop, ―A ‗European Army‘ for the EU and NATO?‖ Egmont Paper (Brussels: 
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another provider of  collective defense is questionable for two reasons. First, the Lisbon Treaty 
explicitly defines NATO‘s primacy in this regard. The Treaty clearly states that the EU respects ―the 
obligations of  certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in [NATO]‖ and 
that its policy will ―be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within 
that framework.‖ 35 Second, the EU‘s six neutral Member States do not indicate any intent to change 
their distinct national defense policies of  not participating in a CSDP.  In practice, this means that 
the EU will not be able to organize its military forces for a territorial defense. Given NATO‘s and 
the EU‘s similar threat assessment, such an attempt would also be unnecessary and redundant. 
However, the solidarity clause might have important legal implications for the Union, for instance, in 
case of  a terrorist attack. Meeting such threats remains vital for the EU, especially in conjunction 
with proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction. Mutual defense may allow the EU to use military 
force internally to meet such threats and their consequences, including natural disasters, man-made 
accidents, or collapses of  supply networks and communications. The mutual defense clause may also 
help to overcome the wide array of  national caveats on the use of  military forces inside the EU, and 
signals that solely nationalistic approaches in defense planning of  its members are no longer 
feasible.36 
In light of  these reasons, the mutual defense clause is not directed to duplicate NATO‘s role and will 
certainly not promote competition between NATO and the EU. The legal and secondary 
implications of  the clause could actually encourage EU Member States to focus on streamlining 
capability planning under the head of  the EU. As long as this is in line with NATO capability 
planning, this could have positive effects for the Alliance as well. In this sense, the mutual defense 
clause could even promote a complementary partnership between both organizations, if  the EU 
does not decide to decouple military defense planning from NATO‘s procedures and if  the 
organization translates the political goal of  common defense in operational terms. This emphasizes 
the need for NATO and the EU to strengthen cooperation through regular consultation, highlights 
that political consensus within the EU is required to shape CSDP more progressively in the future, 
and raises the question of  how cooperation with NATO should be institutionalized.37 
 
The Extended Petersberg Tasks 
In adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks for CSDP, the EU partly took over tasks, such as 
providing military advice, military assistance, and conflict prevention. Since 1994, these tasks were 
already fulfilled by NATO‘s Partnership for Peace program. This creates an overlap in tasks between 
NATO and the EU, but does not necessarily lead to competition between both organizations. The 
credo of  Berlin Plus – to launch EU-led operations only ―where NATO as a whole is not engaged‖– 
still determines whether the EU can actually fulfill these tasks. 38 EU-led operations such as 
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CONCORDIA in Macedonia (completed on 15 December 2003) and EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia 
(still ongoing) have shown that the agreement can be successfully achieved, enabling the EU to act. 
In both operations, NATO‘s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe acted as Operational 
Commander for the EU and the Union launched its missions following a terminated NATO mission 
(e.g., ALLIED HARMONY and SFOR).39 In contrast, the duplication of  tasks can also lead to 
negative examples, such as, the ―beauty contest‖ between NATO and the EU over West Sudan. Both 
organizations were divided due to a US-French argument about the question of  whether NATO or 
the EU was supposed to lead management of  the crisis. Another example is Operation ARTEMIS, 
launched in 2003 to stabilize conflict areas in the Democratic Republic of  Congo. The EU was able 
to deploy military forces without NATO support utilizing Berlin Plus. This was an important 
accomplishment for the EU, but simultaneously raised annoyance among some NATO Members 
because of  the EU's lack of  consultation with the Alliance.40 
Adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks neither promotes a complementary relationship between 
both organizations nor does it increase competition. Like the mutual defense clause, the actual 
utilization of  a task and its perception will depend upon communication and consultation between 
NATO and the EU. This underlines how important it is for NATO and the EU to agree upon a 
standard protocol in this regard and to institutionalize their cooperation. 
 
Adapted Institutions and their Effects for a Strategic Partnership 
The officially introduced European Council, the widely adapted tasks and responsibilities of  the HR, 
and the newly introduced EEAS are remarkable amendments in the EU‘s institutional framing and 
exercising of  CSDP. With the introduction of  CMPD and the streamlining of  its civilian crisis 
management institutions, these changes will have significant effects for the future of  the EU and its 
relations with NATO. 
 
The European Council as a Intergovernmental Institution 
Officially introducing the European Council and its new presidency as the main body responsible 
for developing general guidelines and strategic lines for CSDP strengthens the intergovernmental 
character of  CSDP.41 The Lisbon Treaty underlines that the principle of  unanimity as a cornerstone 
of  security and defense cooperation in the EU will remain, although qualified majority voting applies 
for some areas of  CSDP. This has positive and negative aspects for CSDP. On the one hand, 
decisions that require consensus among the EU‘s members send a strong and firm internal and 
external message demonstrating the EU‘s determination to act. On the other hand, unanimity gives 
member states the power to block decisions that a vast majority might want to take. This hampers 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
39 CONCORDIA and EUFOR ALTHEA were actually the only missions conducted under Berlin Plus. Ibid., 1. 
 
40 Stephen F. Larrabee, ―The United States and the Evolution of  ESDP,‖ What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020? 
(Paris: Rand Cooperation, 2009): 50, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1404.pdf  (accessed 21 
August 2010). LTC (GS) Peter Fischer, ―European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) After Ten years-Current 
Situation and Perspectives‖ (Monograph, School of  Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010):, 27-28. 
 
41 Guérot, 41. 
 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 76
the EU in carrying out CSDP more progressively.42 There is, nevertheless, a good chance that 
political issues between the Member States could be mitigated through the HR, the EEAS, and the 
EDA and that CSDP will be more capable in the future.43 However, progress in this field will 
continue to be slow and will remain dependent on bottom-up initiatives. 
Inter-governmentalism for CSDP neither fosters nor hampers a complementary relationship 
between NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, there are risks that existing political issues between EU 
Members as well as between EU and non-EU Members may become institutionalized, which will 
prevent a strategic partnership. On the one hand, the EU‘s definition of  national security as the sole 
responsibility of  individual Members also undermines the organization‘s attempt to create common 
security. This reduces the power of  its adapted institutions and creates obstacles to aligning military 
and civilian capabilities as well as in creating a competitively viable European industrial defense base. 
On the other hand, the Treaty explicitly provides possibilities to delegate specific defense policy 
tasks and functions to a group of  states. This mitigates the risks of  internal issues for the conduct 
of  CSDP and can lead to multinational cooperation between willing and more capable EU Member 
States. In view of  capability development and a strategic partnership with NATO, this can only be 
appreciated. 
 
The New HR and the EEAS as ―Foreign Ministry‖ of  the EU 
The most prominent and probably most important institutional amendments by the Lisbon Treaty 
are the ―new‖ HR and the introduction of  a diplomatic service for the Union. The office of  the HR 
was clearly strengthened and can – in tandem with the EEAS – function as a ―transmission belt for 
national foreign policy goals, which the smaller member states in particular stand to profit from,‖ 
while the EEAS could benefit from the nations‘ experiences, networks, and traditions.44 Both the 
HR and the EEAS as a single structure have great potential to bring external actions and foreign 
policies of  the EU together. Due to the diversity of  national interests of  its Members, this will 
probably not lead to a unified face in foreign policy for the Union in the intermediate term. 
However, by merging formerly divided responsibilities and fragmented competencies, the HR will 
ensure much more consistency and coherence within the EU regarding foreign policy and will have 
the formal right to initiate proposals regarding CSDP. 
Of  critical importance is the HR‘s central role between the European Commission, the Council, the 
European Council, and the EDA. These links provide the HR the possibility of  exercising CSDP 
more consistently and coherently – from initiating political objectives down to promoting 
multinational cooperation in capability development. The EEAS, directly supporting the HR, will 
facilitate its work and further consolidate the ties to the main decision making bodies of  the EU. 
With this, the HR and EEAS can significantly affect and effectively conduct CSDP within the 
framework of  the other EU institutions. 
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In view of  a complementary relationship with NATO, the HR and the EEAS are likely to play a 
significant role as well. Unifying responsibilities in the two offices will contribute significantly to 
more coherence and transparency in all fields of  CSDP. Thus, the modifications are likely to have a 
positive effect creating greater transparency and establishing closer cooperation between both 
organizations – two of  NATO Members‘ main goals in CSDP. However, to what extent the new 
Foreign Minister of  the EU will actually shape CSDP will depend mainly on the personalities 
exercising the adapted post. In this regard, the ―grotesque dispute over personnel‖45 in appointing 
the first HR for the EU dampens hope that the Member States fully recognize the importance and 
the chances the HR and the EEAS create for the EU and NATO. 
 
Integrating and Streamlining Civilian Crisis Management Planning 
With the introduction of  CMPD, the EU reduces the fragmentation of  civilian-military crisis 
management planning capacities at the political level, provides a more coherent and efficient 
capability for the HR and the EEAS to exercise their responsibilities, and institutionalizes the 
comprehensive approach to strategic level planning. The creation of  CMPD is a result of  the 
suboptimal civil-military planning cell in the European Union Military Staff, which failed to ―act as a 
‗system integrator‘ that would unify the civilian and the military strand of  [CSDP].‖46 In conjunction 
with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, CMPD is the attempt to increase effectiveness, 
coherence, and efficiency of  planning and execution procedures for civilian crisis management 
operations and to establish a civilian counterpart to the strategic military chain of  command within 
CSDP. 
Streamlining its civilian crisis management institutions enables the EU to apply a comprehensive 
approach at the strategic level and will contribute to more efficiency and coherence in CSDP. This 
capability has the potential to benefit a complementary relationship between NATO and the EU, if  
both organizations link their strategic planning capabilities. Yet again, this calls for institutionalized 
coordination and cooperation between both organizations. 
 
Berlin Plus as a Framework for a Successful Comprehensive Approach? 
At this point, it does make sense to briefly reflect on the EU‘s existing procedures to apply its means 
in a comprehensive approach as introduced earlier. As shown, the provisions of  the Lisbon Treaty 
integrate permanent military and civilian planning capabilities on the strategic level of  CSDP. 
However, the EU does not possess the capabilities to actually plan and lead a military operation on 
the highest military level. For its civilian operations, the Union can rely on ad hoc structures to form 
an Operational and Force Headquarters. However, to utilize a comprehensive approach in crisis 
management, the EU relies on the Berlin Plus agreements for operating military command 
structures.  
The Lisbon Treaty does not provide specific provisions for accessing non-inherent capabilities and 
using them in a comprehensive approach in crisis management operations. The EU still depends on 
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Berlin Plus, which has been successfully utilized in the past. However, cooperation under Berlin Plus 
is continuously overshadowed by the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece conflict and their competing national 
interests and objects  on how to shape CSDP. Thus, a strategic and complementary relationship 
between NATO and the EU is unachievable under Berlin Plus. 
 
The effects of  the Lisbon Treaty on Capability Development 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense for a More Flexible and Capable CSDP 
The Lisbon Treaty's most important, innovative, and ambitious amendment is certainly the 
introduction of  PSCD as a tool to deepen the cooperation of  its Member States in various areas of  
CSDP.  PSCD seems indeed to be the Union‘s solution for this issue.47 Key provisions of  the PSCD 
are the prerequisites it demands of  a nation to join, as well as the measures to assess progress and 
the ability to suspend a participating country that fails to meet these standards. Although initially 
high standards were set, proposed prerequisites to join a PSCD were soon lowered on behalf  of  
smaller countries during the Treaty text negotiations, which virtually eliminated any discriminator to 
join.48 However, this will not likely have any serious consequence, because PSCD must be inclusive 
in order to avoid a division of  the EU concerning defense cooperation, and to increase political 
coherence in security matters. On the other hand, too many participants would pose the risk of  
slowing down the pace of  planning and executing a PSCD. Thus, only the right balance of  a critical 
mass of  member states will make PSCD an effective tool.49 
EDA will have to play a major role in creating future concrete criteria to assess the progress of  a 
PSCD.  Assessment criteria will also have to include proposals on how to suspend a country from 
cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty does provide the theoretical conditions to do this; whether the EU 
will be able to achieve this in practice remains uncertain. This also applies to the question of  
whether a PSCD can be established if  it violates particular interests of  another EU Member State.50 
PSCD does have the potential to generate a top-down approach in CSDP and to accelerate 
capability development for the Union. However, it is not the ―silver bullet‖ for solving the EU‘s 
problems.51 
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The introduction of  PSCD clearly favors NATO Members‘ interests in achieving higher efficiency 
in capability development and thus promotes a complementary relationship between both 
organizations. The Protocol explicitly aims at increasing the deployability of  European forces and at 
reducing military capability redundancies among EU countries. With this aim, the Lisbon Treaty 
implements a concept that could open new possibilities in strategic NATO-EU cooperation, 
particularly in armament cooperation. 
 
EDA as an Official Organization of  the EU 
Introducing EDA as an official organization of  the EU has the potential to be the most significant 
change resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. Although at first glance unimposing, associating the EDA 
with the HR and integrating it in CSDP will offer a significant number of  possibilities in three 
interacting areas: harmonizing, specializing and pooling of  European military forces, overcoming the 
fragmented European defense market, and the proactive framing of  multinational armament 
cooperation. 
In the first area, the range of  possibilities is certainly immense but at the same time hindered by the 
most significant political obstacles. Abandoning certain military capabilities to focus on niche 
capabilities and specialization does increase political interdependence among collaborating nations 
and can lead – in the worst case – to an inability to employ viable military force. This narrows the 
scope of  cooperation mainly to pooling of  non-expeditionary forces, the alignment of  military 
doctrine and concepts, and the standardization of  equipment and logistics. A first positive example 
of  successful harmonization and pooling of  capabilities is the European Air Transportation 
Command. With, continuously decreasing military budgets and constant high political ambitions, 
such harmonization, specialization, and pooling of  military forces are likely to increase.52 At the 
strategic level, EDA will play a central role in this regard. 
In the second and third areas, EDA has a great chance of  accomplishing short-term objectives, 
although significant political obstacles exist in these areas as well. The major reason for the 
increasing capability gap between European and US forces lies in the relatively high costs European 
countries have to bear for research, experimentation, and development, and not primarily in a lack 
of  budgets and spending.53 The disproportional costs result from highly fragmented national defense 
programs, which also diminish military interoperability and further consolidate the already 
fragmented industrial base for defense equipment in Europe.54 Here, the primary political obstacles 
are various degrees of  government-industry relations among EU countries and unresolved questions 
of  the ownership of  intellectual property rights of  developed technology.55 With a high redundancy 
of  industrial skills on the national level, countries seek to run their own research and development 
programs. Elevated to Treaty level and under the direct lead of  the HR, the EDA is in the right 
position to address those issues and to overcome protectionism among member states‘ defense 
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markets.56 As such, the EDA will probably perform first the management and coordination tasks. 
Linked by the HR to the EU‘s main decision bodies, EDA can play a central role initiating such 
cooperation and utilizing PSCD as a tool to facilitate progress and to overcome political obstacles. 
EDA is likely to play a crucial role in the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, 
particularly in the field of  capability development. Embedding EDA in CSDP under the HR, the 
EU has taken significant steps clearly directed towards a more capable and deployable European 
force. More harmonized, specialized and pooled European military forces, a competitive defense 
market, and more multinational cooperation will most certainly lead to an increase of  deployable 
military capabilities in Europe. Furthermore, EDA provides NATO with a single point of  contact to 
discuss and to align military capability development programs. This is in the Alliance Members‘ best 
interests. However, limiting EDA to EU‘s Members does exclude non-EU countries, such as Turkey, 
from participation. With a view on the Cyprus conflict, this appears counterproductive to efforts to 
resolve strategic issues between NATO and the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
In implementing the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is undertaking the necessary steps to strengthen CSDP. 
The treaty aligns and harmonizes the institutions and procedures in CSDP and provides a fertile 
framework for future military capability development. That does not mean that the Treaty resolves 
every shortcoming in CSDP and that all provisions are directed towards a complementary 
relationship with NATO. This would be beyond rational expectations.  
On the strategic level, the main political obstacle for a true strategic partnership between NATO and 
the EU remains the unresolved Turkey-Greece-Cyprus conflict. The resulting strategic stalemate 
denies the EU the ability to develop a more coherent CSDP, prevents effective NATO-EU 
cooperation, and hampers military capability development through EDA. Furthermore, the 
strengthening of  the intergovernmental character of  CSDP dampens the hopes for the development 
of  an inherent strategic culture, which would allow the EU to operationalize the EU Security 
Strategy into a civil-military strategy for CSDP. The limited political coherence yet denies the EU 
developing a strategic frame that explains the rationale behind the Lisbon Treaty‘s amendments and 
raises questions of  how integration in foreign relations and the defense sector should go forward. 
Despite those limitations, one must acknowledge that Lisbon Treaty‘s mutual defense clause and the 
extended Petersberg Tasks do not aim at replacing the Alliance‘s role and have rather a high potential 
to promote a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU through its significantly adapted 
institutional structures. The most significant effects of  the Treaty are its provisions regarding the 
EU‘s institutions that deal with CSDP. These provisions will enable the Union to establish a strategic 
partnership with NATO. However, the changes also have the potential to reinforce already existing 
political obstacles within the EU as well as the NATO-EU relationship. First, by introducing the 
European Council as an official institution the EU strengthens the intergovernmental character of  
CSDP and provides an anchor for its Members to oppose further integration as well as block 
important decisions. This decreases the chances for establishing a supranational CSDP and 
continues to limit EU‘s capabilities to the least common denominator. However, by introducing the 
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HR, the EEAS, the CMPD, and the PSCD, the EU is undertaking innovative and ambitious steps to 
increase transparency, coherence, and efficiency of  CSDP. The HR and the EEAS have the potential 
to be the driving forces in CSDP and to strengthen the interconnection with NATO towards a 
complementary partnership.  
The introduction of  the PSCD provides the EU an appropriate tool to overcome member state 
dissention over CSDP and clearly facilitates military capability development through multinational 
cooperation of  those Members who are willing and capable to do so. Streamlined strategic planning, 
operational capability, and the EU‘s ability to apply a comprehensive approach in strategic crisis 
management planning, offer opportunities for future cooperation with NATO. All these changes are 
in the best interests of  NATO and EU Members, if  the EU takes appropriate steps to link its 
institutions, procedures, and planning capabilities to NATO. It will require significant political effort 
of  major state players of  both organizations to mitigate the inertia caused by the unresolved Turkey-
Greece-Cyprus conflict. 
With regard to military capability development, the Treaty introduces EDA as an official institution 
and embeds the Agency in CSDP appropriately. The agency has the potential of  being a cornerstone 
in future NATO-EU relations and cooperation between both organizations in capability 
development. This is in the best interests of  NATO Members, particularly the US. However, limiting 
EDA for EU Member States institutionalizes existing political issues and hampers progress. Overall, 
the Lisbon Treaty creates the necessary institutional prerequisites for successful capability 
development among EU Member States and promotes a complementary relationship between 
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